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This dissertation seeks to demonstrate civic activism among rural communities in Indonesia and 
how they can obtain their policy of interest – two main features that build rural political agency. 
It emphasizes on rural participation in Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs), popular 
community-based farmer organizations, which have proliferated over the last decade. Two 
research questions guide this project: (1) What are the conditions that explain rural participation 
in RPOs in Indonesia? and (2) What are the effects of this participation on the political agency 
of rural communities?. Using a mixed-method approach that consists of original survey analysis, 
interviews, and quantitative analysis, this dissertation found that exposure to trade openness 
provides the primary motivation for rural communities to join an RPO, as they desire to stay 
competitive in the globalized market. The dissertation further explores how membership in RPOs 
promotes not only economic well-being of its members but also rural communities’ involvement 
in political activities, mainly by participating in policymaking discussions. The empirical 
findings suggest that rural participation in RPOs correlates with higher government support, 
although it is still constrained by certain political environment at the local level. The findings in 
this dissertation will help us better understand democracy in developing countries such as 
Indonesia, as nearly three-quarters of its population lives in rural areas and engaging in 
agricultural activities.  
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1.1 Background and Research Questions 
Scholars of democracy have emphasized the importance of civic participation in 
promoting economic prosperity, particularly for the most disadvantaged populations (Putnam, 
2000; Sen, 2000; Gaventa, 2006). With nearly three-quarters of the poor population in 
developing countries living in rural areas and engaging in agricultural activities, understanding 
civic participation in rural agrarian communities should be an integral part of understanding 
democracy in developing countries.  
Small agricultural producers
1
 in developing countries, however, are often considered 
marginalized, both in economic and political terms. They are seen as weak, unable to mobilize, 
and underrepresented in politics (Omamo, 1998; Key et al., 2000; Minot, 2007; Barret, 2008). 
Following Olson (1968), the conventional wisdom is that concentrated interests dominate public 
policy because of their ability to coordinate and solve collective action problems. This is 
contrary to large and diffused groups, such as small agricultural producers, who face many 
market failures such as information asymmetry and limited access to resources. This, coupled 
with their inability to lobby the government, results in agricultural producers being 
underrepresented in politics (Omamo, 1998; Key et al., 2000; Minot, 2007; Barret, 2008). 
Moreover, growing economic liberalization has also further suppressed their role in politics 
because governments opt for efficiency instead of welfare. Developing countries usually exhibit 
                                                             




“urban bias” as they heavily tax and lower the prices of the agricultural sector to support urban 
industrialized constituents that demand cheap products (Lipton 1977, Bates 1981, Bezemer and 
Headey, 2008). This causes high rates of poverty and income inequality in many developing 
countries despite their continued trade and economic growth (Woodward, 1996; Rudra, 2002; 
Williamson, 2011). 
Yet, studies on the existence and role of Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs), popular 
community-based farmers’ organizations, in enhancing the livelihood of small agricultural 
producers have proliferated over the last decade, such as agricultural cooperatives and producer 
associations. These studies show many successful collective action stories of small agricultural 
producers (Berdegue et.al., 2001; Jones 2004; Hellin et al., 2007; Valentinov 2007; Markelova et 
al, 2009; Bernard et al., 2008; Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Shiferaw et al, 2009; Francesconi 
and Heerink 2011; Fischer and Qaim 2011). Because RPOs pool resources and coordinate 
economic activities, they can reduce transaction and production costs of its members. This 
results in increased economies of scale, improved market access, and secured livelihoods for 
members in a growing competitive market.   
Although RPOs focus mainly on economic activities, studies have shown that they are 
also involved in political activities, mainly through their participation in policymaking 
discussions (Ndambo, 2005; Hellin et. al., 2009; Gouët et. al., 2009; Pimbert et. al., 2010). Other 
political activities of RPOs include affiliating with certain political parties and having their 
representatives hold elected office (Swanson, 2006). Scholars and policymakers have therefore 
argued that it is essential for small agricultural producers to work collectively to stay competitive 




Over the past decade, small agricultural producers have consistently increased their 
membership in RPOs in most parts of the world, particularly in developing countries (IFPRI, 
2012). According to the UN's Global Census on Cooperatives (2013), there are about 1.2 million 
agricultural cooperatives, accounting half of the overall cooperatives across the globe. Excluding 
members in farmers’ associations, there are 122 million people in agricultural cooperatives 
around the world. Global comprehensive data on agricultural cooperatives are limited, but some 
information is available about agricultural cooperatives in a few different countries. FAO (2013) 
provides data on the number of agricultural cooperatives and their membership size across 
different countries. For instance, 40 percent of Brazil’s agricultural GDP comes from 
cooperatives; 4 million farmers in Egypt are members of agricultural cooperatives; 924 thousand 
Kenyan coffee farmers are members of cooperatives; 900 thousand Ethiopian coffee farmers are 
members of cooperatives; 12 million Indian dairy farmers are members of cooperatives; and 500 
thousand Columbian coffee farmers are members of cooperatives.  
The significance of RPOs is also evident in Indonesia – the focus of this study – as the 
number of RPOs and its membership total (both agricultural cooperatives and farmer’s 
associations) grew by almost 20 percent between the years 2010 and 2015 (Graph 1.1). In 2015, 
there were about 48 million members of RPOs, which accounted for 25 percent of Indonesia’s 



















Despite these overall positive trends, participation rates in RPOs vary considerably across 
locations as shown in Graph 1.2 below. The graph shows that, in general, rural producers’ 
participation in agricultural cooperatives is higher in developed countries. For example, Japan 
and Korea have a high membership rate of 70 to 90 percent, while countries in Latin America –
such as Colombia and Paraguay – have lower membership rates of 18 and 11 percent 
respectively (International Cooperative Agriculture Organization Statistics, 2017). A more 
interesting observation is that RPO membership also varies considerably across different regions 
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Graph 1.2. Agriculture Cooperative Membership across Countries 
(% of agriculture workers)  
 
 
Source: Multiple sources, including International Cooperative Alliances (ICA) and International 
Cooperative Agricultural Organization (ICAO) 
 
 
Graph 1.3. Indonesia’s RPO Membership across Provinces, 2010 and 2015  
(% of agriculture workers)  
 
 














































































































































































































































































This dissertation seeks to demonstrate how civic activism among rural communities in 
Indonesia shapes the political agency of rural population. By political agency, I refer to rural 
communities’ capacity to participate in matters that concern their well-being and ability to access 
decision-making processes. Because the vast majority of Indonesia’s population live in rural 
areas and are engaged in the agricultural sector, we cannot get the full picture of how 
democratization has changed Indonesian society unless we understand civic participation in rural 
communities. This dissertation is novel in its emphasis on rural producers’ participation in RPOs 
and the ways in which RPOs promote economic welfare and democratic values within rural 
communities. Moreover, this dissertation is motivated by the considerable variation of rural 
producers’ participation in RPOs that exist across sub-national regions of Indonesia. Thus, the 
two research questions that guide this project are: (1) What are the conditions that explain rural  
participation in RPOs in Indonesia? and (2) What are the effects of this participation on the 
political agency of rural communities?   
Using a mixed-method approach that consists of survey analysis, interviews, and 
quantitative analysis, I demonstrate the conditional factors that can affect the level of rural 
producers’ participation in RPOs in a region and how participating in RPO shape the political 
agency of rural communities in Indonesia. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews existing 
literature on the concept of rural political agency, the development and role of RPOs, and 
explanations on the level of RPO participation. Section 1.3 describes the research design, and 






1.2 Literature Review  
1.2.1 Concept of Rural Political Agency 
In this dissertation, rural political agency is defined as both the capacity of rural agrarian 
societies to participate in matters that concern their well-being and access to governance or 
decision-making processes. A succinct justification is given below. 
In sociological terms, the most basic definition of human agency is the capacity of 
humans to take actions towards achieving their aspirations in a particular social structure such as 
within a state, group, or culture (Bennett, 2002)
 2
. Different temporal processes shape this ability. 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) note: “…. human agency is a temporally embedded process of 
social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the 
future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to 
contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).” While 
different structural environments temporally construct human agency, Emirbayer and Mische 
argue that human agency also constructs these structural environments.  
Political agency – human agency in the political realm – consists of different political 
actors’ engagement and their ability to effect change within the political system (Maiguashca and 
Marchetti, 2015; Biekart and Fowler 2008). Particularly, it emphasizes how these actors 
influence policy outcomes within formal state institutions. Maiguashca and Marchetti (2015) 
describes the different theoretical views of political agency, although all entail a similar notion of 
politics – power and the interaction between different political actors. According to the radical 
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 Although the concept of agency in sociological terms is mainly rooted for individual agent, it also applied to 





tradition, “political agency is the capacity to take part in the struggle to define the modalities of 
life in common, stressing the conflictual dimension of politics.” Citing Koremoenos et al. (2004), 
Maiguashca and Marchetti claims that a liberal or rational choice approach sees “political agency 
as being the strategic capacity to coordinate with others in order to have one’s own 
predetermined preferences adopted by the political system.” And citing Wendt (1987) and 
Dessler (1989), Maiguashca and Marchetti argues that the constructivist approach sees “political 
agency as the capacity to take part in socio-linguistic interaction in order to co-determine social 
structures and one’s own identity.” 
From the definitions above, one can see that the civic participation of different political 
actors is a key aspect of political agency. Civic participation is also an important pillar in 
democracy and has been widely discussed in the democracy literature, particularly concerning 
developing countries with relatively new democracies (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Dreze and Sen, 1996; 
Moore and Putzel, 1999; Harriss, 2000; Luckham et al., 2000). In the literature, civic 
participation is used interchangeably with civic engagement or citizen participation, but the 
words convey the same meaning – citizens being able to engage in public processes (Malik and 
Waglé, 2002). Having democratic institutions is not a guarantee for having democratic practices. 
The latter is dependent on whether citizens can hold the government accountable (Moore and 
Putzel, 1999). Through civic participation, citizens can select, monitor, and sanction leaders. 
This hinders corrupt and unjust policies that benefit elites, leading to an improvement in public 
goods provision and good governance. Consequently, civic participation can reduce economic 
instability and improve economic performance since it encourages citizens to cooperate and 




While civic participation in the political system can be primarily understood as 
participating in elections and voting, the scope of participation goes beyond that. Civic 
participation does not necessarily have to be electoral; it can include other forms of engagement 
that affect the political landscape. This includes membership in community groups or 
associations, participating in public meetings, providing feedback to government officials, taking 
part in public decision-making processes, monitoring government agencies, and volunteering 
(Putnam, 2000; Messner et al., 2006).  In fact, these non-electoral forms of participation are 
increasing as indicated by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). When measuring 
citizen participation in established democracies in 2004 and 2014, ISSP found that while there 
was a decline in voter turnout, other forms of civic participation – such as direct contact with 
political leaders and members of civic associations – were rising.   
Discussing political agency begs the question: who are the political actors? Traditionally, 
political agency only encompasses the capacity of political parties and governmental actors to 
influence political systems. However, changes in societal relations – due to globalization, 
modernization, and/or the complexity of the political system – have shifted political agency to a 
wider range of society such as non-governmental organizations, stateless group, and firms 
(Higgott et al. 2000; Arts, 2000; Maiguashca and Marchetti, 2015). Political actors also include 
rural communities, where collective action among rural agricultural producers is flourishing and 
talks with government officials, particularly local government officials, are becoming common. 
These non-states actors are now more involved in the policy process by means of lobbying and 
monitoring the implementation of public programs, thus demonstrating a bottom-up approach to 
policymaking. Political agency can bring about substantial transformative changes, as individuals 




The notion of political agency also encompasses effective participation, in which the 
concerns of rural producers are being heard and taken into consideration in the policymaking 
process. However, as theories of policymaking have indicated, participation does not always 
mean that policy outcomes will match participants’ interests (Shadlen, 2004). Policy outcomes 
tend to favor small groups of elites and organized interest groups, particularly those that have 
economic leverage. This is known as the Biased Pluralism view of policymaking (Gilens and 
Page, 2014). Mass-based interest groups, such as rural agricultural groups and citizens, tend to 
have little to no influence. However, not everyone supports this view of policymaking. Neo-
pluralist scholars argue that policy outcomes are influenced by many contextual variables. 
Therefore, even the elites are not guaranteed their desired policy outcome because they too are 
constrained by other factors such as public opinion, budget, counter opposition, and political 
culture (Gray and Lowery, 1996). This is aligned with Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) view in 
which political agency is influenced by time and place.   
But even when citizens participate, this does not mean that their interests will be taken up 
by their representatives, because they may not always be responsive to their demand. These 
representatives may not deliver what their constituents want because their political interests, 
ideas, etc. can be at odds with those of their constituents (Bradley and Chen, 2014; Htun, 2015). 
In other cases, participation can be used as a mechanism of control from the government. For 
example, the Moroccan government established a participatory institution known as the 
Moroccan Community Abroad, but it was essentially a tool for the old regime to maintain control 
(Dalmasso, 2017). When the desired policy outcome of certain groups is not obtained despite 
their participation, their political agency can be considered weak. Their ability to participate in 




representation exists without participation, political agency cannot be achieved since there is no 
mechanism to hold representatives accountable (Htun, 2015). Political agency should therefore 
consist not only of civic participation but the ability to have representation and influence policy 
outcomes.  
Thus, rural political agency consists of both the capacity of rural agrarian community to 
participate in matters that concerns their well-being and access to governance or decision-
making processes. 
 
1.2.2 Building Rural Political Agency through Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs) 
Three-quarters of the poor in developing countries live in rural areas and have minimum 
access to policymaking processes. Thus there is a growing consensus among development 
practitioners that civic participation of the rural poor is particularly important in improving 
development (World Development Report, 2002; UNDP Annual Report, 2002; UN Human 
Development Report, 2014). Improvement in rural participation will benefit national economic 
performance and democratic development since agriculture remains the primary sector in 
developing countries. It will also improve other important issues – such as urban poverty, 
migration, global food security, and climate change – since they are all linked to rural 
agricultural development (FAO Report, 2002). However, while electoral participation is an 
important form of participation, non-electoral political participation may be more relevant for 
small agricultural producers since access to electoral activities are economically and 




One major form of rural participation widely discussed in agricultural development 
literature is participation in community-based farmers’ organizations or Rural Producer 
Organizations (RPOs). RPOs are the most widespread form of agricultural organizations in 
developing countries. They aim to enhance farmers’ market access, increase their earnings, and 
achieve goals they may not be able to achieve by themselves (Bienabe and Sautier, 2005). With 
the growing liberalization and privatization of the global agricultural sector, small agricultural 
producers face many challenges, such as limited access to market and financial tools as well as 
their lack of resources to compete. These challenges make RPOs an important element for 
farmers to secure their livelihoods, because RPOs are basically economic organizations built 
upon the principle of voluntary collective action, where farmers build their economies of scale 
and improve service quality. RPOs can assume one or several functions, such as marketing, 
processing, collection, and quality control, thus there are different forms of RPOs. 
Cooperatives are the most well-known farmers’ organizations. A cooperative is “an 
independent association of people united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and 
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise” 
(ICA, 2010). Cooperatives are formal organizations, which are registered with the government 
and are guided by state law. Agricultural cooperatives are cooperatives built by farmers and 
specialize in one or more of the following activities: marketing, processing farm products, 
purchasing farm inputs, and increasing members’ production and income. Since cooperative 
activities are democratic, members have control over the organization (Barton, 1989). Another 
principle of cooperatives is user ownership since members pay dues or some monetary 




Other forms of farmers’ organizations are associations, registered producer groups, credit 
groups, women’s groups, and landless laborers’ groups. These are formal organizations of 
individuals around a shared interest, activity, or purpose. The structure and rules of the 
organizations tend to be flexible. Besides these formal organizations, there are also informal 
farmers’ organizations. These organizations are not formally registered with the government. 
They include ethnic networks and traditional community organizations. Typically, these 
organizations consist of people that share the same norms, values, and ethnic backgrounds, 
acting collectively to achieve a common goal. They are more flexible than formal organizations 
yet can be very exclusive and constrained by their customs and culture (FAO Report, 2007). 
However, despite their variety, farmers’ organizations all share the same characteristics: they are 
member-based organizations (owned and controlled by rural producers), rooted in rural areas, 
and mainly engage in collective marketing activities (Bijman, 2007; Wennink et al., 2007; 
Penrose-Buckley, 2007).  
RPOs—particularly cooperatives—have been popular in development programs both in 
developed and developing countries. It is considered the first step in many developmental 
interventions to improve the performance of the smallholder farming sector and achieve rural 
poverty reduction (World Bank, 2013). In the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries widely 
sponsored the establishment of cooperatives mainly as a coordination tool for the central 
government to conduct agricultural programs (Syahyuti, 2014). Indonesia started supporting 
cooperatives under the Massive Guidance (BIMAS) Program in the 1970s as a tool to distribute 
government support, facilitate coordination between the central government and local farmers, 
and coordinate among small producers. The global support for cooperatives grew after the UN 




have increased over the last decade, demonstrating the success of collective action (Roy and 
Thorat, 2008; Narrod et al., 2009; Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Shiferaw et al, 2009; Markelova 
and Mwangi, 2010; Francesconi and Heerink 2011; Fischer and Qaim 2011).
 
For example, more 
than 70 percent of India’s milk is produced by small farmers in dairy cooperatives who own one 
or two animals (FAO, 2004). Similarly, many coffee producers in South America can participate 
in the market value chain due to their membership in cooperatives and farmer groups (Hellin and 
Higman, 2003). 
Previous discussions on rural producers’ agency, however, have centered around their 
economic agency with the focus on how collective action among small agricultural producers 
can improve their economic fortune. Through collective action, small agricultural producers have 
the ability ‒ hence agency ‒ set up their own selling prices, build production infrastructure, and 
select their own marketing strategy. Meanwhile, rural producers’ political agency has been 
understudied. Why does membership in RPOs constitute rural political agency? I argue there are 
three reasons for this.   
First, the main feature of farmers’ organizations is that it is owned and controlled by its 
members. Self-rule is the basic element needed to build rural political agency. It provides a very 
simple form of democratic voting and practices that promote political participation (World Bank, 
2016). Farmers’ organizations are also voluntary, which means that farmers who do join are 
practicing a form of civic engagement. There are many barriers that prevent rural producers from 
joining RPOs. Some reasons are: rational calculations of the expected benefits and transaction 
costs (Stockbridge et al. 2003); weak management and entrepreneurial skills needed to manage 
an organization (Pingali et al. 2005); collective action problems such as free-riding members and 




2007); and the inability to act independent of the government (Mohmand, 2016). When rural 
producers voluntarily decide to join an RPO despite these challenges, they build up their political 
agency as they gain the ability to participate independently and have control over their well-
being. 
Second, although their activities center around increasing the economies of scale and 
market inclusion of its members, many farmers’ organizations have now moved beyond those 
functions into policymaking. For example, Vorley et al. (2012) discuss how coffee cooperatives 
in Ethiopia have successfully lobbied the government for international market access. In Peru, 
the national federation of coffee cooperatives have successfully challenged tax laws that 
disproportionately benefit private businesses (Vorley et al., 2012). In Tanzania, social networks 
in rural villages are involved in many local policies such as government primary education 
programs (Snyder, 2008). Farmers’ organizations are also involved in policymaking in 
Indonesia. For example, farmers in Banyuwangi were able to demand settlements over land 
disputes in 2013 (Tempo, 2013). Additionally, one of the well-known farmers’ organization, 
Network of Farmer Groups, successfully lobbied the local government in Kulon Progo to 
allocate microcredit loans in its budget to farmers (Vorley et al., 2012). In another example, one 
of Indonesia’s farmers’ groups, Kontak Tani Nelayan Andalan (KTNA), successfully demanded 
the government provide more biotechnology to boost agricultural productivity (Metro, 2015).  
Involvement in policymaking even results in political positions in some countries, notably India 
and Japan. In these cases, farmers were able to occupy positions in various political parties, the 
government, and parliament and represent the interests of farmers (Swanson, 2006). As Swanson 
(2006) argued, “… farmers’ organizations will become the basic building blocks of democratic 




Lastly, RPOs are more accessible for farmers compared to other types of rural 
organizations. Other types of organizations include religious, women’s or youth-based 
organizations; mass-based development organizations; and rural political parties. Because rural 
communities tend to work in agriculture, their livelihoods intersect with the economic mission of 
RPOs. This creates a sense of ownership over the RPOs and an urgency to be part of the 
organizations. RPOs are also geographically more accessible to join than other organizations 
because they typically organize around specific landed area and commodities. They thus 
concentrate in one area as opposed to other types of organizations that are more dispersed. RPOs, 
particularly cooperatives and associations, are also economically accessible since member fees 
are democratically agreed upon among members.
3
 Since cooperatives and associations are the 
largest forms of RPOs and the most effective in delivering economic and political outcomes 
(FAO, 2014), this dissertation will focus on the relationship between these two RPO forms and 
rural participation.  
 
1.2.3 Explaining Rural Participation in RPOs: The Importance of Contextual Factors 
 There are two large strands in the literature on RPOs: understanding RPOs’ performance 
and understanding why rural communities become members of RPOs. Both strands, I argue, can 
help us understand rural participation in the aggregate. First, rural participation depends on 
whether RPOs exist in a given area and whether they benefit their members. Second, 
understanding why individual farmers participate in RPOs can help us scale up and explain 
aggregate level of rural participation. 
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 In understanding the performance of RPOs, scholars have focused on the features of 
successful RPOs in practice, typically measured by how the organizations achieve their goals or 
how they benefit their members. Despite growing rural participation, most rural producer 
organizations are still weak (Bourgeois et al., 2003). Many RPOs are not effective in delivering 
the promised outcome, and many simply fail to maintain their organizations (Markelova et al. 
2009 and Poulton et al. 2010).   
 Scholars of agricultural development have studied factors that strengthen RPOs. Ragasa 
and Golan (2012) claim that there are five main factors that make RPOs successful. They are: (1) 
governance and management of the organization; (2) composition and heterogeneity in the 
organization; (3) membership commitment; (4) community and agro-ecological factors; and (5) 
external support. Governance and management of the organization refers to the organizational 
capacity of its members. This is the most widely discussed factor in explaining the success of 
RPOs. It takes into account the formal governing rules and management bodies of the 
organization (whether it is strong or not), free-rider problems, the size of the organization, and 
the leader’s accountability (Coulter et al, 1999; Shiferaw et al, 2009, Bernard et al, 2009; Fischer 
and Qaim, 2012; Ragasa and Golan, 2012).   
 The composition and heterogeneity of membership are also widely discussed in the 
literature. Homogeneity among members with respect to educational level, poverty level, age, 
ethnic and religious background, and shared values positively affects organizational performance 
(Coulter et al, 1999). The proportion of female participants, particularly in leadership positions, 
is also important for RPOs to be successful (Barham and Chitemi, 2009). Thus, what’s important 
is not just the homogeneity or heterogeneity of an organization. It’s important to consider the 




organizational success is membership commitment – the level of engagement of members. For 
example, Shiferaw et al. (2009) argue that financial contributions or resources of members 
increase the success of an organization.   
 Agro-geological and community factors are another factor studied in the literature. For 
example, distance to markets (Bernard et al., 2009; Barham and Chitemi, 2009; Ragasa and 
Golan, 2012) and rainfall availability (Bernard et al. 2009; Ragasa and Golan, 2012) are argued 
to affect the success of RPOs. Some scholars looked at the characteristics of the product or sector 
where successful collective action was seen. Organization occurred around high-value crops and 
not food grains (Barrett, 2008; Berdegue et.al., 2001), showing that whether marketing and 
distribution channels are long and complicated matters (Markelova and Mwangi 2010). 
Additionally, existing social capital is beneficial for organizations because members who share 
the same norms and values have an easier time coordinating among themselves (Heemskerk and 
Wennink, 2004).  
 The three factors above are considered internal factors that affect successful organization; 
however as Ragasa and Golan (2012) have noted, external factors have been understudied in the 
literature. Internal factors refer to the characteristics and operation of the organization, while 
external factors refer to the environment the organization is embedded in. Different studies on 
the factors that explain successful RPOs show variation across place, supporting the need to 
include contextual or external variables in the analysis. Some external variables that have been 
explored by scholars include incidence of conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Ragasa 
and Golan, 2012) and external support from NGOs, research institutes, and government agencies 
(Bernard et al, 2008; Barham and Chitemi, 2008; Ragasa and Golan, 2012). Pojasek (2013) 




legislations, regulatory bodies, economic trends, consumer attitudes, and international trade. This 
has not been studied for RPOs. 
 The other large strand in the literature seeks to understand why farmers participate in 
RPOs. Studies on farmer participation in RPOs mainly focus on individual characteristics of 
farmers, such as their education, age, gender, income, occupation, and time. For example, Karli 
et al. (2006) studied what factors led farmers to join agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia. These 
factors were education, communication skills, income, farm size, and technology. In Northern 
Ethiopia, farmers decided to join cooperatives based on the following factors: information 
access, special skills, frequency of attending a public meeting/workshop, education-level of the 
head of the household, credit access, training access, number of family members in school, 
distance to main market, availability of infrastructures, farmland ownership, and farmland sizes. 
A farmer’s capital, such as land ownership and equipment, is also important (Shiferaw et al., 
2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2011). All these factors contribute to farmer’s utility maximization 
calculation in which farmers join RPOs when costs are lower compared to non-membership 
(Leathers, 2006).  
 Existing studies, however, do not explain the overall pattern of rural participation in 
RPOs across different places. Why do some places have more rural participation than others? 
Why do more farmers join RPOs in one place than in others? Most studies have established the 
role of individual resources and attitudes on rural participation but are mostly context specific, 
resulting in fragmented results. This reflects the need to account for the conditions in which the 
organizations operate (Ragasa and Golan, 2012). Just as studies explaining the performance of an 
organization lack contextual explanations, studies on why farmers participate in RPOs neglect 




shape an individual’s motives, opportunities, and capacity for political participation. Therefore, 
these are important elements to consider when understanding rural participation in RPOs.  
 Although very limited studies have looked at the contextual factors that shape rural 
participation in RPOs, the literature on civic engagement provides useful information regarding 
this matter. This literature outlines the following contextual factors that affect civic participation: 
economic and political institutions, social structure, and cultural settings.  
Democratic institutions are fundamental for rural participation because they provide rural 
populations political rights to organize and vote rights that are limited under authoritarian 
regimes. However, democracy per se does not guarantee that citizens will actively participate 
(e.g., Barber 1984, Lijphart 1997, Skocpol 1999, Putnam, 2000). Moreover, although democratic 
institutions even the playing field for farmers in the political arena (Bates and Block, 2013), they 
still contain power inequalities that hinder rural participation (Van de Walle, 2003). In new 
democracies particularly, rural communities must fight for access to social power which have 
been traditionally reserved for political parties, government agencies, and unions (Ferrara and 
Bates, 2001; Marchetti, 2014). Their participation is thus hindered by bureaucratic systems of 
control and social exclusion, which fuels a more centralized and elite-based participation (Victor 
and Heller, 2007). 
Another structural disadvantage rural producers face is the ability to act collectively. The 
conventional wisdom (Olson, 1965) is that collective action is difficult to achieve in a large 
diffused group such as rural producers. Additionally, market failures; information asymmetry; 
limited access to education, information, technology, and resources; and the isolated 




1998; Key et al., 2000; Minot, 2007; Barret, 2008). Public policies become dominated by small 
concentrated interest groups because they can better overcome collective action problems. Thus, 
rural participation and political agency face many challenges due to an unequal social structure, 
leading to policies that marginalize small agricultural producers and continue poverty and 
development problems of developing countries (Conray et.al, 1996). 
Thus, the specific institutional features of democracy that promote broad civic 
participation are important. Kriesi (2004) argue that the openness of the political system creates 
formal access and more possible channels to influence politics, therefore increasing civic 
political participation. This study uses the characteristics of the state to measure the openness of 
the political system. It argues that states that are facilitative, cooperative, and rely on integrative 
strategies lead to a higher overall level of mobilization. Under an open system, states rely on 
cooperation with non-state actors and are open to public engagement. This contrasts with states 
that employ exclusive strategies that limit public engagement.  
The deepening process of democratic institutions, particularly through decentralization, 
has been widely discussed to benefit rural populations and increase their engagement. 
Decentralization is considered to improve public service provision and better governance 
through the empowerment of citizens. Decentralization makes it is easier for citizens – especially 
marginalized groups – to take part in decision-making through local governments (Crook and 
Manor, 1998; Blair, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). The most common practice within the 
decentralized system is participatory budgeting, where rural communities negotiate and criticize 
local budgeting. In India, for example, the village meetings, known as Gram Sabhas, and the 




to improve village health and sanitation (Joan Costa-Font and Divya Parmar, 2106).  
Additionally, those in rural areas have become more aware of the importance of participating in 
decision-making programs since public officials, particularly at the local level, have improved 
their responsiveness (Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Blair, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 
2001).  
 
1.3 Research Design  
This dissertation adopts a mix-method approach using both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses in answering the research questions. An original survey and interviews were conducted 
as part of the qualitative strategy, with the main goal of obtaining key information for developing 
the theory and collecting original data that was not available elsewhere. Interviews have played 
an important part in developing the theory, where it can reveal the underlying rational choice and 
incentive of an action and help to differentiate among different potential causal mechanisms. To 
generate a causal explanation from the case, semi-structured interviews were conducted during 
my research field in the summer of 2017. The respondents consist of small farmers – both 
members and non-members – of RPOs, board members of RPOs, and people from related 
government agencies.  
An original survey of 220 rural producers drawn from 30 villages across three districts of 
Indonesia – Keeron, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and Semarang, Central Java – 
was conducted to obtain information on their membership in RPOs as well as their individual 
socio-economic and political information. The spread of the region can be seen in Figure 1.1 of 




analysis to: (1) identify the conditional factors that motivate farmers in joining an RPO and (2) 
see how membership in an RPO shape member political participation.  
 
Figure 1.1. Map of Regions in Indonesia 
 
 
Secondary data at the subnational level of Indonesia were also collected to see the 
correlation between the identified contextual factors with the level of rural participation. This 
helps us understand how the level of rural participation in RPOs varies considerably across 
regions of Indonesia. Panel data of Indonesian states during the period of 2010-2015 were 
collected, which consists of RPO membership, socio-economic and political context of the 
regions, and different governmental agricultural and welfare programs. Cross-country data on 
RPO activities appear to be non-existent. But even if the data did exist, comparison across cases 




across countries. Since subnational data is more accessible and comparable, the subnational 
variation can provide similar insights in understanding rural civic participation in general.  
However, a case should not be selected because it is interesting or has data available 
(George and Bennett, 2005). Its selection should be relevant to the research objective and be able 
to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem. Indonesia is a good 
case to understand rural civic participation for a number of reasons. Indonesia is a large and 
growing country and ran as the world’s 10
th
 largest economy. Its population is 252 million, with 
28.6 million still living below the poverty line (World Bank, 2014). Indonesia is open to the 
world market, with a value of over 350 billion US dollars. It is engaged in numerous trade 
agreements, including the ASEAN Free Trade Agreements (AFTA) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements.   
Most importantly, Indonesia is the third largest democracy according to the Freedom 
House Index, which emphasizes public participation. Indonesia is dominated by small scale 
producers where 99.79 percent of Indonesian producers are small scale, and only 0.01% of 
producers are large scale (Indonesia's State Ministry for Cooperatives Small and Medium 
Enterprises). Since 2004, Indonesia has decentralized its economy giving administrative and 
fiscal power to districts. Local governments are also responsible for many tasks, including 
management of natural resource sectors and the provision of social services, such as health and 
education. The local government is selected through local elections, known as the pilkada, that 
are separated from the national elections. Thus, given Indonesia’s regime-type (democracy) and 
its economic relevance, studying rural civic participation in Indonesia can provide a better 





1.4 Structure of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction, 
literature review, and an overview of the project. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide a historical 
background of rural participation in Indonesia during two different political systems. Chapter 2 
focuses on rural participation under the “New Order” authoritarian regime, while Chapter 3 
focuses on rural participation under the democratic regime. The next three chapters will provide 
empirical analyses on rural civic participation in Indonesia.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the following question: does membership in an RPO increase rural 
political participation? This chapter looks at the role of RPO membership on individual political 
participation by using quantitative analysis based on the survey data I collected on 220 farmers 
drawn from 30 villages across three districts of Indonesia. In this chapter, I discuss how RPOs 
can also function as a tool for its member to participate in political activities not just economic 
activities. The study focuses on two forms of political participation – elections and public 
policymaking. Past studies on the role of RPOs have mostly focused on how RPOs increase 
economic production and sales. Meanwhile, studies on RPOs’ role in politics are scarce at best. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the following question: what are the contextual factors explaining 
rural participation in RPOs? This chapter identifies the key contextual variables that explain rural 
participation in RPOs. Through interviews and the survey, I gathered information on the external 
factors that motivate respondents to join RPOs. Using panel data of Indonesian states from 2010 
to 2015, I then conducted a quantitative analysis that tests the correlation between different 
contextual variables and the level of rural participation in RPOs. Studies explaining rural 
participation across the developing world have focused on when or how small rural agricultural 




characteristics of members and organizational features – the literature lacks explanations on the 
context in which the organization is placed. In other words, existing explanations do not answer 
why rural organizations are more prevalent in certain areas than others.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the following question: does rural participation result in farmers 
obtaining their desired policy outcome? This chapter analyzes the effect of rural participation in 
RPOs in obtaining government support, both in the form of agricultural productivity programs 
and general social welfare programs. Quantitative analysis was conducted using the panel data of 
Indonesian state from 2010 to 2015 to test this. Additionally, given that these government 
programs were only provided to a specific group – farmers – this chapter tests whether political 
contextual variables influence this relationship between rural participation and government 
agricultural support.  
And lastly, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings, a conclusion, avenues for 

















RURAL CIVIC PARTICIPATION UNDER INDONESIA'S “NEW 




This chapter provides historical and institutional background on rural civic participation 
during the 32 years of Indonesia’s authoritarian regime known as the “New Order” regime. 
Although rural civic participation in Indonesia has existed since the Dutch colonial era, it was 
formally institutionalized under the “New Order” regime which set the legal bases for many rural 
organizations in Indonesia today. Under the rule of President Suharto, agriculture became the 
leading sector in the economy. Substantial agricultural development programs were 
implemented, including programs that promoted rural civic participation and rural organizations. 
The regime achieved remarkable agricultural growth and economic outcomes. However, rural 
communities did not actively contribute to these economic outcomes since agricultural 
development occurred through oppressive top-down governance.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the early years of Indonesia’s 
agricultural institutional development from the post-independence “Old Order” era to the “New 
Order” authoritarian regime. Section 2.3 discusses the extensive agricultural development 
programs adopted by President Suharto during the “New Order” regime. Section 2.4 focuses on 
how rural participation was developed and shaped by institutional and political forces. Section 





2.2 Institutional Shift from Post-Independence “Old Order” Regime to “New Order” 
Regime 
The “New Order” regime (Orde Baru) refers to the administration of President Suharto 
that was established in 1966 to replace the post-independence “Old Order” regime (Orde Lama) 
administration under President Sukarno. The “Old Order” regime lasted from the beginning of 
Indonesia’s independence in 1945 until the overthrow of President Sukarno in 1966 after a series 
of political and economic instability. Within the first year of independence, the Sukarno 
government established “Pancasila,” the five basic principles of Indonesia (monotheism, 
nationalism, humanism, social justice, and democracy), and the national constitution known as 
the “UUD 1945” (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945). However, ideological conflict over the nation’s 
political system, institutional infrastructure, and international relations emerged in the 1950s 
(Salim, 2001). Part of the reason for the conflict was Indonesia’s multi-cultural society and 
dispersed population, as well as the deep ideological tension mainly occurred between four major 
groups in the country: (1) the military; (2) Communist Party; (3) Nationalist Party; and (4) 
Islamist organizations. 
The military (Indonesian Army) held a significant role during Indonesia’s independence 
and continue to be an important group in Indonesia’s post-independence political activities. 
Indonesia’s 1945 constitution, however, does not provide any political role for the military but 
instead provides important roles to civilians and the President (Said, 2001). But Indonesia’s 
strong military force continued after the revolution, and the early years of Indonesia's 
independence were marked by a “dualism” of leadership between President Sukarno and the 
military. Many of Sukarno’s instructions were disobeyed by the military, creating a hostile 




development of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) during the 
post-independence period. The Communist Party received support from President Sukarno, but 
part of the military were against the Party (Horowitz, 2013).  
Communism in Indonesia, developed during the Dutch colonial era in 1924, grew rapidly 
during the “Old Order.” Poverty increased during the post-independence period and concerns 
over the spread of capitalism were growing. The Communist Party’s main goals were to fight for 
equality for disadvantaged people, such as peasants and rural labors, and promote the 
establishment of rural-based organizations, such as Indonesian Peasant’s Front (Barisan Tani 
Indonesia or BTI) and workers unions (Aspinall, 2005). The Communist Party’s members grew 
from less than 8,000 to fourteen million, making it one of Indonesia’s most popular parties 
(Pauker, 1969). The Party developed close ties with the Indonesian National Party (Partai 
Nasional Indonesia or PNI), a revolutionary party established and led by Sukarno. The two 
parties aligned to counter the increasing strength of the military. This later developed into a 
conflict between two ideologies, capitalism – supported by a significant part of the military – and 
communism. All this was happening in the context of the Cold War. Thus, this international 
ideological conflict seeped into Indonesia and escalated the country’s domestic conflict 
(Aspinall, 2005).  
Meanwhile, a growing number of Islamist groups and parties were interested in making 
Islamic ideology the state’s principle. However, these groups did not gain significant power over 
the state. They were rebuffed by the significant number of non-Muslim citizens in Indonesia and 
the country’s desire to prevent a separatist movement (Said, 2001). Moreover, due to Indonesia’s 
multicultural society and Sukarno’s active nationalism campaign, Islamic political parties found 




Due to these ideological conflicts, the “Old Order” era experienced a series of economic 
and political instability. The country’s multiparty electoral system created coalitions of groups 
that found it difficult to reach a common ground. The distribution of power was relatively equal 
among the political parties,
4
 which created instability in Indonesia’s early political life. Between 
the years 1950-1959, Indonesia experienced seven cabinet changes (Cribb, 1999). Indonesia’s 
political system changed from a presidential system to a parliamentary sytem to a liberal 
democracy and, lastly, to a “guided democracy.”  
Indonesia’s liberal democracy, implemented from 1949-1957, was the closest to a 
western democracy. However, it failed due to a lack of sufficient institutional support, low 
education rates and support for a democratic culture, and a lack of economic support (Hadiz and 
Robinon, 2013). To replace the liberal democracy and provide a fresh start to a polarized 
economy, President Sukarno adopted the “guided democracy.” The administration, 1959-1965, 
was also known as a “systematic and planned democracy” or a “democracy with leadership.” 
(Hadiz and Robinon, 2013). Although the goal was to achieve better national planning, the 
“guided democracy” was essentially an authoritarian regime. Most of the national decision-
making processes were controlled by the presidency with limited political constraints. Under this 
system, Sukarno implemented populist economic policies and emphasized the importance of 
building a national culture to unify the different local cultures and reduce the influence of 
Western imperialist culture. His most popular policies were the nationalization of Dutch 
commercial companies and the adoption of a closed economy in which Indonesia cut all ties with 
the West, including the United Nations, IMF, and the World Bank (Glassburner, 1962). 
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 The first Indonesian election in 1955 was participated by 172 parties with four main parties and the results as 
follows: (1) Masyumi Party (Islamist) receive 20.9 percent of votes; (2) Indonesian National Party (PNI) received 
20.3 percent; (3) Nahdatul Ulama (Islamist) received 18.4 percent; and (4) Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 




However, this created an economic catastrophe. Indonesia no longer received any foreign aid 
money, and most of the plans to nationalize dutch companies failed due to unqualified 
bureaucratic officials (Said, 2001). Moreover, Sukarno spent much of his focus on political 
issues, both domestic and international, rather than on national economic problems. By 1966, 
Indonesia’s budget deficit reached 300 percent of government revenue, and hyperinflation 
reached 600 percent (Kingsbury, 2002).  
In addition to this economic crisis, the 1960s was characterized by a growing tension 
between the Communist Party and the military. Sukarno supported redistribution of rural 
agricultural lands, which increased the strength of the Communist Party. Invigorated by the 
popularity of the Party, many rural communities participated in protests and demonstrations 
against western values. These values, they argued, affected their stability and security. 
Concerned by the radical demonstrations and riots across different parts of Indonesia, some 
military forces – those who were proponents of capitalism – raised concerns about the growth of 
the Communist Party and demanded the government abolish it.  In an effort to ease these 
ideological tensions, Sukarno created a controversial policy aimed at combining three significant 
ideological fractions – Nationalist, Islamic, and Communism. This policy was known as 
Nasionalis, Agama, dan Komunis (NASAKOM). By combining these elements, Sukarno wanted 
Indonesia to honor each of the elements (Said, 2001). The implementation of Nasakom, 
however, led to a stronger polarization between the Communist Party and the military. The 
military itself was divided between those who supported Sukarno’s administration and those who 
were against it.  
The polarization between the Indonesian Army and the Communist Party reached its peak 




against Sukarno in 1967 (Tomsa, 2008). Suharto, commander in chief of the Indonesian Land 
Army, used propaganda and subversive tactics against communists to overthrow President 
Sukarno and gain power. On February 22, 1967, Suharto became president and established the 
“New Order” regime to replace the “Old Order” regime. This represented a significant 
ideological shift in Indonesia.  
The “New Order” regime restructured Indonesia’s political and economic systems. Three 
development principles (trilogi pembangunan) were adopted. They emphasized: (1) equal 
development for all citizens to secure national stability, (2) increased economic growth, and (3) 
economic stability. A series of comprehensive economic stabilization and rehabilitation 
programs were developed to reverse many of the policies implemented during the “Old Order” 
regime. Two important policies were restoring Indonesia’s ties with the West and enhancing 
developmental programs. In restoring ties with the West, Indonesia implemented an economic 
package to gain foreign aid and investment inflow returned to the country. The package focused 
on four policy approaches: (1) open up to foreign investment, (2) practice fiscal discipline and 
balance the budget, (3) practice monetary control through increased interest rates and stabilize 
the budget through exports and imports, and (4) decrease and control foreign debt. 
Indonesia reintegrated into the international market and joined the IMF, UN, and World 
Bank as well as other international organizations such as the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), Asia Pacific Economic Partnership (APEC), and Consultative 
Group on Indonesia (CGI). This provided the Indonesian economy financial assistance and 
signaled to foreign investors that Indonesia had a conducive investment climate. Access to 
Indonesia’s market improved significantly. Tariffs on imports declined from 59 percent in 1987 




(Bird et al., 2008). Indonesia established a foreign investment law in 1967 and repealed a 
domestic investment law in 1968 to simplify economic activity and encourage foreign investors 
to provide new private capital investments. 
Another hallmark of the “New Order” regime was its emphasis on developmental 
programs, particularly those that targeted rural areas. This emphasis on rural development, along 
with other economic strategies, was part of the Indonesian Broad Guidelines of State Policy 
(Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN). This policy laid out Indonesia’s key policy 
approaches. The vast majority of Indonesia’s population live in rural areas. Therefore, their 
incorporation into the economy is vital to increasing the country’s overall economic development 
and accelerating its modernization efforts. Due to this realization, the government implemented 
both short- and long-term development planning goals, known as the Five-Year Development 
Plan (Pembangunan Lima Tahun or PELITA). This plan emphasized the provision of basic 
needs, such as education, income, health, employment, entrepreneurial opportunities, and justice, 
for rural communities. To achieve these goals, the state deemed it necessary to be actively 
involved in the economy and to maintain strong links between its state bureaucrats and the 
business community.  
Suharto’s emphasis on improving the economic conditions of rural areas was not just an 
economic decision. It also served to maintain his political stability. The possibility of a 
communist resurgence was a main concern in the early years of the “New Order” regime since 
rural communities were in deep poverty. To hinder such resurgence, Suharto emphasized 
improving the agricultural sector, particularly rice production – Indonesia’s main food staple. 
The target was to achieve rice self-sufficiency and lessen Indonesia’s dependence on imports. 




programs from the foreign capital flowing into the country. As a result, the Indonesian economy 
grew at an average annual rate of over 6 percent. Because of the remarkable economic successes 
during the “New Order regime,” Indonesia was referred to as one of the “Asian Tiger” 
economies. Additionally, Suharto was famously named the Father of Indonesian Development.  
While Indonesia experienced economic liberalization during the “New Order” era, 
political liberalization, however, was limited. In order to strengthen Suharto’s political power, 
the regime was highly centralized, patrimonial, and predatory (Slater, 2004; Aspinall, 2010). The 
state controlled state resources and extracted profits from these resources. The state also 
distributed patronage through rent-seeking practices. It used quotas, licenses, and monopolies to 
serve the interest of Suharto and his family, friends, and political allies (Malley 1999). Rosser et. 
al. (2005) highlight four main groups that benefited from the regime but served Suharto’s 
interests: (1) the politico-bureaucrats, which included military officers and high level 
bureaucrats; (2) domestic conglomerates; (3) controllers of mobile capital, such as portfolio 
investors, international banks, and manufacturing investors; and (4) western governments. 
The regime used different strategies to maintain their political power. One effective way 
was to limit the political parties allowed to contest elections. Although this strategy can be seen 
as a way to create a more stable political environment, it was essentially a tool for the 
government to consolidate power by having fewer people mobilized for elections (Hadiz and 
Robison, 2013). During the first Indonesian election in 1973, the government only allowed a few 
parties to participate and urged parties to collaborate. As a result, there were only three main 
parties during the election: (1) the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
or PPP), which consists mostly of Islamist parties such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the Muslim 




Educational Movement (Perti); (2) Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia  
or PDI), which includes nationalist parties such as the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the 
League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), Murba Party (Partai Murba), the 
Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), and the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik); and (3) 
Functional Group Party (Golongan Karya or Golkar). Meanwhile, the Communist Party was 
completely banned from the system. The government essentially tried to depoliticize Indonesia.  
The regime also created a hegemonic party system, where Golkar became the regime’s 
leading political party. Golkar was Suharto’s parliamentary and electoral vehicle to garner 
support for the government, thus the regime made efforts to ensure that Golkar kept winning 
elections (Gaffar, 1992). This was done by obligating civil servants to vote for Golkar through 
the establishment of the Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia or 
KORPI) (Emmerson, 1978). Other organizations such as labor unions, peasant groups, and 
business associations were also required to become members of Golkar and vote for the party. 
This limited overall civic mobilization since many civic organizations were affiliated with 
Golkar. This support, however, was not without its costs. In exchange for support, the regime 
had to maintain a close relationship with voters, for example, by funding their activities (Hadiz 
and Robison, 2013). As a result, Golkar won in all the elections during the “New Order,” earning 
over 70 percent of votes each time. Golkar’s supremacy allowed the government to control the 
parliament and easily approve government programs, including those that allowed the 
government to extract profits. Moreover, since the parliament appointed the President, Suharto 
was easily able to serve as President for six terms.  
To have more control over the political system, the government formed an alliance with 




doing so, the military typically had a seat in parliament and were involved in policymaking 
processes. This was known as the “double-function,” or dwifungsi, of the military. At the same 
time, the regime had implemented regulations to limit civic mobilization. The regime limited the 
ability of civilians to conduct demonstrations or protests as well as having control the media. 
Thus, despite implementing strong developmental programs, Indonesia’s “New Order” regime 
cannot be considered a developmental state (Maclntyre, 1994). 
The next two sections provide the contradictory effect of “New Order” institutions for 
rural communities. On the one hand, the “New Order” regime provided government support for 
rural development. On the other hand, the regime’s predatory nature limited the political 
development of rural communities. 
 
2.3 Agriculture Development Programs under the “New Order” Regime 
The agricultural sector has been the main driver of Indonesia’s economy since its 
independence until today. It was also the central focus of the “New Order” regime for two 
reasons. First, the agricultural sector accounts for around three-quarters of total employment in 
Indonesia, making it a significant piece of the nation’s overall economic performance (Timmer, 
1998). Not only does the agricultural sector provide a source of livelihood for many Indonesians, 
it also reduces food shortages and the poverty rate. Moreover, an increase in food production 
also provides cheap products for consumers in urban societies (Fahmid, 2004). Second, a healthy 
agricultural sector was crucial in maintaining the political legitimacy of the regime. A poor 
performance in the agricultural sector can result in a high rate of poverty, increasing the risk of 




The regime implemented four comprehensive policies to increase overall agricultural 
production and productivity: (1) agriculture intensification, which used techniques from the 
“Green Revolution;” (2) agriculture extensification, which extended agricultural production to 
other regions outside Java island – where most agricultural activities take place; (3) agriculture 
diversification, which increased agricultural production from a few commodities; and (4) 
agriculture rehabilitation, which increased agricultural production by rehabilitating land and 
commodities that were in crisis. Suharto, however, put his main priority in developing food 
crops, especially rice – the primary food staple for Indonesians. By having access to foreign aid, 
the regime had the resources to spend on agricultural and rural development programs, with 
agriculture receiving an average of 30 percent of the national budget (Booth, 1998).  
Rice, in particular, received special attention, where 65 percent of the total population 
depends on rice (Timmer, 2005). Due to its significance, rice has become a political commodity. 
Several events in history have shown that when there is instability in either price or stocks of 
rice, civil unrest will increase. Moreover, because many farmers supported the Communist Party, 
government need to make sure to keep communism at bay and maintain political stability. 
Therefore, one of Suharto’s prominent programs was to achieve rice self-sufficiency and lesson 
Indonesia’s dependence on rice imports.  
As part of the effort in achieving food self-sufficiency, Suharto implemented several 
strategies that intervened in food production and distribution. Suharto applied the “Green 
Revolution” strategy, where the agricultural production process adopted some agriculture 
technologies – chemical fertilizers, improvements in the irrigation system, new seeds, pesticides, 
and modernized farming techniques. The government managed access to fertilizers, seeds, and 




National fertilizer factories such as Petro Kimia Gresik, Pupuk Sriwijaya, and Asian Aceh 
Fertilizer were established to ensure that agricultural inputs were within the national price range. 
The “Green Revolution” strategy also emphasized research and developmental programs and 
getting farmers access to capital. 
The government also heavily invested in rural infrastructure, such as roads, irrigation 
systems, bridges, water supplies, and dams, as well as supported infrastructure such as schools, 
markets, and health centers. Within the national five-year development plan (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun or Repelita), irrigation development had its own chapter. By 1978, 
rural infrastructure accounted for 12% of the national development budget. Moreover, research 
and development programs, as well as better financial access for farmers, have been an integral 
part of the green revolution. 
The regime set up a number of institutions to support its agricultural programs. This 
included the agriculture extension body, village cooperatives, the National Logistic Body (Badan 
Urusan Logistik or BULOG), and research institutes such as the Agriculture Technology 
Development Body (Badan Pengkajian Teknologi Pertanian or BPTP). The agriculture 
extension body was established to assist farmers in implementing new technologies under the 
“Green Revolution.” It was established by President Instruction No. 4 Year 1973 and assigned to 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The body instructs that agriculture extension officers be placed at 
the village level to work closely with farmers’ organizations. It is part of the general “mass 
guidance” program, or Bimbingan Masyarakat (Bimas), in which farmers are trained and 
educated to use agricultural technology – seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Bimas was carried out 
in cooperation with foreign organizations, such as the International Rice Research Institute that 




government established a mechanism for farmers to dialogue with other farmers, extension 
officers, government officials, and the President. This was known as “the group of listener, 
reader, and audience” (Kelompok Pendengar Pembaca dan Pemirsa or Kelompencapir). Other 
participatory programs included the farmers management system (Panca Usaha Tani), mass 
intensification (Intensifikasi Massal or Inmas), and Special Operation. These bottom-up 
institutional programs helped the “New Order” era successfully implement the “Green 
Revolution” since they provided support for farmers to participate in many different government 
programs (Suyatno, 2007).  
As part of the effort to increase rural participation in government programs, the 
government established village cooperatives (Koperasi Unit Desa or KUD). Different forms of 
cooperatives − such as agricultural cooperatives, village cooperatives, and commodity 
cooperatives − have existed since the colonial era. However, Suharto incorporated them into the 
KUDs through President Instruction No. 4 Year 1973, which emphasized agricultural activities. 
The focus of KUDs was then shifted to rural village cooperatives through President Instruction 
No. 2 Year 1978. And through President Instruction No. 4 Year 1984, Suharto established more 
concrete programs to develop these village cooperatives.  
The purpose of village cooperatives is to organize agricultural activities among farmers 
and serve as a mechanism for the government to distribute agricultural inputs, facilitate 
production, and market its agricultural development programs. Through village cooperatives, 
farmers not only have access to production inputs but also bank credit and the government’s 
farmer credit (Kredit Usaha Tani or KUT). However, village cooperatives are also a way for the 
government to control and monitor the agricultural production process and push for further 




colonial Indonesia, they were first institutionalized as agricultural cooperatives under the “New 
Order” era.  
In 1988, the Minister of Cooperatives proclaimed Instruction No. 04/Ins/M/VI/1988, 
guidelines on how to develop village cooperatives. The program centered on how to increase the 
role of village cooperatives in the national economy. It also focused on increasing the welfare of 
KUD members by improving their economic and organizational skills, increasing their access to 
financial support, and supporting research and development. A Special Instruction (Instruksi 
Khusus or Insus) was also made available to farmers’ organizations. It assigned a special group 
that developed a work plan, spread information, monitored organizational activity, coordinated 
cooperation among different farmers’ organizations, and held communication with the 
government and related stakeholders. Several benchmarks were used to define successful village 
cooperatives. For example, village cooperatives were successful if they had at least 25% of 
eligible farmers as members. Success was also measured by a minimum level of funding.  
As a result, the number of village cooperatives and its members increased during the 
“New Order” era, with KUDs experiencing an average growth of 6.28% and KUD membership 










Graph 2.1. Number of Village Cooperatives (KUD)  
 
Source: Compiled from Indonesian Bureau Statistics (BPS) and Ministry of Cooperatives 
  
Another important development during the “New Order” era was the establishment of the 
National Logistics Agency (Badan Logistik Nasional or Bulog), which was a marketing board 
that functioned to control overall national production and food supply as well as the distribution 
of agricultural products to stabilize prices. Through Presidential Decree No. 272 Year 1967, 
Bulog was formed as the “single purchasing agency” for agricultural commodities. It is a non-
ministerial body that reports directly to the President. The Presidential Decree established this 
monopolistic body to secure the nation’s food supply, maintain price stability, and regulate the 
import and export of most agricultural commodities such as rice, sugar, soy, eggs, meat, and 
cooking oil – the primary staples in Indonesia (Saifullah, 2001). Bulog was given several 
instruments that allowed it to determine government buying price, ensure commodity 
procurement, and maintain market operation. It also worked closely with KUDs and set the base 





























coordinated warehouse network and transportation system to ensure distribution stability. It 
established multiple storages that were spread across 1,500 locations in Indonesia with a capacity 
of 3.5 million tons (Saifullah, 2001).  
Additionally, to support these agricultural programs, the government invested in a 
research institute, the Agriculture Technology Development Body (Badan Pengkajian Teknologi 
Pertanian or BPTP), that provided innovation in agricultural production techniques and seed 
efficiency.   
As a result of these programs, the agricultural sector in Indonesia developed rapidly. 
Food staple production increased from 12.2 million tons in 1969 to 25.8 million tons in 1984. By 
1984, Indonesia had also become a rice self-sufficient country, shifting its position from the 
world’s third largest importing economy to an exporting country the following years. The shift in 
the agricultural sector also impacted macro level economic growth due to an increase in farmers’ 
incomes and other development outcomes. During the “New Order” era, poverty was reduced by 
half from 23 percent of Indonesia’s total population to only 11 percent. Also, economic growth 
increased from 2.25 percent in 1963 to 12 percent in 1969, with an average annual rate of growth 
of over 6 percent (Graph 2.2). Inflation decreased drastically from 650 percent to 12 percent in 
three years during the “New Order” era (Table 2.1). Indonesia received recognition from the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations as one of the “Asian Tigers” 
due to its remarkable economic success. This was especially notable as Indonesia did not follow 
the “urban bias” pattern of industrialization. This means that instead of putting significant 
support in urban communities, the government gave the agricultural sector significant support 





Graph 2.2 GDP per Capita (in US$) under the “New Order” regime 
 
               Source: Indonesian Bureau Statistics (BPS) 
               
Table 2.1. Economic Indicators of Indonesia under the “New Order” 
Year Inflation Economic Growth 
1964 135.1 3.5 
1965 594.3 1.1 
1966 635.3 2.8 
1967 112.2 1.4 
1968 85.1 10.9 
1969 12 12 
1970 8.9 7.5 
1971 2.5 7 
      Source: Boediono (2016), p.82 
 
2.4 Rural Civic Participation During the “New Order” Era 
The “New Order” regime supported rural civic participation mainly through the village 
cooperatives or the KUDs. However, government support of these KUDs was mainly political – 
development programs were provided in exchange for political support (Bhakti, 2004). The 


















marketing using a top-down, supply-driven, and centralized command and control approach. 
Meanwhile, local governments only functioned as surveillance bodies and forms of social control 
when local farmers did not follow the federal government’s instructions. The power held by 
Suharto and his small circle of elites allowed them to control state profits and secure rents in 
strategic sectors, such as agriculture, through quotas, license distribution, and monopolized 
institutional practices.  
Clientelism and rent-seeking practices were also prevalent in Indonesia’s “New Order” 
regime. New institutions, such as Bulog, were intentionally set up by the regime to maintain 
Suharto’s power. The regime established a clientelistic relation between it and these institutions 
to extract profits. Bulog, for example, was allowed to monopolize many aspects of the 
agricultural sector, such as price setting, marketing, and regulating the import and export of the 
most important agricultural products – rice, sugar, coffee, palm oil, and cloves. This also 
includes the direct appointment of milling services and taking full decisions for most of the 
government procurement process. The agency was led by people who were close allies with 
Suharto and accountable to him only, thus it had limited legitimacy from the public. One of the 
major ways rent-seeking occurred was through exclusive licenses, where distribution 
opportunities and trade contracts were given to privileged groups that had a close relationship 
with Suharto or his allies.  
Additionally, subsidies and government allocation grants were mainly given to private or 
state-owned plantations that could be controlled by the government (Barlow and Tomich, 1991). 
For example, the Clove Marketing and Buffer Stock Agency (BPPC) – controlled by Tommy 
Suharto, Suharto’s youngest son – received exclusive rights over the clove trade (Borsuk 1999). 




estate crops – and PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia – which oversaw sugar distribution – were 
both state-owned trading companies. Often, the appointed person or agency in charge did not 
meet the standards and requirements to perform the tasks. They thus re-sold their contracts to 
legitimate companies that met the government’s facilitiy, quality control, and legal requirements.  
    Similarly, the village cooperatives or the KUDs provided a source of extractive and 
rent-seeking opportunities for a small group of elites, typically through key village leaders or 
more prosperous farmers (Mackie and MacIntyre, 1994; Rock, 2003). They were closely linked 
to the government and had the power to organize farmers and supervise all their agricultural 
activities (Mackie and MacIntyre, 1994). The regime wanted to make certain that rural 
communities had a high appreciation for the government programs to ensure their continued 
political support. The role of rural elites was important to make sure that such government 
support was secured. A patron-client relationship was therefore established between the 
government and elites in rural organizations. These rural elites acted as monitoring agencies in 
the countryside by identifying loyal followers and ensuring support to the central government 
(Antlov 1995; Hellman, 2003). One way the government tried to gain support was by holding 
inauguration ceremonies every time the government provided agricultural development 
programs. The government needed this political support because it was really important for the 
“New Order” regime to be portrayed as a corrective force of the “Old Order regime.” By gaining 
a lot of support from rural societies, the regime could claim some legitimacy.  
Several approaches were implemented by the regime to establish a clientelistic 
relationship with rural communities. For example, a uniform village administrative structure was 
implemented across the country to control all village-level programs, with KUDs functioning as 




given to ensure that Golkar continued to be re-elected, the role of KUDs and local leaders was to 
monitor citizens and suppress political dissent. Thus, rather than functioning as a collective body 
and representative of farmers, the KUDs were intended to be a tool to implement orders from the 
central government (Bourgeois et.al., 2003). The promotion of rural participation did not 
empower farmers because they had very little recourse to challenge the state and were unable to 
mobilize freely.  
Farmers’ organizations were also banned during this era, with village cooperatives or 
KUDs being the only farmers’ organizations allowed. The government’s establishment of the 
KUDs was therefore more of a mechanism to supply governmental programs rather than a tool 
that responded to farmers’ actual needs (Hermanto and Swastika, 2011). Even the largest 
farmers’ organization, National Indonesian Farmers’ Union (Himpunan Kelompok Tani 
Indonesia or HKTI), was a quasi-state corporatist union. It was affiliated with the ruling party 
Golkar, and leaders of the organization were always from Suharto’s circle. Thus, farmers during 
this era were very passive, lacked technical and managerial skills, and had limited opportunities 
for political mobilization (Booth, 1992;  Tabor, 1992; Tjondronegoro, 2017). Nevertheless, 
because of active government control and government incentives, there was still see a high 
participation rate of farmers in KUDs (Hermanto and Swastika, 2011).  
Furthermore, farmers faced other barriers that hindered their political agency during the 
“New Order” era. First, rural elites used farmers’ organizations for their rent-seeking activities. 
Small farmers, therefore, had less control over farmers’ organizations and policy outcomes. This 
created a wealth disparity among farmers. As a result, farmers’ political agency became limited, 
as collective action among farmers was difficult to achieve (Tabor, 1992). Second, the situation 




increasing, and more land was needed to build infrastructure, factories, and buildings. Thus, the 
“New Order” era was characterized by land conflicts, as land was coercively taken from 
smallholder farmers with little to no compensation. Land grabbing became common since the 
government relied more and more on large investments for their rents. As a result, the lot size of 
farmers declined from 0.93 acres per family to 0.83 acres, and the number of landless farmers 
increased drastically (Booth, 2000). This affected the credit score of farmers, leaving them with 
no assets for mortgages. This entrapped farmers in a circle of poverty. 
Lastly, farmers had less control over their income, as they became dependent on products 
and technology that were costly and cut into their profits. Although KUDs provided farmers with 
access to agricultural inputs, they set high prices for fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides. This 
suppressed the real income of farmers. Moreover, industrialization in the agricultural sector was 
unequal across farmers. The system disproportionately benefited wealthy farmers who were able 
to use the new technologies provided by the central government. Additionally, small farmers 
faced barriers to industrialization. Their traditional values were being replaced by modern 
technological values and adjustment towards a profit-oriented worldview from a communal one 
was costly for them.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described how the “New Order” regime implemented many agricultural and 
developmental programs that, on the surface, supported rural civic participation. One of these 
government programs was specifically aimed at establishing rural organizations known as village 
cooperatives or KUDs. In practice, however, such organizations lacked the ability to enhance 




benefited the small circle of elites surrounding the regime. Thus, despite the proliferation of 
KUDs and its large membership, small agricultural producers rs were passive, not mobilized, and 
could not escape poverty. The farmers’ organizations that existed were more of an instrument of 


































This chapter continues the discussion on the historical and institutional background of 
rural civic participation in Indonesia’s democratic era. Indonesia democratized in 1998 after the 
fall of the New Order authoritarian regime, following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998. 
The new democratic government removed many restrictive policies from the past regime, 
including monopolies, rent-seeking, and unfair economic and political practices. The chapter is 
structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the major institutional shifts during the democratic 
era. Section 3.3 discusses the ways in which these institutional shifts affected rural civic 
participation. Particularly, the removal of rural participation constraints has provided 
opportunities for farmers to participate and organize independently. Section 3.4 discusses the 
challenges faced by independent rural organizations, including under the current decentralized 
system. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Institutional Shift from New Order Authoritarian Regime to Democratic Government  
The democratic government in Indonesia started in 1998 after the fall of Soeharto’s 
authoritarian regime. Following the Asian Financial Crises that occurred between 1997 to 1998, 




Indonesian Rupiahs by 229% in relation to the US dollar. This led to inflation, capital flight, and 
macroeconomic instability. The economic situation was worsened by the weak regulatory body 
and legal framework under Soeharto’s regime. Consequently, mass unemployment spread across 
Indonesia, and the poverty rate increased by a significant amount. By 1998, more than half of the 
Indonesian population lived below the poverty line, with an income of only $0.55 per day.   
The Soeharto regime agreed to a bailout program by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1997 to tackle the economic situation.  However, these bailout programs came with 
strict conditionalities in the form of structural adjustment policies. The IMF imposed a series of 
macroeconomic stabilization and financial restructuring policies on the Indonesian economy, 
mainly on the banking sector. One policy sought to transform private debts into public debts 
through the issuance of state bonds. This, however, burdened the state’s finances which resulted 
in a high national debt, amounting to over 90% of national GDP in 2000 (Sufian and Habibullah, 
2010).  A large portion of the state’s budget today is still being allocated to repay this debt. In 
addition, the IMF also called for the elimination of subsidies on basic commodities, such as 
petroleum and electricity. This increased the price of many basic commodities by 70% (Hara, 
2001). With no improvement in real wages, this economic situation precipitated huge national 
protests, which peaked in May 1998. The protestors demanded Soeharto’s resignation and the 
country undergo a “reformation” process for a democratic transition. This was supported by 
Indonesian civil society, which at the time had become more educated due to the development 
that occurred under the New Order regime. 
Led by the newly appointed President, B.J. Habibie, a number of significant institutional 
changes were adopted during this transition. The government deregulated many aspects of the 




practices were eliminated against rent-seeking practices (Wie, 2002). Additionally, an anti-
competition law was implemented to regulate monopolistic, monopsonist, and collusive practices 
that were prominent in the authoritarian regime. In the agricultural sector, the law made it clear 
that the government no longer had authority over agricultural sales and prices. Soeharto’s 
privileges in many agricultural products, including clove, were removed. As a result, Indonesians 
were able to enjoy freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information, checks and 
balances between the executive and legislative branches of the government, free and fair 
elections, and a depoliticized military. These rights were not available to them in the previous 
regime. 
In addition to the aforementioned internal institutional shifts, the government continued 
to pursue a more outward market approach through the removal of many import and export 
restrictions – both tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) – and promoted international trade and 
investment cooperation in general. The efforts were also part of the IMF structural adjustment 
program attached to the previous bailout program during the New Order era. The Indonesian 
government committed to reducing tariffs to around 5% by 2010. In 2002, Indonesia, along with 
other Southeast Asian countries, signed the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which 
implemented liberal tariffs of 0-5%. To further support market liberalization, Indonesia also 
adopted more transparent trade practices and open administrative trade procedures. 
After the democratization process, Indonesia underwent decentralization in 1999. Power 
was diffused to a larger number of government units at the local level. Power was not only given 
to Indonesia’s 30 provinces but also to more than 300 district governments, both regencies and 
municipalities. The goal was to strengthen regional autonomy and increase social welfare evenly 




between the central and local governments was established along with the division of authorities 
for several national issues. While the central government has authority over foreign policy, 
defense and security, monetary policy, the legal system, and religious affairs, local governments 
were given more power in other areas such as agriculture development and social welfare 
programs. 
After democratization and decentralization that followed in the agricultural sector, local 
governments were given more authority to provide agricultural services that were based on local 
needs, while the central government was responsible for designing and managing strategies of 
national policy (Chordhury et.al., 2009). Under the revised Law of Decentralization (Law No. 32 
Year 2004 regarding Local Governance), local governments were given a larger share of fiscal 
revenue than the central government. The increased role of local governments in managing the 
agricultural sector is further codified through Government Regulation No. 38 Year 2007 
regarding Separation of Local Government Authorities. According to this regulation, the 
agricultural sector is one of the 32 sectors whose budgets can be managed by both central and 
local authorities (Sumarto et.al., 2004). However, local governments are not required to take on 
this task, as not all regions have a strong agricultural sector. This differs from the education and 
health sectors, where all local governments are responsible for managing these budgets. Figure 
3.1 below shows the way the state’s budget is managed between the central and local 
governments. 
Because of this arrangement, most of the government’s agricultural fund is allocated to 
the local governments. Over 80% of the agriculture national budget has been given to local 
governments over the past years, and most government programs are operated by local 




development programs, such as agricultural fields, irrigation systems, infrastructure 


















Democratization and decentralization in Indonesia created an open political system that 
allowed civic participation to flourish. With basic freedoms of expression and association being 
upheld, the number of civil society organizations increased significantly. These organizations 
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include non-governmental organizations, community associations, trade unions, religious groups, 
ethnic-based organizations, peasant organizations, and politically affiliated organizations. From 
2004-2014, the number of civil society organizations throughout Indonesia grew dramatically. 
During the early period of democracy, there were around 40 national labor organizations, 300 
local labor unions, hundreds of peasant organizations, and more than 10,000 labor associations. 
These figures continue to grow. Popular participation in associational life is the most common 
form of civic participation in Indonesia, with 80 percent of the population belonging to such an 
organization (Lussier and Fish, 2012). 
Under the New Order regime, these organizations were not allowed to flourish, during 
which there was only one labor organization and one farmer union in the country. Civil society, 
once previously discouraged by the New Order regime, is now active participants of Indonesia’s 
political life. Civil society has also participated in establishing government accountability rules 
and mechanisms by monitoring the democratic process and participating in the decision-making 
process itself. Lussier and Fish (2012) found that in recent years, there has been both an overall 
increase and change in the type of civil society organizations’ engagement in Indonesia. The 
types of activities observed include demonstrating, publicizing a policy analysis in mass media, 
developing a written advocacy strategy, carrying out a customer satisfaction survey, organizing a 
media campaign, submitting a petition to the government, and lobbying the government. They 
found that almost all types of activities show a dramatic increase, with the notable exception of 
demonstrations. Further, they found that civil society engagement in government planning and 
decision-making processes, specifically, have become more common in recent years. Civil 
society organizations involved in public consultations and planning meetings (Musrenbang) grew 




Graph 3.1 Civil Society Participation in Indonesia  
 
 
With governments being more accessible at the local level, decentralization has created 
new opportunities for civil society to further engage in public affairs. Under the decentralized 
system, many government programs were developed using a bottom-up approach, allowing 
people to participate in national planning and budgeting in public forums such as Musrembang. 
These bottom-up approaches were supported by donor-initiated programs such as the World 
Bank’s Community Driven Development (CDD) program. The program focuses on poverty 
reduction, which results in community participation in planning, budget development, and the 
allocation of funds (Bebbington et al., 2004). This high level civic participation at the local level 
has improved the quality of Indonesia’s democracy and has been a significant part of the 
democratic consolidation process in Indonesia until this day. The presence of strong civic 




associations at the local level promotes trust and develops the capacity to engage politically, 
therefore building strong democratic institutions from the bottom-up (Putnam, 1993). 
 
3.3. The rise of Independent Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs) 
Democratization has also enabled civic participation in the agricultural sector by creating 
the opportunity for farmers to organize and advance their collective interests. The agricultural 
sector shifted from a tightly controlled and clientelist system to a competitive market-based one 
(Khudori, 2005). The government made reforms within the agricultural sector that loosened its 
control over the market. A notable improvement was the elimination of Bulog’s monopoly over 
agricultural activities. This transformed the production, distribution, and marketing processes, as 
they became competitive for the public. Only certain strategic commodities such as rice and 
sugar remained under Bulog’s control, as outlined by Law No 23 Year 1999. Another reform, 
enacted through President Instruction No 18 Year 1998, focused on Village Cooperatives known 
as Koperasi Unit Desa (KUDs). Many privileges from the government, such as fertilizer 
subsidies and other government support, were retracted. KUDs were no longer able to set the 
base price and selling price of commodities and such functions were transferred to the new 
reformed Bulog. This reform was outlined in two regulations, President Instruction No 32 Year 
1998 and President instruction No 8 Year 2000. These new regulations resulted in the dismissal 
of many KUDs during the early years of democratization. 
At the same time, the government also removed restrictions on establishing farmers’ 
organizations. Exploitative agriculture farming through a top-down, monopolistic, and coercive 
approach was no longer allowed. It was replaced by a bottom-up grassroot process (Suarta and 




farmers could freely choose whether to participate in an organization or not. If they did, they 
could organize independently, choose any variety of commodities to plant, and decide how to 
sell and distribute the commodity and by how much. This allowed farmers to handle their 
activities and build market-based relationships with different stakeholders (Montgomery et al. 
2002). Thus immediately after the democratic reform, there was a boom in sector-based farmers” 
associations and cooperatives, known as the RPOs (Suarta and Swastika, 2004). As shown 
previously in Graph 1.1 in Chapter 1, farmers’ associations and cooperatives increased 
significantly, particularly the number of RPOs (both agricultural cooperatives and farmers’ 
associations) and members (shown again in Graph 3.2). 
 Decentralization further allows farmers’ organizations to flourish at the local level since 
they are closer to local authorities (Sumarto et.al., 2004). In addition, local governments tend to 
coordinate with RPOs in distributing government support and provide technical support through 





















Agriculture has become one of the primary sectors that the government has focused on 
during the reformation era. The government views farmers’ organizations mainly as a medium to 
communicate with geographically diverse farmers, which makes coordination less costly. 
Programs such as National Community Development Program (Program Nasional 
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or PNPM) and Rural Agribusiness Development Program (Program 
Usaha Agribisniss Pedesaan or PUAP) are examples of national development programs in which 
the government works closely with farmers’ organizations (Hansen, 2019). RPOs in Indonesia 
are also supported by several government regulations. The Minister of Agriculture Regulation 
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economic conditions, or common commodities to increase the welfare of all members. They 
function as cooperative platforms to increase production and create economies of scale that are 
more efficient and effective. They also serve as places where members can exchange information 
and develop new skills in agricultural farming, productivity, and production. Such organizations 
are not limited to cooperatives but also include other types of rural organizations that do not 
necessarily require regulation like the older KUDs (Syahyuti, 2007). This includes Farmers’ 
organizations (Kelompok Tani or POKTAN) and Collaborative Farmers’ organizations 
(Gabungan Kelompok Tani or GAPOKTAN). 
While Farmers’ Organizations (Poktan) are smaller in scale, Collaborative Farmers’ 
Organizations (Gapoktan) involve several farmers’ organizations working together. Like 
farmers’ organizations, collaborative farmers’ organizations can provide benefits to their 
members by increasing their access to financial support, facilitating collaborative production and 
marketing, utilizing their economies of scale, and increasing earnings and livelihood among 
others. Collaborative farmers’ organizations, however, mostly emphasize their leadership, 
entrepreneurial, and managerial skills. The role of Gapoktan is to provide production facilities 
and farming units, which helps farmers increase their production on a larger scale (Nuryanti and 
Swastika, 2016). In practice, both forms of RPOs have worked closely with one another as well 
as with the government and partnered with different external actors such as business partners and 
NGOs. The dynamics of RPO activities in Indonesia are seen in Figure 3.2. Meanwhile, 
Stockbridge (2007) list several services the organizations provide, including marketing services 
(input supply, output marketing and processing, market information), facilitation of collective 
production activities, financial services (savings, loans, and other forms of credit), technological 




welfare services (health, safety nets), policy advocacy, and the managing common property 
resources (water, pasture, fisheries, forests). 
 
Figure 3.2 The Relationship between Farmers’ Organizations (Poktan) and Collaborative 













The government established laws and regulations to protect farmers and promote their 
development, among others through the enactment of (1) Law No. 16 Year 2006 on Counseling 
System; (2) Law No. 1 Year 2013 on Microfinance institutions; and (3) Minister of Agriculture 
Regulation No. 82 Year 2013 on Developing Farmers Organization and Farmers Network 
Organization (Syahyuti, 2014).  Law No 16 Year 2006 focuses on agriculture, fisheries, and 
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forestry. The Minister of Agriculture Regulation No 67 Year 2016 provides clear guidance and 
support for farmers, including how farmers’ organizations can better cooperate and develop. The 
government’s agricultural extension programs, in particular, support the development of RPOs 
(Hansen, 2019). They provide technical assistance to help farmers develop their production and 
marketing skills as well as their organizational skills. The latter occurs through activities such as 
training, monitoring, information sharing, and evaluation. Training centers for extension officers 
are also built into all levels of government, including at the village level. They provide funding 
to support extension activities as well (Hansen, 2019).  
Democratization has, therefore, increased the important role of RPOs in Indonesia’s 
agricultural sector, as their political influence. New RPOs represent farmers’ interests in the 
economy, as well as in the policymaking. The Sugarcane Farmers Association (Asosiasi Petani 
Tebu Rakyat or APTR), for example, is one of Indonesia’s active farmers’ associations and has 
successfully advocated for the end of sugar smuggling and a reduction of imports (Zulkarnaen, 
2015). A ban on sugar imports was even imposed in response to their demands. Similarly, the 
Association of Indonesian Coffee Farmers (Asosiasi Petani Kopi Indonesia or APEKI), in 
collaboration with other RPOs such as the Gayo Organic Coffee Farmers Association (Persatuan 
Petani Kopi Gayo Organik or PPKGO), is actively involved in developing coffee certifications 
with the government (Mariyudi et.al., 2018). In some cases, strong organizations such as the 
Indonesian Cocoa Commission (Komisi Kakao Indonesia or KKI) have taken the lead in 
formulating national cocoa policy (Narulita et.al., 2014). Such influence is not only seen at the 
national level but also the local level. The relatively close access to local governments, due to 
decentralization, has made farmers interact more with local governments. Because local 




development requires partnership with farmers. Thus, many farmers are invited to policy 
discussions and consultations on planning, implementation, control, and evaluation of different 
agricultural development programs (Jaya and Sarwopasodjo, 2017; Jalieli and Sadono, 2013). In 
many cases, national level organizations and local level organizations are affiliated with one 
another, with each focusing on different responsibilities and strategies. For example, the 
Indonesian Coffee Farmers Associations (APEKI) has its regional level organization, Gayo 
Coffee Farmers, in Aceh. National level organizations are more active in lobbying government 
officials and typically coordinate with different other organizations within the same subsector. 
With more elections held at the local level, farmers’ participation in politics has 
increased. Jaya and Sarwopasodjo (2017) argues that participation in farmers’ organizations 
increases farmers’ abilities to develop organizational and civic skills. Through activities such as 
group discussion, planning, adoption, monitoring, and evaluation, farmers increase their ability 
to make decisions on production inputs and techniques, exercise dialogue, and problem-solve. 
Such civic skills promote rural participation in political activities (Jaya and Sarwopasodjo, 2017; 
Jalieli and Sadono, 2013). Participation in politics particularly increases during election times, as 
political contracts between farmers’ organizations and candidates commonly form during this 
time. To gain rural votes, legislative personnel at the local level pledge their support for 
agricultural programs through the media and face-to-face campaigns and discussions. RPOs also 
engage in politics by encouraging members to enter into the political system. This is done by 
helping members occupy political positions starting at the lowest administrative structure, such 
as the head of villages or a seat in the local parliament (Raya, 2016). In Garut district, for 
example, the Pasundan Federation of Farmers (SPP) holds 13 of the 45 parliament seats 




significantly in number and prominence. Not only do they engage in economic activities, RPOs 
also engage in political activities as well. 
 
3.4 Challenges of Rural Civic Participation under Democratic Era 
Democratization has made a positive impact on rural civic participation in Indonesia. 
However, rural civic participation still faces many challenges that come from both within and 
outside of RPOs. Indeed, despite progressive institutional reforms and strong national 
commitments, many RPOs are still unable to develop. Additionally, most small producers in 
Indonesia are not members of an RPO (Syahyuti, 2014). Based on Indonesia’s Ministry of 
Agriculture data, there are around 318 thousand farmers’ organizations and 10 million members. 
Meanwhile, there are about 21 million other farmers that are not members of an RPO. Moreover, 
successful RPOs are unevenly distributed across Indonesia, as shown in Graph 1.3 of Chapter 1 












Graph 3.2. Indonesia’s RPO Membership across Provinces, 2010 and 2015  
(% of agriculture workers)  
 
 




Establishing viable organizations poses challenges and mainly depends on member 
commitment – their expected benefits and costs. As Olson (1968) argued, rational and self-
interested individuals will have the incentive to free-ride if the conditions make it possible to do 
so. In this case, an individual will choose their personal interests rather than the group’s interests 
based on their expected benefits and costs. Such collective action problems exist in all 
organizations including RPOs. The problem is more pervasive in larger groups, as individuals in 
these groups have greater incentives to shirk commitments. In larger groups, member 
contributions are more likely to be unequal (Booth, 2012). One way to avoid such collective 
action problems is monitor and enforce members’ compliance with the agreed rules and develop 

































































































































































































































































mechanisms such as norms, shared values, and conventions. However, RPOs typically are 
underdeveloped and do not have punishment mechanisms, making collective action problems 
difficult (Syahyuti, 2014). Although some RPOs have informal norms that can overcome such 
problems, the existence of such norms depends on the type of agricultural products managed. We 
can expect such norms to be upheld in RPOs that focus on rice commodities, for example, 
because rice farming requires cooperation among different farmers. On the other hand, products 
such as coffee require less cooperation and, therefore, coffee RPOs may not be able to uphold the 
informal norms needed to avoid collective action problems.  
In many cases, RPOs are formed to obtain financial services and governmental support 
such as capital funding and subsidized fertilizer. This is because certain governmental programs 
are only distributed to verified RPOs. As soon such programs end, many RPO members leave 
these organizations, and the organizations become inactive (Syahyuti, 2007). This contributes to 
the rational calculation made by farmers on whether they are better off joining and establishing 
an RPO or not (Stockbridge et al., 2003). Thus, collective action can only be established if 
expected benefits are higher than transaction costs and capacity enhancement outweighs the costs 
of complying with collective rules and norms.  
Furthermore, successful associations also require strong management and entrepreneurial 
skills, which most farmers with little education lack (Pingali et al., 2005). In fact, farmers do not 
have many characteristics for successful cooperation, such as education and financial capacity. 
This can result into weak organizations. Thus, many RPOs in Indonesia still do not have well-
functioning organizational structures, and they have high member turnover. Some of these 
problems can be traced to practices to Indonesia’s previous authoritarian regime, which resulted 




al., 2003; Syahyuti, 2014). Even large national institutions, such as Bulog, have struggled in the 
transition between the two regimes. 
 
Contextual Factors 
Despite Indonesia’s significant progress and becoming the third-largest democracy 
worldwide, democratization is a work in progress and yet to be consolidated. The development 
of RPOs is no exception. Transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democracy because of a 
deep crisis, rather than modern development, has created challenges in Indonesia’s democratic 
identity and implementation (Hara, 2001). Indonesia lacks a strong political culture and ethics, 
that are needed for consolidating democracy. Moreover, many Indonesians today still face 
economic hardships. Despite the substantial reduction in poverty since the transition to 
democracy, the wealth gap in Indonesia is growing. Many Indonesians care less democracy than 
economic well-being and good governance. This has resulted in an electoral system that is 
marked by many vote-buying practices (Lussier and Fish, 2012).  
Furthermore, Indonesia also faces problems of law enforcement and freedom of 
expression. In many cases, movement remains restricted by Indonesian authorities (Lussier and 
Fish, 2012). Journalists and publishers can face extra-judicial threats and violence from elites 
and even religious organizations. Many political and economic elites are linked to corrupt 
behavior, and to some extent, have the power to influence media and law enforcement. Many of 
these elites, including those with ties to the Indonesian military that benefited from the New 
Order era, succeed in maintaining their power after the reformation. They continue to influence 




Economic corruption is also a major problem in Indonesia and has made daily headlines. 
The pattern of corruption changed dramatically after regional decentralization was implemented. 
Due to proximity to local citizens, decentralization is said to promote active citizenship. This 
distribution of power improves community participation in the decision-making process (Ito, 
2011; Beard, 2005; Greem, 2005). Local government is made more accountable and expected to 
provide public services that are more accessible, appropriate, and efficient to the public (Blair, 
2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Manor, 1999). In contrast, such 
accountability is lacking in the central government, making it relatively unchecked and prone to 
rent-seeking behavior (Ostrom et.al., 1993). The political transitions and governance initiatives 
at the provincial and local level, however, have not resulted in the hoped for progress. Most of 
the corruption cases are found at the local level (Akhmadi, 2017). Because local governments 
started to produce regulations, more officials from multiple levels of government and other 
agencies were able to engage in corruption. Corrupt practices at the local level have resulted in a 
lack of political commitment to rural development (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). Many 
agricultural programs are being used for political ends and subject to manipulation by corrupt 
leaders. This may result in the continuation of a top-down process of government programs that 
lead to public services not suitable for rural producers. Green (2005) have noted that local 
governments that are supportive of farmers are not too common in Indonesia. 
Moreover, local authorities may have inadequate capacity to support farmers’ 
participation in RPOs, in terms of personnel, capability, or financial resources. They may also 
have weak extension services, which suffer from limited funding, few human resources, a lack of 
coordination, and a lack of managerial skills (Purnomo and Lee, 2010; Dendi and Shivakoti, 




since local governments have limited funding (Widodo, 2017). The lack of support of extension 
programs, including training programs, has resulted in a low number of extension officers who 
cannot keep up with the growth of farmers (Widodo, 2017). Extension programs in Indonesia are 
also prone to coordination problems. There are many cases of conflict in implementation 
between different government tiers or between executive and legislative branches (Dendi and 
Shivakoti, 2003). The frequent change of rules and management procedures by the central 
government has also made extension officers confused on how to operate the program (Akhmadi, 
2017).  
As the country democratized, Indonesia also underwent a series of economic 
liberalizations which affected rural activities. After implementing the structural adjustment 
programs suggested by the IMF, the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, and the World Bank in 
1997, Indonesia continued to reduced import tariffs significantly. This resulted in challenges for 
farmers. Foreign investment laws created greater competitive pressures for farmers and tightened 
export margins. New laws that initially limited ownership of foreign investors were changed to 
allow agricultural product exports from 100 foreign-owned companies rather than require foreign 
investors to create joint ventures with domestic companies. Within years after the reformation, 
large international traders and investors opened branches across Indonesia in different sectors. 
Some of the well-known foreign companies include Cargill, Andira, Bero, and Olam. These 
foreign companies have advantages in the production system, which created powerful 
competition and allow them to nearly dominate the agriculture sector. For example, foreign 
companies are estimated to control over 50 percent of the total volume of export in coffee 




Small agricultural producers, therefore, face a new set of challenges – increasing imports, 
market competition, and international standards. They had to compete with large international 
farms that were able to sell at a low price because these farms are heavily subsidized. At the 
same time, their access to efficient production is limited as fertilizer subsidies were eliminated, 
which increased the prices of agricultural production supplies. Additionally, the government 
focused more on the industrial and manufacturing sectors rather than the agriculture sector. This 
is reflected in the low share allocated to the agriculture budget (Breman and Wiradi, 2004; 
Khudori, 2005). A lot of agricultural land was also transformed into housing and used for 
industrial purposes. Within 30 years, land was mostly owned by large companies, housing, 
farms, and mining firms (Simamarta, 2002). As a result, Indonesia became a net food importer in 
many of Indonesia’s main commodities. Rice imports increased by 64%, sugar increased by 
57%, and shallots increased by 50%. At the same time, exports decreased from US$210 million 
to US$3 million, with profits from soybean exports decreasing from US$2.2 million to US$281 
thousand (Khouduri, 2005).  
Under this economic liberalization backdrop, the role of local governments became more 
significant. They became more accountable since they controlled many trade-related policies. 
Regional regulations, such as charges and taxes, proliferated in Indonesia. From 2001 to 2006, 
13,520 regulations were enacted at the province and district levels (Bourgeois et.al., 2003). The 
empowerment of local authorities can, therefore, influence trade activities and encourage the 
public to become more involved in local governmental programs (Sumarto et.al, 2004). As the 
country became more liberal, local governments gained attention from international trade and 
development practitioners. This is because local governments gained a significant role in the 




trade-related issues. According to the Center for International Relations Studies (CIReS), local 
governments have become central actors in developing human resources, product 
competitiveness, infrastructure, and market information needed for trade activities and 
cooperation. Other roles for local governments include providing technical assistance, promoting 
local goods and services, maintaining quality control of products, stabilizing prices, facilitating 
investors, creating easier business conduct and licensing processes, developing infrastructure, 
and maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions. Local governments are expected to 
understand local resources and capacities in order to develop their regions further. Indonesia has 
repeatedly emphasized the role of local governments through its commitment with the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC). 
The role of local governments in international affairs has also been mandated in 
Indonesian Law No.32 Year 2004 clause 42 point 1. It states that local governments can facilitate 
international cooperation on behalf of and regarding local jurisdictions as long as they are still 
protecting the national interest. For example, the Batam, Bintan, and Karimun regions of 
Indonesia have established special economic agreements with Singapore 2006. This cooperative 
agreement covers a duty-free area and trade facilitation issues.  
The increasing role of local governments in the global context has, therefore, raised the 
importance of collaboration between local and central governments in Indonesia. However, this 
is unlikely to happen. There is a lack of central-local coordination and a clash of interests in 
Indonesia that has made many central regulations unable to be implemented at the local level 
(Chowdury et.al, 2009). In many instances, local regulations also contradict central regulations, 
which makes trade and investment programs difficult to conduct. One major problem that exists 




stated in Law No.28 Year 2009, local governments can collect taxes to gain their own revenue. 
However, this has led to over-taxation and high business costs, with Indonesia ranking the 
highest among ASEAN countries (Tambunan, 2006).   
Nevertheless, small agricultural producers have become part of a large production chain 
both at the national and international levels. This allows them to work closely with international 
actors such as international NGOs, donors, and organizations. These external actors, on many 
occasion, have facilitated and assisted farmers in different aspects of their lives (i.e., improved 
production, provided access to health care, transferred knowledge on sustainable resource 
management). However, farmers gain the most by being exposed to new information and 
technology that they did not have before. With foreign goods flowing rapidly into the market, 
farmers who are empowered to voice their concerns by becoming more politically active. Thus, 
despite the challenges of economic liberalization and democratization, several farmers’ 
organizations were empowered (Montgomery et.al., 2002). Indonesian Sugar Association and 
Indonesian Cocoa Farmers (APKAI) are examples of the most powerful political groups in the 
agricultural sector. Within two years of the country’s crisis-driven liberalization, these newly 
empowered sugar farmers allied themselves with the country’s sugar mills to push for re-
regulation of the sugar sector, including the reintroduction of a sugar import ban. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Democratization in Indonesia has paved the way for rural civic participation and RPOs to 
flourish. It provides a way for rural communities to participate in political activities since it 
removes a significant barrier to farmers’ economic and political power – a ban on organizing. 




RPOs – that stymie their progress. RPOs are prone to collective action problems, which hinders 
their viability. Meanwhile, external factors such as the rise in democratic practices in Indonesia 
and economic liberalization, have further limited the progress of RPOs. Indeed, the data shows 
that there is still limited rural producers’ participation in Indonesia, and it differs significantly 
across the country. Even decentralization does not guarantee higher rural participation in RPOs. 
Thus, democratization and decentralization can be considered necessary for rural civic 






























 As mentioned in Chapter 1, studies on RPOs have mostly focused on how RPOs affect 
small agricultural producers’ livelihoods. Studies on how they function as political instruments 
that promote the political participation of members are scarce at best. Although the common 
understanding is that being a member of an organization can increase individual political 
participation, scholars who study collective action and organizations have suggested that not all 
organizations have the same influence on political participation. Some scholars even argue that 
an organization, depending on its characteristics or the contextual environment in which it is 
embedded,
5
  can work in the opposite direction and hamper political participation (Hulme and 
Edwards 1996; Luciak and Gonzalez, 2001). Although many studies have investigated the 
different effects of organizations on political participation, there are no studies on rural 
organizations, particularly RPOs. The goal of this chapter is, therefore, to look at how RPOs 
shape member political participation. 
 Additionally, this chapter considers several conditional factors that might support or 
obstruct farmers’ decisions to participate politically. These factors concern individual 
characteristics of farmers. This chapter thus considers that an organization does not bring the 
                                                             
5
 Hulme and Edwards (1996), for example, argues that organizations who are highly dependent on donors may 




same effect to different individuals, as political participation may vary across individual 
attributes – such as gender and age – within the same organization. Factors considered in this 
chapter are an individual’s structural position in the organization, land ownership status, 
educational level, gender, and age. These factors are based on the agricultural development 
literature and information gathered during fieldwork for this study. 
 To test whether participation in RPOs increases rural political participation, I conduct an 
original survey of 220 farmers that are drawn from 30 villages across three districts of Indonesia, 
namely Keeron, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and Semarang, Central Java. I 
gather information about whether a farmer is a member in an RPO as well as his/her socio-
economic and political information. This chapter focuses on two forms of political participation 
– voting and participating in policy discussions. Through quantitative analysis of the survey data, 
I found that members of an RPO are more likely to participate politically compared to non-
member farmers.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows: The second section discusses the concept of political 
participation as the dependent variable of this analysis, the determinants of political participation, 
and how organizations can promote political participation. The third section presents my 
hypotheses. The fourth section, the empirical strategies section, explains the survey and 
quantitative strategies in more detail. The fifth section provides the empirical findings and 







4.2 Literature Review 
Conceptualizing and Measuring Political Participation 
 To understand how RPOs influence member political participation, the concept of 
political participation must be clarified. Scholars have long discussed the importance of political 
participation. It is commonly understood that democracies will not survive without the political 
participation of their citizens (Almond and Verba 1963; Huntington and Nelson 1976; Verba et 
al. 1978; Dahl 1989; Leighley, 1996; Lijphart 1997; Diamond 1999; Tocqueville, 2003). 
According to past literature, four key components define political participation. They are: (1) 
actions, (2) by the citizens, (3) to influence, (4) policy decisions and government appointment 
(Bennett and Bennett, 1986; Dahl 1989; Verba et al. 1995; Brady, 1999).  In this definition, the 
focus is less about a small group of elites using their power to make policies and more about the 
public’s ability to influence policies. Citizens are considered political actors that can press the 
government to generate policies in their interests (Dahl 1989; Verba et al. 1995).  
 There are different views on what constitutes political participation (Norris, 2002). 
Political participation includes a broad spectrum of activities that, either directly or indirectly, 
influence the government. In general, political participation can be divided into electoral and 
non-electoral forms of participation. Voting is the most direct form of electoral participation that 
can affect the political landscape. Other forms of electoral participation include registering as a 
candidate, being a member of a political party, and campaigning. Non-electoral participation can 
influence the political landscape as well. This includes being a member of community groups or 
associations, participating in public meetings, providing feedback to government officials, being 
involved in a public decision-making process, monitoring government agencies, and 




donating money and wearing symbols of support. Hooghe and Marien (2013) divide political 
participation into institutional and non-institutional forms of participation. Institutional 
participation is participation within the political system, such as voting and direct 
communication with the government. In contrast, non-institutional participation involves indirect 
participation outside formal institutional channels, such as demonstrating, signing petitions, or 
donating money.  
Because of the numerous forms of political participation, scholars have used different 
ways to measure it. Some scholars have separated the different forms of political participation, 
and others have combined them into an index. Pollock (1982), for example, uses an index that is 
composed of three forms of political participation – voting, campaigning, and contacting 
politicians or public officials. Meanwhile, Dinesen et al. (2016) analyze the different types of 
political participation separately. Although previous analyses have mostly used voting as the 
primary indicator of political participation, other forms of participation are also being measured 
and analyzed. The selection and measurement of the variable depends on the purpose and focus 
of the study. If the goal is to understand the overall pattern of political participation, then 
building an index would be appropriate since it captures a wide range of activities. However, if 
the focus is to acknowledge the multidimensionality of political participation and understand the 
effects of different forms of political participation, then analyzing each form separately would be 
more appropriate. 
 Since the goal of this dissertation is to understand how rural producers participate in 
institutional forms of the political system, I focus on voting and participating in policy 
discussions. The former is an electoral form of participation, and the latter is a non-electoral 




social movements, and solving community problems – are also able to influence policy change 
(Diamond 2008; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Holzner 2010), such participation is still 
considered less effective when compared to institutional political participation (Hooghe and 
Marien, 2014). Moreover, institutional political participation has been made more available 
today through the deepening process of democracy and increasing economic liberalization. 
 
Determinants of Political Participation 
The determinants and processes that lead to political participation have been an extensive 
topic in the democracy literature. Political participation as the dependent variable is studied at 
both the micro- and macro-level. Micro-level analyses focus on the individual’s attitudes and 
decisions that affect participation, while macro-level analyses focus on the aggregate level of 
political participation in a region. A series of different explanatory variables have been explored 
at both levels.  
The socio-economic attributes of a person, particularly education, has been widely 
acknowledged to influence the level of a person’s participatory behavior (see, e.g. Verba et al., 
1995; Mayer, 2011; Schlozman et.al., 2012). The role of education in political participation even 
triumph the role of age (Turcotte, 2015). Education increases political participation because it 
allows people to develop an interest in politics, increases awareness of their civic duties, and 
helps them learn skills that are relevant to politics (Verba et al., 1995; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). 
Outside of education, resource model of political participation focuses on other variables besides 
education such as time and income (Verba et.al., 1978; Nie et.al., 1996). Additionally, 
psychological factors also influence an individual’s decision to participate politically. This 




politics, and how satisfied an individual is about their general civic life (Almond and Verba, 
1963; Scheufele, & Moy, 1999). As for the latter point, people who have complaints about 
society and feel like they are being deprived, will have higher rates of political participation than 
those who are satisfied in life. 
  Meanwhile, macro-level analyses consider the relational and social contexts in which 
individual choices are being made. This is because a person’s environment can influence their 
decisions. Studies on individual attitudes are inadequate to explain the different patterns of 
aggregate political participation across different contexts. They are also inadequate in explaining 
why participation in some cases remain low despite the high level of resources available to 
individuals. As we saw with the variation of farmer participation in RPOs, different patterns exist 
across places, including across sub-national states within a country. Contextual factors, which 
can include economic, social-structural, political, institutional, and cultural settings, can 
influence which citizens and how citizens participate. Thus, these factors shape opportunities as 
well as constraints for political participation. 
 The literature on political participation discusses several contextual variables. These 
include social networks, social inequality, political institutions, and democratic transitions. 
Social networks are referenced often in the literature, which claims that social networks often 
include people who share similar cultures and values, which can generate norms of reciprocity 
and trust amongst each other (Putnam, 2000; Krishna, 2008). Similar to the notion of social 
capital, social network promotes social interactions, cooperative behavior, information sharing, 
and community problem solving, which makes political participation possible (Mcclurg, 2003). 
Another contextual factor is social inequality which is argued to increase political participation 




them to participate politically (Lijphart 1997; Coffe and Bolzendahl 2010). Lastly, institutional 
contexts such as regimes, political institutions, and democratic institutions, are argued to shape 
opportunities for political participation (Molyneux 2001).  
 
Political Participation through Organization 
The studies mentioned above look at how different variables directly affect an 
individual’s political behavior. However, there is a strand within the literature that looks at the 
role of organizations in fostering the political participation of members. Although an 
organization can be non-political, its activities can translate into political participation through 
activities such as voting, campaigning, and being involved in policy discussions with officials 
and politicians. 
Many studies have examined how and through what mechanisms an organization shapes 
an individual’s political participation. First, an organization is argued to develop civic skills in its 
members, which facilitate participatory activities (Verba et.al.,1978; Verba et al. 1995; Oxhorn 
2006). For example, members of organizations can develop their communication, presentation, 
and decision-making skills. Second, an organization fosters social capital since members interact 
with one another and develop a sense of shared values, identities, and goals. This, in turn, can 
create motivations to participate politically, particularly in achieving collective goods (Putnam, 
1993). Third, an organization can influence members’ cognitive and emotional functions, which 
can motivate the members to participate politically. Organizations can create a sense of identity, 
self- worth, and, more importantly, political consciousness of civic duties and roles (Diamond 




 However, studies have also shown that not every organization leads to more members’ 
political participation. Member political participation is conditional on the characteristics of the 
organization. Political organizations, such as political parties, have the highest chances of 
member political participation (Jennings, 1997). But, an organization does not necessarily have 
to be political to enhance participation. Scholars have argued that civil society organizations, 
despite not being political in nature, can also draw individuals into political life (Verba et al., 
1978). Some civic organizations that have been discussed in the literature are trade associations, 
labor unions, occupational associations, and non-governmental organizations. Organizations, 
however, do need certain characteristics to promote political participation. 
Having a strong managerial and administrative capability is one crucial aspect of 
promoting political participation. Although these are technical, they ensure that the organization 
is meets its objective. Many cases have shown that organizations fail to enhance political 
participation because they are weakly administrated. This is particularly acute in developing 
countries where managerial and organizational skills are relatively weak in comparison to 
developed countries (Boris et.al., 2002). Activities that deepen the nature and membership of the 
organization are also important in fostering political participation (Brady, 1999). Brady et al. 
(2012), for example, argue that activities that provide educational opportunities, such as 
problem-solving discussions, are important. Group discussions among members can translate 
into more awareness of societal and political issues (Mcclurg, 2003).  
Since an organization consists of different individuals, relational networks among 
members can also promote political participation. When tolerance between members is achieved, 
crosscutting solidarity between different people in the organization is achieved. This leads to 




(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Mutz, 2002). However, this cooperation depends on the 
democratic nature of the organization, as democratic organizations provide a better opportunity 
for members to develop their civic skills (Verba et.al., 1995; Almond and Verba 1963). 
Additionally, whether an organization is voluntary is particularly important in promoting the 
political participation of members. Ayala (2000), for example, found that a person’s political 
participation is higher in a more voluntary organization than in a less voluntary organization 
because there are fewer constraints and decisions are made more freely. Employment 
associations or labor unions, for example, are considered to be less voluntary because 
membership is contingent on the survival of member jobs. This makes the members less free to 
participate and develop civic skills needed for political participation outside the organization 
(Verba et al., 1995). 
In addition, the purpose of the organization also matters. Wilson (1973) has noted that the 
level of political participation differs between three types of organizations: solidary 
organizations; purposive incentives organizations (ideology, collective interests); and material 
rewards organizations (tangible benefits, member services). Wilson argues that political 
participation is highest in purposive incentives groups because political participation goes 
beyond voting and involves more active participation, such as campaigning and contacting local 
politicians.  
Thus, while is it the conventional wisdom that being a member of an organization fosters 
political participation, characteristics of the organization determine the outcome. Those that 
promote democratic values and activities are argued to push their members to participate 






Based on the discussion above, organizational characteristics play a vital role in 
delivering member political participation. Voluntariness and democratic values are two main 
features needed in the organization. In chapter 1, I explain that RPOs ‒ particularly cooperatives 
and producer associations ‒ meet both characteristics. The goal of RPOs is to increase the well-
being of its members through activities that are independent and voluntary (Barton, 1989; van 
Dijk and Klep, 2005). This means that members can join the organization based on their own 
will and thus have a sense of ownership and control over the organization. Additionally, RPO 
activities are based on cooperation among members, particularly in production and marketing 
processes. This intensifies communication among members (Bijman, 2007; Wennink et al., 
2007; Penrose-Buckley, 2007). RPOs are also categorized as purposive incentives organizations, 
which have the highest likelihood of increasing member participation (Wilson, 1973). 
Due to these voluntary and democratic features, RPOs provide a function other than what 
they were designed to do. This function is to foster member political participation. Based on the 
fieldwork I conducted in Indonesia, there are three main channels in which RPOs successfully 
enhance member political participation. First, RPOs provide education that enhances members’ 
civic skills. This results from members’ activities in the organization, such as problem-solving, 
communicating, and cooperating. Second, RPOs provide a venue for information exchange, 
leading to more awareness of members’ political role in society. Often, members share 
information regarding social and political issues that might concern them. Their contacts with 
external actors – such as extension officers, local governments, and traders – also make them 




strengthen social capital within their organizations through cooperating to achieve a collective 
goal. Many of the RPOs I studied were founded because the members either shared the same 
commodities or land. Through collective action, RPOs strengthen solidarity among members. 
These effects, in turn, enhance members’ capacity and motivation to participate in the 
political realm. The analytical framework of this argument can be seen in Figure 4.1 below. 
Since the focus of this analysis is on institutional political participation, the framework tests two 
forms of political participation, voting and participating in policy discussions. The hypotheses 
are below: 
H1: Smallholder producers, who are members of an RPO, are more likely to participate in      
       electoral voting than non-members. 
 
H2: Smallholder producers, who are members of an RPO, are more likely to participate in  
      policy discussions than non-members. 
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I expect that members of an RPO are more likely to participate politically. However, the 
literature has shown that the impact of an organization on member political participation may 
depend on other factors. The literature on organizations has focused on how the characteristics of 
the organization can play a role. Given that not all organizations are voluntary or promote 
democratic values, we would expect variation in the relationship between being a member of an 
organization and political participation. RPOs are not without exception; in fact, most of them 
are still weak (Bourgeois et al., 2003).  Many RPOs in developing countries face problems, such 
as a lack of organizational skills (Markelova et al. 2009 and Poulton et al. 2010), dependency on 
external actors, lack of resources, and internal conflicts. These problems can influence the 
behavior of members. However, whether an organization is democratic is the most significant 
factor affecting member political participation, with democratic organizations more likely to 
increase member participation than non-democratic ones. When certain individual members have 
more power over the organization, organizations may have different effects on different 
members. This is supported by studies that show variations in political participation exist among 
members within the same organization. Guo (2007), for example, found that the leaders of an 
organization have a higher level of political participation than regular members. Fanny (2014) 
found more educated members of a female organization in the South West region of Cameroon 
were more likely to participate politically.   
As with any social organization, RPOs have a political structure that distributes authority 
and power within the organization which may not be done unequally across members. Despite 
RPOs being member-based organizations at their core, not all members of RPOs contribute and 
benefit equally, especially in large settings (FAO, 2015). I argue that certain individual attributes 




certain members from acquiring the capacity and motivation to participate politically. Members 
who have more power or leverage have a better opportunity to develop civic skills. Because of 
this “structural inequality,” the opportunity to develop such civic skills may not be equal across 
members and thus explain the different political participation patterns of RPO members.  
In rural organizations, I argue that four factors can potentially provide such leverage for a 
member. They are (1) structural position in an organization, (2) land ownership, (3) education, 
and (4) age.  
A person who holds a vital role in the organization, such as the leader, secretary, or 
council member, is more involved in bargaining with actors inside and outside the organization. 
Through this role, the member develops more knowledge about the organization and community 
and gets the opportunity to practice their communication and bargaining skills as a representative 
of the organization. Although a regular member could develop these same skills, those who hold 
a structural position in the organization are more likely to be involved these organizational 
activities (Guo, 2007).  
A second factor is education. The role of education on political participation has been 
thoroughly discussed. A person with more education is more likely to develop cognitive skills 
that will allow them to be receptive towards new information (Nie et al., 1996). An educated 
individual is more likely to have an interest in politics and, therefore, a higher commitment to 
civic duties (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). This can foster political participation. Education is also 
said to bring higher social status, which can result in a person holding a central position in 
society. This can also lead to political participation (Nie et al., 1996). 
Third, land ownership also affects political participation. The agricultural development 




million households who do not own any farmlands and are thus agricultural farm workers 
(Barrett et.al., 2008). Most farmlands are either state-owned lands or large farms. One common 
practice, however, is forming a communal land organization. In this practice, a community 
shares land use among members of the organization, but each member can independently 
cultivate their farm. In this case, even though farmers do not formally own land, they do have 
authority over parts of the land. This is in contrast to agricultural farm workers who do not get to 
cultivate for themselves. These landless farmers are dependent on their landowner and have no 
access to credit or have the ability to cultivate and market farm products. Those who own or have 
the authority over land, therefore, have leverage within an organization.  
The last factor that can leverage one’s position in an organization is age. Young people 
are argued to have difficulty accessing the services, opportunities, and benefits provided by 
RPOs as well as participating in decision-making processes (FAO, 2015). Because RPOs are 
rural-based organizations, traditional values – such as holding elders in high esteem – still apply 
in the community.  
Based on the arguments above, the following four hypotheses will also be tested in the 
second part of the analysis:  
H3: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in 
elections/policy discussions if the person holds a structural position in the organization.  
 
H4: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in 
elections/policy discussions if the person has higher education. 
 
H5: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in 
elections/policy discussion if the person owns farmland. 
 
H6: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in 


















4.4 Data and Methodology 
To test the abovementioned hypotheses, both quantitative and qualitative analyses are 
conducted. The quantitative analysis uses survey data to test the correlation between membership 
in RPOs and rural farmer political participation. Meanwhile, qualitative studies are conducted to 
complement the survey by providing more extensive information on RPO membership and how 
it can translate into political participation. The qualitative studies consist of a series of interviews 
with key informants – such as the head of an RPO, extension officers, and randomly selected 
farmers – to gain information on how RPOs function. The purpose is to understand RPO 
activities and how they shape member political participation. Insights from these interviews can 
be used to generate variables for quantitative analyses, i.e. examining how structural position 
might matter. Additionally, these interviews can also help understand the possible causal 
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To gain the necessary data on rural farmer political participation, I conducted a survey 
from July-September of 2016 of 220 rural producers from 30 randomly selected villages in three 
districts of Indonesia: Keerom, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and Semarang, 
Central Java. Each region is located in three provinces – Central Java, South Sumatera, and 
Papua – spanning western and eastern Indonesia (Figure 4.3). They represent a variety of 
geographical conditions, cultures, proximity to the central government, agricultural commodities, 
and level of RPO participation. Each region has different agricultural characteristics. Thus, 
obtaining a sample that consists of this variety can expand the external validity of the 
relationship by confirming that the relationship holds across different context (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979). Central Java is dominated by food crops – such as rice, wheat, and corn –while 
South Sumatra and Papua are dominated by estate crops – such as palm oil and cocoa 
(Agriculture Statistics, Ministry of Indonesia, 2016). RPO membership also varies across the 
three regions. Central Java has the highest rate of RPO membership among the three at 53%, 












Graph 4.1 RPO Membership in Provinces of Indonesia 
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Figure 4.3. Map of Selected Provinces 
 
 
220 farmers from the three districts were then randomly selected and administered a 
survey questionnaire (Appendix A). In selecting the respondents and spreading the questionnaire, 
I was greatly supported by the Agriculture Extension and Human Resource Development 
Agency (AEHRD) in the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. AEHRD is an agency 
under the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia that works closely with farmers on the 
ground and conducts agricultural extension programs. This consists of education, information 
sharing, trainings, and coordination of government-related regulations and programs. The agency 
is regulated under Indonesia’s national Law Number 16 year 2006. Its purpose is to increase the 
productivity and livelihoods of Indonesian farmers through a participatory mechanism. 
Agricultural extension in Indonesia is conducted through regular and systematic programs where 
extension officers regularly visit different farmers within their jurisdiction and follow up on their 




was distributed randomly to farmers from different villages within the representative’s 
jurisdiction. This technique does not follow the stratified sample technique because an equal 
number of villages from each district were not selected. Rather, my technique selected farmers 
directly. 34 samples are drawn from 7 villages in Semarang, Central Java; 96 samples are drawn 
from 9 villages in Keeron, Papua; and 91 samples are drawn from 14 villages in Muara Banyu 
Asin, South Sumatera. To prevent biased answers, the respondents are asked to fill the 
questionnaire anonymously. 
The survey questionnaire consists of information about the farmers’ membership in 
RPOs, agricultural activities, socio-economic characteristics, and forms of political participation. 
Because this chapter seeks to understand institutional political participation, my analysis focuses 
on voting and participation in policy discussions with the government. Both forms of political 
participation are coded dichotomously. If a respondent answered they had participated in the 
activity during the past year, the act was coded as “1.” If, on the other hand, they had not taken 
part in this act in the past year, the action was scored as “0.” Since Indonesia is a decentralized 
country with local elections held independently, the question refers to both national and local 
level elections. On RPO membership, the survey asked whether farmers belong to either 
agricultural cooperatives or producer associations. RPO membership is also coded 
dichotomously. If a farmer is currently a member of an RPO, they are coded as “1.” If they are 
not a member of an RPO, they are coded as “0.” An alternative measure is to code the variable 
categorically and distinguish between non-member, regular member, and member that holds an 
important role in the organization. However, a separate measure on members having a structural 
role in the organization is also included. Thus, coding RPO membership categorically is not 




Official surveys and reports on farmers within Indonesia exist. However, available data 
does not include the questions needed for this study. Most of the surveys gather information on 
agricultural production and the socio-economic information of households. Meanwhile, 
information regarding organizational membership and political participation is almost non-
existent. The largest national survey on farmers, PATANAS (National Farmers Panel), for 
example, provides information on farmer incomes, workforce participation, consumption habits, 
poverty indicators, production assets, technology used, and financial access. Additionally, 
surveys are done annually with a focus on different commodities each year. For example, the 
2011 PATANAS focused on the vegetable subsector, while the 2012 PATANAS focused on 
estate crops.  
 
Model Specification 
To test whether membership in an RPO increases the likelihood of a farmer participating 
politically, I construct the following model and run the estimation by Probit regression model 
using the survey data collected. 
 
PEi = βo + β1RPOMEMBERi + β2 POSITIONi + β3 RPOMEMBERxPOSITIONi + β4 Xi +  εi  … (1) 
  
PPi = βo + β1RPOMEMBERi + β2 POSITIONi + β3 RPOMEMBERxPOSITIONi + β4 Xi +  εi  … (2) 
 
PEi is participation in an election (voting). PPi is participation in a policy discussion. POSITIONi 
are variables influencing a person’s position in the organization. Xi is a set of control variables 




As explained above, two forms of political participation – voting and participation in 
policy discussions with the government – are the dependent variables. RPO membership is the 
primary independent variable. However, other variables can determine individual behavior. To 
test whether an individual’s position in the organization constrains the relationship between RPO 
membership and member political participation, I include the four variables that influence a 
farmer’s position in the organization as the interaction variables in the model. The four main 
variables are whether the farmer holds a structural position in the organization, educational level, 
land ownership, and age. If farmers hold a structural position in the organization, such as the 
head of the organization, treasury, or secretary, they will take the value of “1.” If they do not 
hold any structural positions (i.e. regular members), they will take the value of “0.” Educational 
level is measured by an ordinal variable that goes from “1” for having no education at all, “2” for 
having elementary school education, “3” for having middle school education, “4” for having 
high school education, and “5” for having higher education. Land ownership is a binary variable, 
where a value of “1” represents those who own their own land or have the authority to cultivate 
land, either formal or informally. A value of “0” is given to those who do not own land or have 
authority over land. In other words, the “0” value is given to farmers who are solely agricultural 
workers. Meanwhile, age is a continuous variable dependent on the respondents’ ages.  
Other relevant variables are also introduced to control for alternative explanations for 
farmer political participation. One crucial factor that previous theories have suggested is the 
context in which the organization is located. In the case of RPOs, this may include the type of 
agricultural commodities (staple foods or estate crops) the RPO focuses on, whether the 
organization is in a region where agriculture holds a vital role in the economy, and the farmers’ 




participation through enhancing their civic skills. Thus, it is important to look at how different 
agricultural subsectors – and their different production and marketing systems – can influence 
the development of these civic skills. For example, food staples (i.e. rice) are argued to have a 
more complex production process that requires more coordination during the irrigation and 
milling processes than estate crops (Talhelm et al., 2014). This creates closer collaboration 
between RPO members (Bray, 1986) and provides them with a greater opportunity to develop 
civic skills. The location of an organization also influences an organization’s performance and its 
ability to provide civic skills to members. If the organization is located far from the market, it is 
harder for farmers to coordinate since economic activity becomes too costly. This makes it more 
difficult for the farmers to develop their civic skills (Alene et al., 2008). Similarly, if the 
organization is located in an agriculture dominant region, then farmers may be able obtain more 
substantial support from the government, i.e. infrastructure development, input access, and other 
support. This increases the opportunity for farmers to effectively participate in the organization 
and develop their civic skills.   
Other control variables that I include are those that relate to a person’s affiliation with 
external actors. This includes whether RPO members are affiliated with certain political parties; 
whether they have connections with other civic organization such as religious, youth, and 
women’s organizations, among others; and whether they hold business contracts. This controls 
for the intrinsic characteristic of an individual – whether the person has an interest in politics and 
social activities in the first place (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999). Summary statistics of all 






Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of All Variables in the Model 
Variables Obs Mean StdDev Min Max 
 
Participation in Policy Discussion 
(1=participate) 
 
220 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Participation in Election 
(1=participate) 
 




220 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Education 
(1=no education, 2=elementary school, 
3=middle school, 4=high school, 5=higher 
education) 
 
220 2.35 1.22 1 5 
Age 
 
220 43.4 13.2 19 72 
Structural Position in the Organization 
(1=hold structural position in the 
organization) 
 




220 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Organization located in agriculture 
dominant sector 
(1=located in agriculture dominant sector 
district) 
 
220 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Staple Food as the main agriculture 
commodities (1=staple food) 
 
220 0.61 0.51 0 1 
Distance to market (km) 
 
220 31.42 88.87 1 500 
Member of a political party 
(1=member) 
 
220 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Member of other civic organization 
(1=member) 
 
220 0.44 0.49 0 1 
Hold economic contract 
(1=hold economic contract) 
 





4.5 Empirical results and analysis 
 This section reports estimation results for the model presented above in equation 1 and 2. 
Two forms of farmer political participation – participation in an election (voting) and 
participation in policy discussions with the government – are predicted from membership in 
RPOs and a set of control variables that might be associated with political participation. The 
summary results of my analysis are reported in Table 4.3 – for participation in elections – and 
Table 4.4 – for participation in policy discussions. I estimate the model using different methods 
in which model 1 uses the bivariate probit analysis, model 2 uses the multivariate probit analysis, 
model 3 uses the multivariate logit analysis, model 4 uses the multivariate probit analysis using 
interaction variables, and model 5 uses the multivariate logit analysis using interaction variables. 
The results of my analyses demonstrate that being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood 
of a farmer participating in both forms of political activities. This supports previous theories that 
suggest organizations increase levels of political participation. 
The first step of the analysis is to see whether there is an association between RPO 
membership and farmer political participation. A descriptive analysis of the data shows that 
86.4% of farmers who are members of an RPO participated in an election, and 76% of farmers 
who are members of an RPO participated in a policy discussion (Table 4.2). However, 
individuals who are not members of RPOs also have a high participation rate in elections and 
policymaking. However, they have a lower rate of participation than RPO members do. 61.1% of 
non-members participated in an election, while 55.5% of non-members participated in policy 
discussions. This shows that RPO members have a higher participation rate in both elections and 




shows a significant association between RPO membership and participation in an election. 
However, this does not hold for participation in policy discussions. A similar test is also 
conducted using bivariate probit analysis to see the independent effect of RPO membership on a 
person’s participation in both voting and policy discussions. The results, shown in Model 1 of 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, demonstrate a positive correlation. However, they differ in significance. 
The results illustrate that there is a significant difference in the rates of participation in elections 
between members and non-members of RPOs but not for participation in policy discussions. 
 
Table 4.2 Estimation Results in Explaining Participation in Policy Discussion 
Political Participation Member Non-member 
Participate in election 
Chi2 (1, N=220) = 13.22*** 
 
86.4%  61.1% 
Does not participate in election 
 
13.6% 38.9% 
Participate in policy discussion 
Chi2 (1, N=220) = 2.338 
 
76% 55.5% 













Table 4.3 Estimation Results in Explaining Participation in Policy Discussion 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable = Participation in Policy Discussion 










RPO Member 0.3536 0.498 0.797 0.145 0.377 
 (0.236) (0.275)* (0.469)* (1.453) (2.39) 
Education  0.232 0.3876 0.263 0.448 
  (0.0934)** (0.1570)** (0.255) (0.4282) 
Age  0.0003304 -0.0006 0.0055 0.00997 
  (0.0082) (0.0138) (0.025) (0.0404) 
Land Ownership  0.166 0.297 -0.0186 -0.0287 
  (0.255) (0.428) (0.613) (0.995) 
Hold Structural Position  0.112 0.261 -1.195 -2.021 
  (0.236) (0.413) (0.706)* (1.244) 
Organization located in 
agriculture dominant 
sector 
 0.5979 1.0202 0.618 1.06315 
  (0.322)* (0.525)* (0.333)* (0.542)** 
Market Distance  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.00305 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.00197) 
Member of Political Party  0.805 1.462 0.867 1.5146 
  (0.3030)*** (0.563)*** (0.31813)*** (0.576)*** 
Member of Other Civic 
Organization 
 -0.009 0.029 0.048 0.119 
  (0.207) (0.354) (0.211) (0.362) 
Hold Economic Contract  -0.182 -0.287 -0.0936 -0.202 
  (0.233) (0.405) (0.2438) (0.415) 
Staple food as the main 
agriculture commodity 
 -0.0707 -0.1287 -0.0814 -0.158 
  (0.202) (0.7040 (0.207) (0.35) 
RPO*education    0.013 0.0108 
    (0.273) (0.457) 
RPO*age    -0.0056 -0.0115 
    (0.02654) (0.0433) 
RPO*land ownership    0.3087 0.5309 
    (0.67063) (1.01) 
RPO*structural position    1.551 2.676 
    (0.7544)** (1.334)** 
Constant 0..35549 0.962 -1.624 -0.92 -1.66 
 (0.21373)*** (0.636) (1.056) (1.348) (2.213) 
Number of observation N=220 N=220 N=220 N=220 N=220 




Table 4.4 Estimation Results in Explaining Participation in Election 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable = Participation in Election 










RPO Member 0.8168 0.67 1.185 0.51 0.612 
 (0.2415)*** (0.297)** (0.52)** (1.623) (2.8) 
Education  0.274 0.5267 0.4544 0.777 
  (0.108)** (0.21)** (0.3021) (0.514) 
Age  0.192 0.03357 -0.0025 -0.007 
  (0.0102)* (0.0189)* (0.028) (0.048) 
Land Ownership  -0.484 -0.805 0.045 0.07 
  (0.342) (0.615) (0.688) (1.178) 
Hold Structural Position  -0.1946 -0.3314 -1.0718 -1.5403 
  (0.274) (0.52) (0.7912) (1.38) 
Organization located in 
agriculture dominant 
sector 
 -0.46734 -0.871 -0.324 -0.652 
  (0.474) (0.924) (0.48) (0.925) 
Market Distance  0.00073 0.00115 0.008 0.0013 
  (0.0017) (0.00296) (0.0017) (0.003) 
Member of Political Party  1.098 1.915 1.09 1.943 
  (0.262)*** (0.456)*** (0.268)*** (0.467)*** 
Member of Other Civic 
Organization 
 0.224 0.415 0.235 0.429 
  (0.261) (0.474) (0.263) (0.481) 
Hold Economic Contract  0.52 0.999 0.553 1.0775 
  (0.32) (0.6303) (0.3293)* (0.673) 
Staple food as the main 
agriculture commodity 
 -0.117 -0.244 -0.0876 -0.1811 
  (0.247) (0.46) (0.2528) (0.4701) 
RPO*education    -0.238 -0.371 
    (0.32626) (0.568) 
RPO*age    0.02617 0.0497 
    (0.0306) (0.0525) 
RPO*land ownership    -0.6791 -1.135 
    (0.806) (1.428) 
RPO*structural position    0.923 1.313 
    (0.845) (1.494) 
Constant 0.282 0.023 -0.041 0.064 0.315 
 (0.211) (0.748) (1.42) (1.4985) (2.55) 
Number of observation N=220 N=220 N=220 N=220 N=220 




To test whether RPO membership contributes to the different levels of political 
participation instead of other variables, I conduct a multivariate analysis to estimate the effect of 
RPO membership on farmer political participation. Multivariate analysis lets us control for other 
potential alternative explanations that can contribute to farmer political participation. Table 4.2 
and Table 4.3 report the results. For participation in an election, both probit and logit models 
show a positive and statistically significant relationship. This means that members of RPOs are 
more likely to participate in an election. This relationship holds even after controlling for other 
alternative explanations. The inclusion of contextual variables, such as commodity type and 
geographical location, suggest that the relationship is generalizable across contexts. 
Similarly, both probit and logit estimation show that after controlling for other alternative 
explanations, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between RPO 
membership and participation in policy discussions. This result reaffirms many organizational 
theories that argue that being a member of an organization will increase the likelihood of a 
person participating politically. This result shows that the theories apply to a specific type of 
organization, RPOs (agricultural cooperatives and producer associations), in rural agricultural 
communities.  
To determine the magnitude of the relationship, I calculate the marginal effect of the 
estimates. This is reported below in Table 4.5. Based on the results, we can see that farmers who 
are members of an RPO are 16.9% more likely to participate in policy discussions than farmers 
who are not members of an RPO. Similarly, farmers who are members of an RPO are 17% more 





Table 4.5 Marginal Effect on Probabilities of Political Participation 
Independent Variables 
Marginal Effect on 
Participation in Policy 
Discussion 
 






















































































Since the position of a member in an organization can yield different levels of political 
participation, I also test whether the relationship between RPO membership and a person’s 
political behavior is conditional on a person’s position in the organization. Model 4 and 5 in both 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the results of the estimation. The general finding is that a person’s 
position in the organization does not determine his/her political participation. For participation in 
elections, participation is not influenced by structural position in the organization, land 
ownership, age, or education. For participation in policy discussion, the estimations show that 
only holding a structural position in the organization influences the level of member 
participation. This is reasonable since most policy discussions with authorities may only involve 
representatives of the organizations instead of all members. However, participation in policy 
discussions does not differ by age, education, and land ownership. 
Other findings also reaffirm several previous studies. First, education increases the 
likelihood of a person participating in both elections and policy discussions with the government. 
This confirms the education theory of political participation. Second, the significance of several 
variables that relate to the contextual factor of the organization is also confirmed. In particular, if 
the organization is located in an agriculture dominant sector, farmer participation in policy 
discussions increases. This shows that in an agriculture dominant region, governments are more 
inclined to support farmers by involving them in policy discussions than farmers who are in 
regions where agriculture is less significant to the economy. Third, having an affiliation to a 
political party increases the likelihood of a farmer participating in both elections and policy 
discussions. This is reasonable since political organizations can mobilize members to participate 
in elections and policy discussions more than organizations who do not have political party 






 The goal of this chapter was to see whether being a member of a Rural Producer 
Organization increases the likelihood of farmers participating in two ways – voting in elections 
and participating in policy discussions with the government. This, in turn, is to see whether 
membership in RPOs represent one component of rural political agency, which is the focus of 
this dissertation. The empirical results show that farmers who are members of an RPO are indeed 
more likely to participate in both forms of political activities than farmers who are not members 
of an RPO. This relationship holds even after controlling for other alternative explanations 
gathered from past theories or fieldwork. The relationship in general also holds across all 
members of an RPO regardless of the position they hold in the organization, their age, their 
education, and their land ownership status. This suggests that RPOs, in general, are relatively 
democratic in that every member of the organization has the same opportunity to develop civic 
skills, receive information, and build trust with other members. Thus, these members can 
develop skills that enhance political participation. Additionally, membership in an RPO makes 
farmer political participation more likely than membership in other civic associations, such as 



















 The previous chapter demonstrated the importance of RPOs in shaping rural political 
agency. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to understand the factors that explain rural RPO 
participation in Indonesia. As discussed previously, there is still a limited understanding of the 
contextual factors that contribute to the level of rural participation in a region. In the case of 
Indonesia, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show that a change in the political system from an 
authoritarian to a democratic regime has shaped how rural communities participate in these 
RPOs. However, the variation in rural participation under Indonesia’s decentralized system 
indicates that there are other possible contextual explanations outside the political system. Using 
mixed-method qualitative and quantitative approaches, this chapter identifies these other 
contextual features and tests how they correlate with rural participation in RPOs. Through an 
interview I conducted on selected farmers, several contextual factors were identified – (1) 
exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of government support programs, and (3) existence 
of external supporting actors. Based on these factors, a survey was also conducted to see which 
of the variables were most common. A quantitative approach – a fixed-effect panel data 
regression on panel data of Indonesian states from 2010 to 2015 – was then used to test the 
correlation between these contextual factors and participation in RPOs. The period selection is 




availability of RPO membership. Data on RPO membership at the local level, both province and 
district levels, are only available since 2010 from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Republic of 
Indonesia. The empirical results show that regional exposure to international trade is the main 
factor that explains variation in rural participation in RPOs.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 discuss the interviews and survey I 
conducted, which provide the bases for the variables I test in the quantitative analysis. In this 
section, I discuss how the survey and interviews demonstrate that exposure to trade liberalization 
is the primary reason small agricultural producers join RPOs. Section 5.3 discusses the analytical 
framework and hypotheses connecting trade liberalization to rural participation. Section 5.4 
explains the empirical strategies, measurement, and data that are used. Section 5.5 discusses the 
empirical findings and analyses. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Qualitative Research: Insights on Contextual Factors Explaining Rural Participation 
 To understand which contextual factors influence the level of rural participation in RPOs, 
I conducted interviews and a survey. Ten members of an RPO, where six hold important 
positions in the organization, were interviewed to identify key contextual factors that motivate 
farmers to join their organization. A semi-structured interview using a set of questions 
(Appendix B) was adopted during my research fieldwork in the summer of 2017. This allowed 
participants to provide information that is important to them but not necessarily reflected in the 
interview questions. The selected participants were active members of an RPO and represented 
each region under study as well as different agricultural products to obtain a diverse set of 




Resource Development Agency (AEHRD), Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia that 
works closely with Indonesian RPOs.  
The interview results show that several main conditional factors influence farmers’ 
participation in RPOs: (1) the exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of government 
support programs, and (3) existence of supporting external actors. For the most part, farmers that 
were interviewed had a similar initial response when asked what motivated them to join an RPO. 
In other words, farmers were motivated to join an RPO to stay competitive in the market, as they 
are concerns over the fluctuating prices and the low selling price of agricultural products in 
Indonesia due to the effect of global market activities. A sugar farmer, for instance, said that he 
and his group were having a hard time selling their sugar products due to the increasing sugar 
imports coming into Indonesia. According to him, this has created a fall in sugar prices for local 
farmers, as they are not well equipped to compete in the growing market. Furthermore, he 
explained that farmers have limited resources, such as capital, inputs, and finances, making many 
of them feel excluded from the market. Similarly, a rubber farmer described that due to a more 
open market, the government has less control over agricultural prices, making it difficult for 
farmers to sell their products at a competitive price. With limited financial options and other 
resources, it is more challenging for farmers to keep up with global competition.  
When asked whether being in an RPO helped, the rubber farmer responded that while 
farmers still struggle with a stiff competitive market, being members of an RPO have helped 
them connect to the government and important actors, such as distributors and business partners. 
“At least when the government understands that the commodity price is harming us, they will try 
to be in touch with rural organizations to make purchasing arrangements,” he further responded. 




market is by working together and finding the solution, either through making our productions 
more efficient or by raising the problems to relevant authorities.”  Palm oil farmers agreed with 
these statements and put much emphasis on the role of RPOs in increasing the collective 
bargaining position of farmers, mainly with the government and traders.   
Exposure to trade has also brought other challenges for farmers, such as having to adhere 
to stricter regulations and standards in the global market. The agricultural market has become 
more complex due to more extended and sophisticated supply chains. This creates stricter 
regulations, higher food safety and quality standards, and changing consumption patterns 
(Narayanan and Gulati, 2002). Because farmers have limited access to information in the formal 
market as well as limited ways to share information amongst each other, they face high 
information asymmetry. Thus, it is difficult for them to meet market requirements (Gulati et al., 
2007). Several participants talked about this problem and explained that on many occasions, their 
export sales were rejected because their products were deemed unqualified. Many of the 
participants explained that being a member of an RPO has allowed them to overcome these 
challenges because they have access to many governmental and non-governmental programs that 
help them meet the necessary requirements. This has allowed them to penetrate foreign markets. 
A palm oil farmer further emphasized, “[B]eing a member of an RPO is a mechanism for them 
[farmers] to connect with the government and related authorities so that concerns over the global 
market can be conveyed.” 
Indeed, access to governmental programs is also the main reason why farmers join RPOs, 
as indicated by my respondents. In Indonesia, most of the government’s agricultural support is 
distributed through RPOs, although not necessarily. Farmers can also get support directly from 




provides it through RPOs instead of sending it directly to farmers. When asked how often and 
through what means – through their RPO or directly – they receive government support, the 
answer varied among respondents. A rice farmer answered that she received much government 
support, i.e. seeds and equipment, through her organization and never directly from the 
government. However, the rubber and palm oil farmer experienced both. The rice farmer stated 
that the government tended to provide rice through RPOs because rice cultivation required 
farmers to coordinate their irrigation. This was not true for other products, such as palm oil.  
Either way, this accessibility to government agricultural support is one of the primary motivation 
for farmers to join RPOs.    
Respondents also replied that the existence of active external supporting actors, the 
agriculture extension officers in particular, was another reason why they joined RPOs. When 
such external actors are actively available, farmers can benefit from their guidance and 
information, thus increasing their productivity and competitiveness. The rice farmer explained 
that many rice farmers in her area were enticed by extension officers to join an RPO because 
they offered guidance programs. Extension officers, however, are not the only external actors 
that can influence farmers’ decisions to join an RPO. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and business partners looking to cooperate with farmers are also common. Collective action 
among farmers through RPOs can make such relations more effective. One farmer said: “...it is 
easier for them to work with us as a group rather than individually.” Moreover, he explained that 
because they are now linked to global commodity chains and global food supplies, many farmers 
are motivated to join RPOs to increase their market access in the global market. Additionally, 




because RPOs not only provide a mechanism for collective activities, but they also overcome 
fundamental issues, such as economies of scale and access to financial institutions.  
A survey was then conducted towards the same group of farmers survey was conducted 
in Chapter 4 to see which of the identified factors were predominant. One of the questions asked 
on the survey was: “what motivates you to join rural organizations such as agriculture 
cooperatives or producers organization?” Results are shown in Graph 5.1. where we see 
exposure to trade liberalization as the main motivating factor for farmers to join an RPO, 
followed by government support incentives. 
Graph 5.1 Survey Result on Farmers’ Motivation to Participate in RPOs 
 
Since exposure to trade has been identified as the main contextual factor driving farmers 
to join an RPO, the next section provides an analytical framework on the relationship between 
































5.3 Analytical Framework and Hypothesis 
 To complement the insights gained from the interviews and survey above, this section 
builds an analytical framework on the relationship between trade liberalization and rural civic 
participation. The literature indicates that there are three main channels in which trade 
liberalization can translate into higher rural civic participation: (1) distributional economic effect, 
(2) government accountability, and (3) information effect. The distributional economic effect 
relates to how trade distributes benefits differently across different actors, as the Stolper-
Samuelson (SS) theory suggested. The SS theory is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model 
which argues that countries will produce goods based on their relative abundant factors or 
endowments. Take an example of two countries, where one has a capital-abundant factor and the 
other has a labor-abundant factor. The country with a capital-abundant factor will produce 
capital-intensive goods, and the country with a labor-abundant factor will produce labor-
intensive goods. Both countries gain from trading with each other so they can both acquire what 
they lack. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is the extension of the H-O model, which states that a 
rise in the relative price of a good will lead to a rise in the return on the factor used most 
intensively in the production of the good. Conversely, it will lead to a fall in the return on the 
factor that is used less in the production. In a two-factor model, such as skilled and unskilled 
labor, trade will increase the income of those with abundant factors in the country and reduce the 
income of those with scarce factors. Thus, the theory suggests that the income of unskilled labor, 
the abundant factor, will increase in comparison to skilled labor in developing countries. The 




towards society, scholars have argued that trade can shape national coalitions, either based on 
class (Rogowski, 1989) or sector / industry (Gourevitch, 1986; Frieden, 1991).  
Since the agricultural sector in developing countries is dominated by unskilled labor (i.e. 
small farmers) and is land intensive, the SS theory would then predict that trade liberalization 
will increase the livelihood of small farmers. When this is the case, the modernization theory of 
democracy suggests that this can promote civic activism in rural communities. This is because 
farmers gain more access to education and, therefore, become more receptive towards new ideas 
(Schumpeter, 1950; Lipset, 1959). The reality, however, shows that trade does not necessarily 
benefit farmers economically. Instead, my interviews show that trade poses income risks for 
farmers, as they face higher market competition and stricter regulations. Several studies have 
suggested that globalization, in general, has resulted in large corporations dominating the global 
agri-food system (Jussaume, 1998; Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002). Many small farms are 
being replaced by these large multinational corporations, and the latter have more political 
influence to obtain benefits from the government and shape public policy (Roach, 2007). 
Likewise, a study by Paul (2013) suggests that current global production is dominated by a 
handful of companies that creates an oligopoly in the global agricultural market. For instance, 
three of the biggest seed producers dominate 90% of global sugar beets. A similar situation can 
be found for 57% of global maize production and 55% of global soya beans production. 
However, risks from trade liberalization do not necessarily mean rural deprivation. In 
many cases, rural populations have revolted and created movements to fight these challenges. 
Moyo and Yeros (2005) review how rural movements arose in three continents – Africa, South 
America, and Asia. These popular resistances challenged the neoliberal state and the ways in 




commodification of land policies. Van der Ploeg (2009) also reiterates this view. He argues that 
when confronted with increasing dependence on global market and depeasantization, rural 
populations can form resistances to the capitalist production logic and form counter movements 
of repeasantization. Bhavnani and Jha (2013) also test this close relationship between “trade 
shocks” and rural movements in India. They find that pro-democracy independence movements 
and parties in India are mostly active in regions that have experienced negative trade shocks. 
Thus, the first channel that links trade and rural civic participation aligns closely with the 
information obtained in the interviews – distributive economic effects of trade liberalization 
motivate rural civic activism. 
The second channel is government accountability. Trade can improve governance since it 
requires institutions that are transparent, less corrupt, and able to provide equal opportunity for 
different stakeholders to increase their incomes and conduct efficient resource allocations 
(Bonaglia et.al, 2001; Aman, 2001; Chesterman, 2008). Through its potential benefits, trade can 
also increase a government’s financial capacity. Governments can receive higher revenues from 
taxes, tariffs, and other fees associated with trade activities. To gain these benefits, governments 
have incentives to create stable economic and political conditions and enhance their 
responsiveness. Thus, trade creates a more accountable government that is more likely to be 
responsive to the need of its citizens. This allows RPOs to flourish, as government support is one 
important factor that contributes to the success of RPOs . 
The last channel is the information effect of international trade. The basic argument is 
that trade will lead to higher interactions among small farmers as well as with other actors –such 
as traders, local governments, importers, investors, NGOs, and other international organizations. 




democratic practices. Latynskiy (2016) argues that these external actors can help sustain 
successful RPOs. Since trade reduces information and traveling costs and intensifies the 
interactions among foreign countries and individuals, the transmission of new ideas is more 
attainable. This paves the way for more democratic practices to be implemented. Exposure to 
trade liberalization will therefore create incentives and awareness among farmers to mobilize and 
take part in new participatory acts such as joining rural organizations.   
Figure 5.1 shows the summary of the analytical framework described above. Based on 
this argument, the following hypothesis is tested:   
H1: Increase exposure to trade will increase rural participation in RPOs. 
 












The relationship between trade and rural participation in RPOs, however, is conditioned 
by agricultural landscape. Different regions vary in commodities and endowments. The literature 
on democracy has indicated that factor endowments play an important role in determining 
whether trade increases democratic processes. The focus is on the economic conflict between 
elites – who are equipped with high capital endowments – and citizens with high labor 
endowments (Robinson, 2006). In labor-abundant countries, trade will increase the income of 
labor and allow them greater de facto political power, resulting in more democratic practices. 
However, the same does not hold for capital-abundant countries, where trade widens income 
inequality and provides an avenue for elites to gain more power. This theory is further tested by 
Doces and Magee (2015) who argue that a higher level of trade in labor-abundant countries is 
associated with an increase in democratic processes. This is not true in capital-abundant 
countries.  
Although the above theories are used to understand national level democracies, I argue 
that they can be applied to local level democratic practices as well. Within the agriculture sector, 
endowment factors vary. There are land-abundant regions    regions with high land-owning 
farmers – that are typically dominated by large agricultural lands. There are also labor-abundant 
regions – regions with high landless farmers. Based on the SS theory, trade liberalization will 
benefit areas based on their endowments factor. In a labor-abundant agricultural area, trade will 
benefit agricultural laborers more than it will benefit those with land-abundant factors. This 
increases the possibility of rural participation. In contrast, in a land- and capital-abundant area 
(i.e. dominated by large agriculture land ownership), trade will not benefit agricultural laborers 




As agricultural regions may vary in this regard, the effect of trade on rural civic 
participation can differ. I adopt the factor endowment theories in the trade and democracy 
literature and test whether trade increases rural civic participation only in regions that are labor-
abundant. The following hypothesis is tested:  
H2: Trade will increase rural participation in RPOs in areas with labor-abundant agricultural 
sectors. 
 
5.4 Empirical Research Design 
The Model 
To test both hypotheses above, I develop a model that explains the level of rural 
participation in RPOs as follows: 
RPOit = αo + α1TRADEit + α2ENDWMNTit + α 3Xit + α4 Λ it + εi 
RPOit is rural participation in RPOs, TRADEit is the level of trade liberalization or trade 
exposure, ENDWMNTit is a variable that captures endowment factor, Xit is a list of control 
variables, and Λ is the interaction between trade liberalization and endowment factor.  The main 
independent variable is trade exposure and its interaction with the endowment factor. The 
relevant control variables included are those that have the potential to explain rural participation 
in RPOs, such as demographic information, human development, and a state’s economic 
characteristics. 
I test the model on Indonesian state-level data between the period of 2010-2015. While, 
ideally, this theory should be tested across countries, data on rural organization membership at 
the national level are very limited. Moreover, such organizations may not be comparable since 




Since the model is tested across Indonesian states, socio-political variations across states  is 
required.  The selection of the time period is therefore based on the period in which Indonesia 
has decentralized (2004 onward) as well as the availability of Indonesian RPO membership data 
(which starts in 2010). I ran the model by using both fixed effect and random effect regression 
for the panel data. This allows me to control for potential unobserved variables and differences 
across states and time since it contains information on both intertemporal dynamics and 
individual characteristics. The panel data is balanced and includes a total of 186 observations. 
The dataset is constructed using several data sources described in the following section.  
 
List of Variables and Measurements 
Dependent Variable: Rural Participation in RPOs 
 The dependent variable in this model is rural participation in RPOs, which measures RPO 
membership in a region. It is measured by calculating the total number of agricultural farmers 
belonging to RPOs divided by the total agricultural farmers in the state. It includes different 
types of RPOs, including agricultural cooperatives and producer associations. This measure, 
however, does not capture the magnitude of rural participation because high membership level 
does not necessarily mean more activities and high member engagement. For example, an 
organization may have a high rate of membership but low contribution from its members. 
However, scholars have argued that calculating RPO activities is a difficult task since there are 
different forms of RPOs with different activities, goals, and characteristics (Shiferaw et al, 2009; 
Fischer and Qaim, 2011; Ragasa and Golan, 2012). When this task is possible, it is typically 




activities is almost impossible to do. Membership level is, therefore, a better proxy to determine 
the level of rural farmer engagement in an organization. 
Moreover, I argue that because RPOs are voluntary organizations, being a member of an 
RPO is itself a form of rural farmer participation. Data on the number of farmers joining RPOs 
and total agricultural workers are obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Republic of 
Indonesia. The data on RPO membership is obtained specifically from the Extension Program 
and Human Resource Development Department under the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of 
Indonesia (BPPSDMP).  
 
Main Independent Variable: Trade Liberalization 
 The main independent variable is trade liberalization, which is defined by the level of 
market openness in a region. The literature on trade has used different ways to measure trade, 
which includes tariff levels and policies, trade volume, deviation measures, and subjective 
indexes (Spilimbergo et. al, 1999; Calderón et al, 2005). Scholars have argued that to measure 
the level of openness, we need to look at trade policy instead, i.e. tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
However, quantifying trade policies, particularly for non-tariff barriers, is difficult. In this study, 
trade policies are not relevant to use since I am conducting a within-country analysis. Trade 
policies tend to be made at the national level. Trade volume (ratio of export and import to GDP) 
is the simplest and most commonly used measure. The measure, however, is problematic because 
trade volume does not reflect actual trade policy because it captures the real level of trade 
openness. This level can be affected by other things, such as geographical conditions, income, 
and size of the economy. The second trade measure that is commonly used is whether the region 




trade is measured not only by its density but also by its type. The classification that is commonly 
used is whether a region is a net importer or net exporter, and thus trade is measured by the trade 
balance. The trade balance is the difference between the value of goods exported and goods 
imported for a certain period of time. The code “1” represents net importer – where imports 
exceed exports – while “0” represents the opposite, a net exporter. 
Since there are debates on how best to measure trade, I use both trade volume and trade 
balance to check the robustness of the theories. Moreover, since the interest of this study is rural 
agricultural communities, both measures are more relevant to the theory since they focus on the 
agricultural sector. Trade volume is measured by the ratio of total agricultural exports and 
imports per agriculture GDP of a region. Trade balance is measured by the difference between 
agricultural exports and imports. To check whether rural political participation in RPOs can be 
influenced by the general trade liberalization of a region, I also conduct an analysis using general 
trade volume. In this case, state level data on trade and GDP are used rather than agricultural 
sector data. All the dataset used here are obtained from the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics 
(BPS). 
 
Control Variable: Endowment Factor 
 Endowment factor is defined by the production factor endowed in the region. Based on 
previous trade theories, endowment factor is divided into those that are endowed with labor and 
those that are endowed with capital owners. Within the agricultural sector, the division can be 
based upon agricultural landowners and those that are purely agricultural laborers. An ideal way 
to measure endowment factor is by looking at how many farmers own land. However, such data 




Data (PATANAS), have explored the subject but are done at the individual level and typically 
concentrate in a specific area at different times. Thus, I cannot find state-level data that is 
comparable across cases.  
An alternative measure is to look at the type of commodities dominating the region. The 
agriculture subsector consists of five main sub-sectors – staple foods, horticulture, livestock, 
fisheries, and estate crops. Based on the Indonesian National Farmer Survey Data (PATANAS), 
smallholder farmers dominate the staple foods subsector more than private plantations and 
national state-owned enterprises. In 2003, the number of smallholder farmers in the staple food 
subsector reached 18 million. In 2013, there was a slightly lower number of 17.7 million 
smallholder farmers. This represented around 60% of total smallholder farmers in Indonesia 
(PATANAS, 2014). Further data on smallholder farmers within the Indonesian agriculture 
subsector is shown in Graph 5.2 and Graph 5.3. 
Based on this reasoning, I use a proxy for endowment factor by looking at the share of 
staple food commodities in the agriculture sector of a region. If a region’s agriculture sector is 
dominated by staple foods, I assume that land ownership is low. Therefore, that region can be 
considered a labor-abundant region. On the contrary, a region in where non-staple food 
commodities dominate indicates high land ownership. Thus, this region can be considered a 
land-abundant region. The share of the commodity is calculated by the ratio of the total 
production of staple food to the overall agricultural GDP. All relevant data ‒ state level 
commodity production and agriculture GDP ‒ is obtained from the State Statistics Annual 






Graph 5.2 Number of Smallholder Households Based on Agriculture Subsector* 
 
* A smallholder household can cultivate multiple agriculture commodities. 
 Source: Indonesian National Farmer Survey (PATANAS, 2003, 2013) 
 
 
Graph 5.3 Number of Large Agriculture Companies Based on Agriculture Subsector 
 





























































Control Variables: Socio-political factors 
 Other variables are included in the model to control for alternative explanations of rural 
participation in RPOs. The variables include socio-economic and political factors as well as the 
structure of the agriculture sector in the state. Socio-economic factors measure the 
developmental level of the population in the state. This includes poverty level, inequality, share 
of rural population, and the human development index. Poverty and inequality are expected to 
have a negative correlation with rural participation in RPOs. This is because poorer rural 
populations will have less capacity and power to act in a collective manner. Meanwhile the 
human development index is expected to have a positive correlation with rural participation in 
RPOs. Scholars have long acknowledged the importance of high socio-economic standings for 
democratic practices, such as civic participation (Lipset, 1960; Diamond, 1999). Despite doubts 
about the ability of these theories to explain the recent wave of democracies, scholars and 
practitioners commonly agree that democratic practices will survive better in the presence of 
wealth and development. Data on poverty, inequality, and the human development index are 
obtained from the State Statistics Annual Report, which is provided by each state’s 
representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS). The human development index 
data from the BPS consist of three elements: life expectancy, educational level, and income.   
 Another control variable that is included in the model is the structure of the agriculture 
sector in the state. This includes the share of the rural population in the state, agriculture share to 
GDP, whether the agriculture sector is the main sector of the state, and farmer access to 
agriculture credit. It is expected that a when the agriculture sector plays a large role in the 
economy ‒ indicated by the population share, economic share, and its relative position in the 




farmers will be more accessible. And when the agriculture sector is important in the economy, 
the government is also more likely to include rural participation in public affairs as well as 
encourage farmers to become members of RPOs. Additionally, access to agriculture credit is 
important for encouraging rural participation in RPOs since RPOs are economic-based and, 
therefore, require financial institutions. The data is obtained mostly from State Statistics Annual 
Report provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS) 
as well.  
Data on whether agriculture is the main sector is obtained by calculating the share of 
agriculture GDP to the overall GDP. I then construct a measure where the agriculture sector in 
the region is considered the main sector when the agriculture share is over 50 percent of the 
overall GDP. I code the regions using a binary measure – “1” represents agriculture as the main 
sector of the region, and “0” stands for the reverse. Meanwhile, agriculture credit is calculated by 
the value of total credit given in the agriculture sector per agriculture GDP using the data 
obtained by the Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia. 
The last control variables are those that are related to political factors. These include the 
number of jurisdictions and the election period. The number of jurisdictions is the number of 
districts within the state based on the data obtained from the Ministry of National Affairs 
Republic of Indonesia. Since rural participation in RPOs often requires collective action and 
cooperation between different farmers across districts within a state, more jurisdictions in a state 
is expected to reduce rural participation in RPOs. In addition, rural participation in RPOs is 
expected to flourish during the election period because farmers in developing countries are a 
large share of voters. In Indonesia, farmers are included in the 65% of blue-collar voters, making 




(Mujani et. al, 2018). Moreover, agricultural issues are a sensitive election issue in Indonesia and 
other developing countries since many developmental problems lie within the agriculture sector. 
Thus, many vote-buying activities that deliver agriculture needs, such as fertilizer and loans, are 
mostly conducted through an organized body such as an RPO. In Indonesia, for example, 
supporting the Indonesian National Farmer Association (HKTI) is common for political 
candidates who want to gain support from farmers across the country.  
A summary of all the variables, definitions, and measurements is displayed in Table 5.1 
below. Descriptive statistics of each of the variables are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1 List of Variables 
 




The level of Rural Producer 
Organizations (RPOs) 
membership in the state 
 
Percentage of small 
agriculture producers 
belonging to RPO to total 
small agriculture producers in 
the state 
Extension Program and 
Human Resource 
Development Department, 
Ministry of Agriculture 




Level of agriculture market 
openness  
Total agriculture export and 
import per agriculture GDP  
Indonesian Center Bureau 
Statistics (BPS). 
GENERAL TRADE Level of the overall market 
openness 
Total export and import per 
agriculture GDP 
Indonesian Center Bureau 
Statistics (BPS). 
NET IMPORT Trade balance shows higher 
import value than export 
Trade balance is calculated by 
total export minus total 
import. The data is coded “1” 
when the state is net importer 
(import exceeds export), and 
“0” for net exporter (export 
exceeds import) 




Main endowment factor of 
production in the state 
Use proxy of staple food share 
from the state’s total 
agriculture production 




The share of population 
living under the poverty line. 
Poverty line is calculated 
based on national standard of 
living, including both food 
and non-food needs.  
Percentage of population 
living under the poverty line to 
total population of the state 
 
Indonesian Center Bureau 
Statistics (BPS). 




Variable Definition Measurement Data Source 
INEQUALITY The unequal income 
distribution within the 
population.  
 
Calculated using the gini 
coefficients. 





Development level of 
population in terms of 
education, health, and 
income. 
Calculated by the Indonesian 
Center Bureau Statistics (BPS) 
using equation that captures 
the three development 
components. 
 





The relative size of rural 
population in the region. 
The share of rural population 
to total population in the state. 




The relative size of 
agriculture sector in the 
economy. 
 
The share of agriculture GDP 
to total GDP of the state. 
Indonesian Center Bureau 
Statistics (BPS). 
MAIN SECTOR Whether agriculture sector is 
the main sector in the state. 
Binary data, where “1” holds 
for the condition where 
agriculture is the main sector 
in the economy, while “0” 
holds for the opposite. 
Agriculture is the main sector 
in the economy is when 
agriculture GDP share holds 
more than 50% of the total 
GDP. 




Access to agriculture credit. Total of agriculture credit 
value per agriculture GDP. 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Republic of Indonesia 
JURISDICTION Number of districts within 
the state. 
Number of districts within the 
state. 
Ministry of National 
Affairs, Republic of 
Indonesia 
ELECTION Election period, either at 
national level or local level. 
Binary variable where “1” 
holds when there are either 
national or local level election 
within that year, while “0” 
holds for the opposite. 
0 is for the years under 
authoritarian regime (prior 
1995) 
Ministry of National 








Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of All Variables in the Model 




186 23.13 14.56 3 65 
General trade share 
 
186 22.69 27.68 14 138 
Agriculture trade share 
 




186 0.8 0.39 0 1 
Agriculture credit 
 
186 9.8 4.2 2 29 
Poverty 
 
186 12.87 6.8 4.18 36.8 
Inequality 
 
186 0.37 0.037 0.28 0.46 
Rural Population 
 
186 59.63 14.9 17 80.7 
Human Development Index 
 
186 66.45 3.6 54.5 74.17 
Agriculture share 
 
186 21.5 9.32 3.64 43.57 
Agriculture as main sector 
(1=agriculture as main sector) 
 
186 0.55 0.5 0 1 
Endowment Factor (Share of staple food 
production) 
 
186 63.15 29.8 0.814 99.62 
Number of Jurisdiction 
 
186 12.9 7.09 4 29 
Election period 
(1= election held within the year) 
 
186 0.17 0.37 0 1 
 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
Seven models are conducted to test the hypotheses above, and the results are shown in 




membership. Based on the bivariate model, the empirical results show a positively significant 
relationship between the two variables at p<0.05. The following models then test the relationship 
using multivariate analysis to see whether rural participation in RPOs can be attributed to trade 
liberalization or socio-economic, agricultural, and political factors. Multivariate models allow us 
to test the effect of trade liberalization on rural participation in RPOs while simultaneously 
testing and controlling for alternative explanations. The estimation results in model 2 show that 
even after controlling for alternative factors, trade liberalization still has a positive and 
significant effect on rural participation in RPOs (p<0.1).  
To test the robustness of the result, I conduct a similar model (model 3) in which I use 
overall trade liberalization instead of agriculture trade liberalization. I then test this relationship 
again using trade balance as the trade indicator (model 4). I also conduct the same model as 
model 2 but use a random effect method rather than a fixed effect method (model 6). The 
estimation results in model 3 show that overall trade has no significant effect on rural 
participation in RPOs. This indicates that farmers are reacting to the agriculture market only. 
This is predictable since the direct impact of trade on farmers comes mostly from the agriculture 
sector. The estimation in model 4, however, shows a negatively significant effect between net 
importers and rural participation in RPOs (p<0.01). This shows that net-importer regions have a 
lower rate of rural participation in RPOs. In other words, rural participation in RPOs is more 
likely to occur when the agriculture sector is benefiting from trade rather than in regions facing 
market competition from growing imports. The last model for robustness check is shown in 
model 6 where I estimate the multivariate relationship between agriculture trade liberalization on 
rural participation in RPOs using a random effect method. The estimation result shows a 




in RPOs (p<0.05). Despite showing similar results, the fixed effect method is the most suitable 
model for the estimation by using the Hausman Test. 
The overall estimation results indicate that regions with higher exposure to trade have a 
higher rate of rural participation in RPOs. Specifically, regions that are net-exporters have a 
higher rate of rural participation in RPOs. This shows that trade exposure encourages rural 
political agency since it motivates farmers to join RPOs. RPOs can not only benefit farmers 
economically, but they can also increase farmers’ political roles in the society. This also shows, 
as seen in the trade-democracy literature, that trade shocks can support deeper democracy by 
leveraging inclusivity of rural population,  
To test whether the relationship between trade and rural participation is conditional on 
factor endowments, I take the existing model and include an interaction variable of factor 
endowment. This is measured by the share of staple food subsector in the agriculture sector, 
using both a fixed effect method in model 5 and a random effect method in model 7. I found that 
although the endowment factor significantly affects rural participation in RPOs, it does not affect 
the relationship between trade liberalization and rural participation in RPOs. The use of staple 
food share in the agriculture sector as a proxy indicates that a region with a high rate of landless 
farmers ‒ which mostly exist in the staple food subsector ‒ has a higher rate of rural participation 
in RPOs. Regions with high land-owner farmers, on the other hand, have a lower rate of rural 
participation in RPOs. Regions that are exposed to higher trade liberalization, however, are not 
affected by this factor endowment and, in general, show an increasing rate of rural participation 
in RPOs 
Other interesting findings from the estimation show that different contextual variables are 




human development index, agriculture share, and rural population share. Human development 
index shows the most consistent findings. The results show the human development index 
positively and significantly affects the rate of rural participation in RPOs. Since education is a 
main element of the human development index, this finding supports the findings of previous 
theories that argue education is a predictor of civic participation. This finding shows that the 
theories hold even for marginalized populations such as rural agrarian communities. Other 
contextual variables that influence the rate of rural participation in RPOs are agriculture share 
and rural population. A higher agriculture share means that farmers are important to the 
economy. They thus have a higher willingness to act collectively and cooperate more with 
government officials. A similar logic applies to findings that show higher rural population results 



















Table 5.3. Estimation Results in Explaining RPO Movement 
 
  Dependent Variable = RPO membership 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  FE FE FE FE Interaction (FE) RE Interaction (RE) 
Agriculture Trade Share 0.0903534 0.0793251 
  





(0.0936831) (0.03457)** (0.081) 



















   
  
 
      
AgriTrade x Factor Endowment 
 












      
Socio agriculture aspect 
 
      
Poverty 
 
0.07309 -0.0439836 0.1669389 0.0367698 -0.2685036 -0.2798519 
  
 
(0.433899) (0.4381765) (0.4311668) (0.4387598) (0.29604) ( 0.2983) 
Inequality 
 
25.43636 29.56412 24.791 25.28238 28.34176 27.92303 
  
 
(24.1233) (24.87765) (23.82045) (24.17632) (22.3155) (22.29971) 
Rural Population 
 
0.7188563 0.8389254 1.028249 0.6713029 0.0510631 0.0532612 
  
 
(0.4720877) (0.4731021)* (0.4664633)** (0.4792811) (0.2045006) (0.20664) 
Human Development Index 
 
2.28509 2.005856 2.52798 2.171397 1.54639 1.502262 
  
 
(0.7830398)*** (0.8731592)** (0.7796417)*** (0.8058734)*** ( 0.53536)*** (0.53826)** 
Agriculture Share 
 
1.50425 0.9908195 1.224821 1.468488 0.4094787 0.4525949 
  
 
(0.729896)** (0.7945264) (0.7047196)* (0.7337339)** (0.3309286) (0.33637) 





  Dependent Variable = RPO membership 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  FE FE FE FE Interaction (FE) RE Interaction (RE) 
Agriculture as Main Sector 
 
-6.506785 -5.764886 -7.186175 -6.481648 -3.867988 -4.16922 
  
 
(4.058758) (4.125666) (4.021772)* (4.067667) (3.342126) (3.36171) 
Factor Endowment  
 
0.07188563 0.0872497 0.0772495 0.0488408 0.1029508 0.0641581 
  
 
(0.0441371) (0.0447891)* (0.0432688)* (0.0577756) (0.03901)*** (0.0531264) 
Agriculture Credit 
 
0.04587 0.0678657 0.0501851 0.0610394 0.1912915 0.2071027 
  
 
(0.1886335) (0.1934371) (0.1862507) (0.190614) (0.1769812) (0.1777417) 
  
 
      
Political Variables 
 
      
Election Period 
 
0.17083 .1253076 .1688971 0.0835103 0.2256993 0.0625116 
  
 
(1.254422) (1.269127) (1.238259) (1.264983) (1.212173) (1.220104) 
Number of Jurisdiction 
 
0.9806289 0.7200955 0.9898309 0.9826986 0.3768642 0.3882331 
  
 
(0.7896433) (0.7916544) (0.7758424) (0.7913443) (0.2899869) (0.2943002) 
Constant 
 
-231.4707 -203.2286 -253.8555 -218.4083 -112.7465 -108.0984 
  
 
(81.63) *** (88.47249)** (81.23295)** (84.47653)** (43.306)*** (43.686)** 
  
 
      
Observations N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 
R- squared 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 




Next, I address concerns regarding endogeneity, as the relationship between trade and 
rural participation may run in the reverse direction. Since this theory is heavily drawn from the 
trade and democracy literature, scholars in this literature have repeatedly raised the concern of 
reverse causality where democracies influence the level of trade openness (Eichengreen and 
Leblang, 2006; Grofman and Gray, 2000; Yu, 2007). Democracies are more conducive for open 
trade activities in contrast to authoritative regimes (Mansfield et al, 2000) because they have 
better rule of law (Barro, 1999), better enforcement of intellectual property rights, and better 
product safety standards (Rodrik, 1997). Democracies are also thought to produce more free 
trade policies since interest groups have more opportunities to shape trade policies and gain trade 
protections when needed (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Rotemberg, 2003). In particular, labor 
groups in democracies can gain power that could further push for more democracy (O'Rourke 
and Taylor, 2006). Although no studies have been done to test whether civic participation, in 
general, can influence the level of trade openness, the possible relationship between democracy 
and trade could similarly apply to civic participation. As the democracy and trade literature 
suggest, the participation of labor groups can result in different trade policies. Active civic 
participation can also mean that citizens are more concerned with trade policies and thus obtain 
more information regarding the issues. Therefore, they participate more in trade activities which 
can lead to more trade policies.  
Several strategies have been introduced to solve this endogeneity problem. A highly 
suggested solution is using an instrumental variable, which is a variable that measures trade but 
is not correlated with other variables that can influence democracy. Instrumental variables that 
are commonly used for trade include the following geographical and demographic variables: the 




1999; Wei, 2001; Cordova and Meissner, 2008). These instrumental variables, however, cannot 
be applied to rural participation because they can directly influence the interaction between 
citizens and, therefore, influence civic participation. Moreover, since I use a subnational level 
unit of analysis, some variables (i.e. distance to other nations) cannot be applied to predict the 
subnational level of trade openness. Meanwhile, the use of distance to other regions within the 
country does not link to the level of trade openness either. Finding a suitable instrumental 
variable is not an easy task. There is risk of generating weak findings when weak instrumental 
variables are used (Yogo, 2004).  
Another plausible way to avoid the endogeneity problem is to use the lag identification or 
the use of one period lagged explanatory variables (Bellemare et al, 2017). This strategy is 
common across the social sciences. The idea is that the suspected independent variables occur in 
advance of the dependent variable (Antonakis et.al., 2014). In other words, the lagged value of 
the interest explanatory variable is unlikely to be endogenous to the dependent variable. The 
findings from the lagged independent variable estimation are reported in Table 5.4 below. The 
estimation results show a consistent outcome – that the relationship between trade exposure in 








Table 5.4. Estimation Results in Explaining RPO Movement Using Lagged Independent Variables 
                                                                                                                                                                             (Continued) 
 
  Dependent Variable = RPO membership 
Independent Variables (lagged 1 
year period) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  FE FE FE FE Interaction (FE) RE Interaction (RE) 
Agriculture Trade Share 0.0364 0.1154 
  
0.028 0.0925 -0.0092 
  (0.0216)* (0.037)*** 
  
(0.083) (0.0313)** (0.066) 



















   
  
 
      
AgriTrade x Factor Endowment 
 










   
(0.001029) 
  
Socio agriculture aspect 
 
      
Poverty 
 
-0.318 -0.343 0.562 -0.367 -0.24 -0.284 
  
 
(0.0446) (0.48) (0.275)** (0.45) (0.3123) (0.3133) 
Inequality 
 
0.9325 -0.553 12.822 0.367 1.0137 0.1823 
  
 
(1.45) (1.5919) (15.82) (1.524) (1.324) (1.394) 
Rural Population 
 
-4.853 -1.04 -0.67 -3.045 -0.157 -0.152 
  
 
(4.0225) (4.56) (3.45) (4.303) (0.217) (0.218) 
Human Development Index 
 
1.564 1.467 2.067 1.296 1.327 1.118 
  
 
(0.7034)** (0.822)* (0.53)*** (0.74)* (0.544)** (0.554)** 
Agriculture Share 
 
1.567 0.973 0.49 1.4345 0.506 0.497 
  
 





* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
  Dependent Variable = RPO membership 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  FE FE FE FE Interaction (FE) RE Interaction (RE) 
Agriculture as Main Sector 
 
-2.516 -0.276 -1.814 -1.467 -1.582 -0.688 
  
 
(1.368)* (1.724) (2.971) (1.634) (1.17) (1.265) 
Factor Endowment  
 
0.0121 0.049 0.063 -0.02 0.05 0.001 
  
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.029)** (0.05) (0.039) (0.05) 
Agriculture Credit 
 
0.086 0.054 -0.15 0.093 0.1917 0.1908 
  
 
(0.1717) (0.183) (0.115) (0.171) (0.165) (0.163) 
  
 
      
Political Variables 
 
      
Election Period 
 
1.828 1.659 0.258 1.6325 1.477 1.297 
  
 
(1.0609)* (1.106) 0.73 (1.072) (1.05) (1.043) 
Number of Jurisdiction 
 
0.74165 0.3763 0.355 0.7105 0.535 0.514 
  
 
(0.7408) (0.768) (0.498) (0.74) (0.305)* (0.308)* 
Constant 
21.96 
167.134 -35.671 -140 81.76 -77.87 -60.56 
  
(1.035)*** 
(244.61) (264) (44.75) (254.9) (41.95)* (42.9) 
  
 
      
Observations N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 





The main goal of this chapter was to understand the contextual factors that explain rural 
civic participation in RPOs. Through interviews and a survey I conducted on selected farmers, 
three contextual factors were identified: (1) exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of 
government support programs, and (3) existence of external supporting actors, with exposure to 
trade liberalization being the most common factor. The quantitative analysis confirmed the 
correlation between exposure to trade and rural participation in RPOs even after controlling for 
other relevant factors, including the existence of incentives such as government support 
programs. As the insights from the interview and the theory have suggested, exposure to trade 
poses several challenges for farmers, mainly through its distributive economic effect. This thus 
makes collective action through RPOs more likely. Collective action through RPOs not only 
helps farmers stay competitive on the market, but also allows them to relay their concerns to 

















In the previous chapter, I showed that rural civic participation in RPOs builds rural 
political agency. RPO membership increases farmer participation in other civic activities, 
including participation in policy-making discussions. Indeed, the concept of rural political 
agency consists not only of the ability of rural communities to act collectively but also to have 
access to political decision-making processes and obtain favorable policies. The main objective 
of this chapter is to see how rural participation in RPOs influence the level of governmental 
support programs, measured by the level of spending. This chapter focuses on government 
productivity programs that specifically target agricultural development as well as general social 
welfare programs. The agricultural productivity programs include an array of government 
support such as agriculture infrastructure, irrigation systems, extension programs, and production 
inputs.  
I argue that RPOs, due to the nature of their activities, will be more effective in 
influencing agricultural productivity programs than general welfare programs. Furthermore, 
because local governments have control over many productivity policies, this chapter argues that 
the effectiveness of rural participation is mostly at the local level compared to the central level. 





By using quantitative analysis on subnational data of Indonesia from 2010 to 2015, I 
found that rural participation in RPOs is associated with a higher level of local agricultural 
support. However, this does not hold true for agricultural support provided by the central 
government as well as general welfare spending. This finding demonstrates that rural 
participation is most effective at the local level rather than at the national level. 
In this chapter, I further argue that the effectiveness of rural participation in obtaining 
local agricultural supports is not inevitable. Instead, it depends on the local political environment 
which shapes the behaviors of local governments. Because local incumbents are also political 
actors interested in re-election, targeted spending such as agricultural support provides them an 
opportunity to engage in vote-buying with rural agrarian communities. This motive, in turn, 
provides a mechanism to solve free-riding problems inherent to RPOs.  
Such vote-buying practices, I argue, are conditioned by three political contexts, namely 
(1) the level of political competition, (2) the level of state independence, and (3) the level of 
central-local political cohesion. The level of political competition represents the political value 
of farmers to politicians. Vote-buying practices are likely to occur when political competition is 
high, meaning the political value of farmers is high. The level of central-local political cohesion 
looks at the environment that enables local incumbents to engage in vote-buying without being 
constrained by their counterparts in the central government. Lastly, the level of state 
independence represents the capacity of local governments to generate revenue to finance vote-
buying practices. The empirical findings generally support these claims, suggesting that further 
development of rural political agency depends on the political incentives of local governments. 
           The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 provides background information 




analytical framework that demonstrates the relationship between rural participation in RPOs and 
the level of agricultural productivity programs. By drawing from previous electoral literature, 
section 6.4 then discusses how local governments’ electoral incentives promote vote-buying 
behavior, which further shapes the provision of agricultural productivity policies. I will then 
discuss the empirical methods and analysis in sections 6.5 and 6.6, along with insights from 
fieldwork. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Related Government Support Programs under Decentralized System 
Agriculture and Rural Development Support 
Since decentralization, agriculture affairs in Indonesia have mostly been handled by local 
authorities to reach more effective and efficient agricultural development outcomes. As 
explained previously, the decentralization law established two kinds of local responsibilities for 
different sectors. First, local governments have obligatory responsibilities that include state 
development, public facilities maintenance, health, education, government administration, the 
environment, census taking, local safety, and law enforcement. Second, local governments can 
take on optional tasks. These include agriculture, forestry, mineral resources, tourism, fisheries, 
trade, and industrial affairs. Since these sectors depend a lot on local environments, they prove 
difficult for the central government to legislate alone. Typically, local governments manage these 
optional tasks together with the central government. Therefore, agricultural spending in 
Indonesia comprises of both local and central government resources. Good coordination between 
central and local governments is therefore required to achieve better agricultural development. 
While the central government focuses on agricultural policymaking, including legislating 




local authorities. At the same time, local governments are also responsible for developing their 
own agricultural programs that are a better fit for regional needs. Two main sources of local 
agricultural development budgets are (1) the deconcentration and co-administration fund from 
the central authority’s national budget (APBN) and (2) the regional subnational budget (APBD). 
The regional budget (APBD) consists of three components: (1) the region’s own revenue, (2) 
general allocation fund from the central government (DAU), and (3) special allocation fund from 
the central government (DAK).
6
 Since local government funding in the agricultural sector and in 
general are still limited, funding from the central government is an important source of funding 
for local agricultural development. The structure of local and central funding for the agricultural 









                                                             
6
 Law Number 33 Year 2004 requires the central government to provide funding transfers to subnational 
governments based on the national income. Since decentralization has transferred a wide range of governmental 
tasks to subnational governments, the central government gives general allocation fund (DAU) to subnational 
governments – both at the province and district level – to support local governments in governing their jurisdictions. 
The DAU is provided in the form of a “block” grant in which there are no specific programs that are targeted. The 
calculations are based on the characteristics and needs of the subnational unit, with the population, GPD per capita, 
land area, construction price index, and fiscal capability taken into consideration. Meanwhile, special allocation fund 
(DAK) is provided from the central government to fund special tasks or programs, mainly infrastructure. Some 
examples of this are school infrastructure and road infrastructure. These programs are usually  targeted towards 
underdeveloped and disaster-prone areas. Another criteria is whether the region has a sector  important to the 




















According to Sumedi et al. (2013), local agricultural spending at the subnational level is 
limited because half of the budget is used solely for administrative activities. The other half – 
development programs – includes spending for the general agricultural sector, food security, and 
rural development. Because local authorities having the authority to allocate local agricultural 
spending, there is a considerable amount of variation in agricultural expenditures across 
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Graph 6.1 Agriculture Development Spending in Provinces of Indonesia*) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia. 
*) Agriculture Development Spending includes spending that is provided for agriculture sector, food security, and 
rural development 
 
To supplement these agricultural programs, the central government has provided 
additional funding to local governments through their deconcentration and co-administration 
programs. This has also increased rapidly over the years (Graph 6.2). The source of this revenue 
is from the national budget for the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia and, therefore, 
separate from the regional subnational budget (APBD). From 2005 to 2010, central agricultural 
spending grew 220 percent from about USD 130 million in 2000 to USD 250 million in 2006 
and USD 495 million in 2010 (Sumedi et al., 2013). More than half of the spending is given to 
support local agricultural programs and activities through  deconcentration spending. This 
includes, among others, research and development, quarantine programs, financial credits, 
extension and human development programs, agriculture infrastructure, agriculture tools and 




























































































































































































































































































       Source: Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. 
 















































Social welfare assistance programs in Indonesia include a wide array of social spending 
in areas such as education, health, industry, and disaster relief (World Bank, 2015). Several 
popular programs that support the poor are cash transfer programs, scholarships, and subsidized 
rice. The two main sectors of social welfare programs, however, remain education and health. 
They are included in national development priorities (World Bank, 2015). Both social welfare 
programs are under the responsibility of local governments. This means that local governments 
are required to provide such welfare programs. Based on Indonesia’s education Law number 20 
Year 2003, local governments are required to provide at least 20 percent of its regional budget 
(APBD) towards education spending. The same requirement also applies to the central 
government, as 20 percent of the national budget (APBN) must be allocated towards education 
spending. Despite these requirements, the implementation of education spending resembles those 
in the agricultural sector. Local governments account for most of the overall education spending 
(Graph 6.4). How much of this education spending is distributed at the local level also varies 
across provinces in Indonesia (Graph 6.5). The 20 percent requirement has not been met in all 
regions. 
Graph 6.4 Structure of Indonesia’s Education Spending 
 





















Graph 6.5 Education Spending in Provinces of Indonesia (%) 
 
  
    Source: Ministry of Education and Culture Republic of Indonesia, 2016. 
 
 
Similar to education, health spending is one of the required sectors that local 
governments must provide. Based on Indonesian Health Law Number 36 Year 2009, local 
governments must allocate at least 10 percent of their subnational budget (APBD) towards the 
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to health care, health facilities, and insurance. They also need to ensure the identification of 
health beneficiaries. However, like the agricultural and education sectors, health spending across 
subnational Indonesia also varies, with the majority of provinces still not achieving the 10 
percent requirement (Graph 6.6). This figure is slightly more positive when compared to 
education spending figures. 
 
Graph 6.6 Health Spending in Provinces of Indonesia (%) 
 
  
    Source: Ministry of Health Republic of Indonesia, 2016. 
 
 
Although local authorities are responsible for the health sector in their jurisdictions, the 
central government also plays a vital role in local health programs. While local governments 
provide basic health care and set fees for public health services, the central government is 
responsible for national health programs, including health insurance (Kruse et al., 2009). The 
structure of the overall health spending in Indonesia, therefore, comprises of central and local 
































































































































































































































































spending. In 2015, the total local government spending accounted for 24.2 Trillion Rupiahs, 
while the central government accounted for 62.4 Trillion Rupiahs (Ministry of Finance Republic 
of Indonesia, 2016). This figure shows that the central government accounts for around 70 
percent of the total national health spending, a different picture compared to the agricultural and 
education sectors. The central government also provides health deconcentration spending to local 
governments, but that only accounts for a small percentage of the overall health spending (Graph 
6.7). 
Graph 6.7 Structure of Indonesia’s Health Spending 
 
 
           Source: Ministry of Health Republic of Indonesia, 2016. 
 
The discussion above shows that the role of local governments in providing support for 
rural development, either in the form of agricultural productivity programs or general welfare 
programs, became more significant in Indonesia as it decentralized. The significant role of local 
governments and the different forms of government support programs should therefore be 














6.3 Rural Participation and Agricultural Productivity Program  
Collective action studies have suggested groups that are better organized and able to 
solve collective action problems have a higher chance of demanding and obtaining their desired 
policy (Olson, 1965; Keefer, 2011). Groups that can manage their common interests through 
cooperation and coordination will have more bargaining power to influence a policy outcome. 
This condition explains why narrow special interests dominate public policy, as they have a 
greater ability to solve collective action problems compared to the general public (Olson, 1965). 
Similarly, Bates (1983) argues that the ability of large agricultural and industrial interest groups 
to organize themselves disadvantages small farmers. Small farmers are often large in number and 
scattered in different geographical locations. It is therefore difficult for them to overcome 
collective action problems such as free-riding, information asymmetry, and high transaction 
costs. As a result, one of the main problems developing countries face is that agricultural support 
is often given to large private firms at the expense of small farmers (Bates, 1983). These large 
firms and politicians, therefore, maintain a cozy relationship where they get continued access to 
agricultural support, while the politicians get political support.  
To overcome collective action problems among larger groups of citizens, organizations – 
from political parties to civil society groups – are important (Keefer, 2011). Organizations can 
overcome “free rider” problems by forming smaller groups which lower the cost of participation 
and increase the benefits for potential participants (Lichbach, 1994). Policymakers and 
development practitioners have followed the same line by promoting collective action among 
farmers through RPOs. These RPOs not only overcome market access problems, but they also 
represent farmers in policymaking (Hellin et al., 2008). As shown in Chapter 5, farmers who are 




RPO collective action is successful, it can perform a similar function to small interest groups. In 
both cases, they allow members to coordinate and advocate for their common interests to the 
government.  
The ability of RPOs to shape agricultural productivity support is shown in many cases in 
Indonesia. A study by Regaty (2017), for example, shows how “Tani Sekar Mulyo,” a farmer 
organization based in Batu city, East Java, has successfully advocated for higher agricultural 
infrastructure during the years 2009-2016. The study indicates that coordination and cooperation 
among members of the organization are the main forces driving the successful lobbying of the 
local government. Another success case is “Kelompok Tani Maju 1.” It is a farmer organization 
based in East Lampung which acquired support from the local government to expand its 
production fields and received other production support such as seeds and fertilizer.  
Similar insights were also gained from my fieldwork in Indonesia. Based on the survey I 
conducted, 76% of farmers who are members of an RPO have participated in policy discussions 
with the local government. Their participation occurred in different forums, but it was through 
three main venues. First, farmers participate in Participatory Development Planning, known as 
“Musrembang.” These are public forums held by local officials in different government levels, 
including village, county, city, and district. They are based on a principle of bottom-up planning 
in which different societal groups can participate. The results of these forums are then given to 
provincial governments to input into their development and budget planning. Discussions with 
respondents during fieldwork indicate that musrembang is one of the main venues for farmers to 
communicate with the government. A farmer I interviewed mentioned that, in many cases, 
agricultural support given by the government is based on their discussion 




The second venue farmers use to participate is through policy discussions with 
agriculture extension offices. These offices are spread across different regions and hold regular 
consultations with farmers. This program is held in coordination with the Regional Agriculture 
Office and the central government. The main objective of the program is to provide education 
and information related to different government programs and ensure that government national 
planning objectives are met. As they are typically close to farmers, extension offices are more 
accessible to farmers. Policy discussions through extension offices are more common than other 
venues. The office maintains registration information of farmers who participate in their 
programs to keep track of their development, and they also work closely with RPOs within their 
jurisdictions. This provides farmers with the opportunity to deliver their concerns and provide 
feedback for the government in a structured and consistent way. Although extension officers 
have limited authority in the policy decision-making process, many farmers I interviewed 
emphasized the important role these officers play in advocating for their needs.  
The last venue farmers use to participate is through personal connections with local 
officials and local legislators who hold office. Regaty (2017) argues that the success case of the 
“Tani Sekar Mulyo” farmer group can be attributed to its connection with certain legislators. 
Specifically, the study revealed how the provision of agricultural support is based on a vote-
buying relationship, where support is given in exchange for votes. Nevertheless, a common 
practice among local officials and legislators is to hold direct meetings with farmers and discuss 
relevant policy issues. Since the provision of agricultural support is typically given to certain 
groups and not individuals, direct public discussion is mainly held in coordination with RPOs.  
The discussion above shows that participation in RPOs is an important way for farmers to 




voluntary, we can assume that the rate of membership represents successful collective action. 
Therefore, we can expect that higher rural participation in RPOs is associated with higher 
agricultural compensation support. This points out to the first testable hypothesis of this chapter, 
which is:  
H1: Higher rural participation increases local agricultural support.  
Moreover, I argue that certain actors can have greater influence in obtaining productivity 
policies at the local level instead of the central or national level. By bringing political and 
administrative control to local governments, these governments not only have more authority 
over some policies but are more accessible to their citizens compared to the central government. 
Although the central government also has an important role in providing productivity programs, 
the role of local government is more significant. Productivity programs demanded by the citizens 
and provided by the government are not the same as  general welfare programs. I argue that 
RPOs, due to the nature of their activities, will be more effective in delivering agricultural 
productivity programs than general welfare programs. Therefore, we would expect that rural 
participation in RPOs is not associated with general welfare programs. On the contrary, 
participation in labor institutions better guarantees general welfare policies, as suggested by 
previous studies. 
To emphasize the two claims raised above, I test the following hypotheses: 
H2: Rural Participation is not associated with central agricultural support 
H3a: Rural Participation is not associated with general welfare policies 







6.4 Vote-buying Practices in the Provision of Agricultural Productivity Programs  
The effectiveness of rural civic participation in delivering agricultural productivity 
programs, however, is not a foregone conclusion. Rather it depends on local politicians’ vote-
maximizing behavior. The pluralist view of policy-making has suggested that successful 
collective action, even those that are formed by narrow and wealthy special interests, do not 
guarantee successful policy outcomes (Dahl, 1958). While the power structure of the society may 
provide some level of influence, the final policy outcome will largely depend on the strategic 
behavior and interests of policymakers, including their electoral strategy for re-election. With 
elections and policy decision-making processes devolving to the local level for many 
democracies, the electoral strategy of local incumbents has, therefore, become an important 
aspect in understanding agricultural productivity policies. The political relationship at the local 
level that was once between local and central politicians has shifted to local politicians and their 
local constituents.  
I argue that local incumbents will only provide agricultural productivity programs when it 
provides them with a higher chance of winning elections. Through particularistic benefits such as 
agricultural support, such voting exchange is easier to control. This vote-buying practice, in 
which rents are provided in exchange for votes, has indeed been ubiquitous in developing 
countries (Schaeffer and Schedler, 2007; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Larreguy et al., 2016). 
Through political decentralization, local political actors are now prone to vote-buying practices, 
as many rent opportunities have shifted from the national to the local level (Schaeffer and 
Schedler, 2007). Indonesia experienced a similar situation, as elections at different government 
tiers are highly marked by vote-buying practices (Aspinall et.al, 2017; Kurniawan et. al., 2017). 




patronage. They, therefore, have been argued to be highly susceptible to vote-buying in 
developing countries.  
Why do politicians pursue vote-buying practices? One explanation that incentivizes such 
practice in developing countries is the weak mobility of political parties (Berenschot, 2018). 
Most political parties in developing countries are less stable and legitimized, causing political 
actors to build their connections with their constituents or local elites to develop their supporters. 
When politicians look for personal votes instead of party votes, particularistic benefits, such as 
agriculture support, are commonly given to secure votes. Non-excludable goods, on the other 
hand, are prone to free-rider problems.  
In Indonesia, and several other developing countries, such an incentive is also shaped by 
the legislative electoral system. Indonesia has an open list Proportional Representation (PR) 
system in electing both national and regional parliaments. Under such a system, voters can vote 
either for individual candidates or a party. The number of seats that each party has is 
proportional to the combined votes for the party and the candidates. The candidate with the 
highest votes will obtain their party seat. Although voters can vote either for an individual or a 
party, this system promotes individualized electoral campaigns because individual votes is more 
effective than party votes. In many instances, candidates coming from the same party compete 
with one another. This has increased the motives for politicians to provide transactional goods, 
making voters seek benefits for themselves or their group and be less interested in party 
programs or national issues (Aspinall et.al., 2017). Considering that the electoral system is 
implemented in both national and local level elections, such conditions spur vote-buying 




Providing agricultural productivity programs in developing countries is particularly 
beneficial for incumbents. Rural agrarian voters represent a large share of votes in developing 
countries (Varshney, 2000; Bates and Block, 2013). In many cases, they represent the median 
voters in the electorate. Based on the median voter model, politicians should, therefore, promote 
policies that are beneficial for rural agrarian communities as part of their effort to gain electoral 
votes. Due to their low turnout, farmers are targeted for vote-buying practices, which provide an 
even greater benefit for politicians (Gersbach, 2008). While changing voters’ preferences has 
become the core discussion in the vote-buying literature, mobilizing voters by offering rents has 
become an important strategy for politicians .  
Poor voters are also more risk-averse and, therefore, more receptive towards vote-buying 
rents (Kitschelt, 2000; Brusco et al., 2004). They tend to have low reservation prices and highly 
elastic voting behavior in which votes are relatively easier to buy in exchange for rents. Like 
other poor populations, farmers would prefer to receive short-term benefits from engaging in 
vote-buying practices because the marginal return is greater than future public goods. Moreover, 
their dependence on the government ensures their support since rents can be withdrawn when 
they do not comply (Varshney, 2000).  
Vote exchange, however, is too expensive to provide when targeting large groups such as 
farmers individually. RPOs, in turn, can play an important role in obtaining larger agricultural 
support, as they can overcome free-rider problems by monitoring voter compliance (Bernard and 
Spielman, 2009). In this case, politicians focus on building networks with the head of the 
organization. The head distributes the benefits and influences the voting behavior of members. 
Through these “mediators,” politicians can lower the monitoring cost and better control voter 




incumbents to provide broader agricultural support since the incumbents have more control over 
voters. Agricultural productivity policies are therefore provided when rural participation is likely 
and politicians have motives to engage in vote-buying.  
 
Local Political Contexts for Vote-Buying Practice  
As explained above, political contexts, such as the electoral system and party 
mobilization, can shape the incentives of politicians in Indonesia to provide vote-buying rents. 
The national political context, however, does not explain the subnational variation of agriculture 
spending within Indonesia. I further argue that three local political variables condition vote-
buying practice at the local level. They are: (1) the level of political competition; (2) the level of 
decentralization or state independence; and (3) central-local political cohesion.  
Due to the lack of transparency in vote-buying, there is a lack of direct observation of the 
practice
7
 (Antwi and Adams, 2003; Aidt and Jensen, 2017). One way to overcome this hurdle is 
to observe the political environment that facilitates such behavior.
8
 Thus, looking at the political 
context of vote-buying practices can help us understand the underlying factors that explain 
agricultural productivity policies at the local level. I elaborate on each of the relevant political 




                                                             
7 One strategy that could be used to observe vote-buying is to calculate the share of individual votes compared to 
the overall party votes. Allen (2014), for example, uses such a strategy to observe personal votes in Indonesian 
national elections. However, as the author mentioned, such data is not available at the local level. 
8 Beck et al. (2001), for example, uses the Database of Political Institutions to measure the checks and balances of 
elections, which includes the number of parties and whether the president’s party has a majority in the legislature. 





1. The level of Political Competition 
 Political competition, which is measured by the number of effective parties,
9
 is widely 
discussed in the political science literature. Higher political competition is argued to provide 
political challenges for incumbent parties, as that can promote political accountability, discipline 
clientelism, and lessen corruption in the government (Medina and Stokes, 2002; Piattoni, 2001; 
Hale, 2007). When a small number of political parties  control the local government budget, that 
lowers political competition. These parties will have more discretion to use the budget to their 
benefit which is conducive for vote-buying behaviors. In cases where extreme parties dominate 
moderate parties, vote-buying practices become more common, as the former can pursue their 
desired policy to a greater extent (Brusco, 2004). Because the decision to provide rents is based 
on whether incumbent politicians exploit their power, providing limits to this power through 
higher political competition will limit vote-buying practices. The increased competition will also 
lead citizens to compare across parties, which increases government accountability. As 
challengers exist and make promises, constituents will have the ability to punish corrupt 
incumbents by switching to other parties (Medina and Stokes, 2002).  
The concept of vote-buying requires some level of competition, however. Indeed, recent 
studies have found many instances in which higher political competition is associated with vote-
buying. When one party dominates, hence, low political competition, there is no incentive for 
politicians to provide rents to gain more votes. In other words, the political value of particular 
constituents like farmers is low when political competition is low. Under this condition, 
politicians are more likely to provide universal and non-excludable goods instead of 
particularistic benefits commonly associated with vote-buying. On the contrary, it is when 
                                                             
9 Since political parties aggregate their preferences of different issues in the society, political parties, therefore, 




political competition is high do votes become valuable for politicians to buy (Keefer, 2002; 
Krishna, 2008).  
As explained above, vote-buying practices that distribute agricultural productivity 
programs are dependent on the level of rural participation. Thus, expanding on Hypothesis 4, I 
test the following hypothesis: 
H4: Rural participation will increase local agricultural support in areas with high political 
competition. 
 
2. Central-Local Political Cohesion 
The second relevant political context is central-local political cohesion, which shows 
party harmonization between the central and local governments. This variable shows the 
enabling environment for local incumbents to build vote-buying networks. The logic is that when 
the central and local government winning party is the same, vote-buying practices at the local 
level will be constrained. This happens either because there is more monitoring and disciplining 
from the central government or more electoral coordination from the central counterparts 
(Filippov et al., 2004; Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2006). Indeed, intergovernmental conflicts 
between central and local governments have been one of the most discussed problems under the 
decentralization system. Local governments become empowered to achieve their interests while 
the central government has less control over government policies. This conflicting interest is 
particularly common in resource allocation (Besley and Coate, 2003). Thus, without discipline 
from the central government, vote-buying and corruption become prevalent in subnational 
governments (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). On the contrary, when party harmonization exists 




(Filippov et al., 2004; Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2006). Based on this argument, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: Higher rural participation will increase local agricultural support in areas with low 
central-local political cohesion. 
 
3. Level of Decentralization or State Independence 
The last political context relates to local governments’ capacity to finance vote-buying 
practices, which is the level of decentralization or state independence. It is measured by the 
percentage of states’ own revenue from its total revenue.
10
 Highly decentralized states mainly 
generate their own revenue by imposing taxes, which leads to a high-cost economy. More control 
over taxes, in turn, give states more authority over resources. This makes them more inclined to 
use such resources for vote-buying practices. Although it is expected that local governments’ 
responsiveness is high in areas where tax is high, large local governments tend to be more 
exposed to vote-buying and corruption risks (Stokes et.al, 2013). Based on this argument, I test 
the following hypothesis:  
H6: Higher rural participation will increase local agricultural support in areas with high 
independence (more decentralized). 
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Figure 6.2 Theoretical Framework on Local Vote-buying Practice 
 
6.5 Empirical Method 
Model Specification 
The first part of the analysis is to see whether rural participation in RPOs influences the 
level of local agricultural public spending as well as the central government’s agricultural 
spending and local welfare spending. Political variables that might affect local government and 
central government's spending are also included in the model. The model is stated as follows: 
LOC_AGRISPENDit = αo + α1 RPOit + α2POLCOHit + α3POLCOMPit +  
 α4INDPit +  α5ELECit + α6Xit  +  εit…………………....(1) 
                              
LOC_WELFSPENDit = αo + α1 RPOit + α2POLCOHit + α3POLCOMPit +  
α4INDPit +  α5ELECit + α6Xit + α7PLP it  +  εit…….....(2) 
 
CENT_AGRISPENDit = αo + α1 RPOit + α2POLCOHit + α3POLCOMPit +  







where LOC_AGRISPENDit  is the level of local agriculture spending; LOC_WELFSPENDit is the 
level of local welfare spending; CENTGOVSUPit is central agricultural support that is given from 
the national to the subnational government; RPOit is rural participation in RPOs; POLCOHit is 
central-local political cohesion; POLCOMPit is political competition; INDPit is the level of state 
independence; ELECit is the pre-election period; Xit is the list of control variables; and PLP it is 
the labor institutions suggested by Rudra (2005). The PLP variable is included in the model of 
welfare spending based on Rudra’s findings that government welfare programs depend on the 
strength of the general labor institutions.  
Similar to the previous model on rural participation in RPOs, relevant control variables 
are also included in this model to account for alternative explanations for government spending 
on rural communities. The control variables used here are development indicators, which include 
poverty, inequality, and the human development index. It also includes the relative importance of 
rural agricultural communities in the population, such as the share of the rural population, the 
share of the agricultural sector in the economy, whether agriculture is the main sector in the 
economy, and the share of staple foods in the agriculture sector. These socio-economic 
conditions are included to show that the comparative disadvantage of the agriculture sector in the 
economy is the basis for government support.  
As explained above, rural participation in RPOs does not automatically translate to higher 
agricultural support and depends on the electoral incentives of local incumbents. As agricultural 
support is targeted towards a specific group, such spending can provide a source of rents for 
vote-buying. To see how rural participation and vote-buying practices interact, I test whether the 




the political context that supports vote-buying practices – i.e. political competition, central-local 
political cohesion, and state independence. This test is depicted in equation (4), where β3 
indicates the extent to which the political context modifies the relationship between rural 
participation in RPOs and different government spending. The marginal effect of rural 
participation in RPOs is therefore presented in equation (5), which indicates that the effect of 
rural participation in RPOs on government spending is only partial. 
        Government Spending = β0 + β1 RPO Participation + β2 Political Context +  
                                                 β3 RPO Participation × Political Context + εi               
                                                                                                               ............(4)      
 
        ∂ Government Spending / ∂ RPO Participation = β1 + β3 Political Context..…(5)  
   
 I test the model on the same dataset used in Chapter 4, which is the Indonesian state-
level data between the period of 2010-2015. The panel data is balanced and includes a total of 
186 observations. The dataset is constructed using several data sources described in the 
following section.  
 
List of Variables and Measurements 
Dependent Variable: Government Spending 
1. Local Agricultural Spending 
The variable of LOC_AGRISPEND shows the level of subnational government spending on 
agriculture-related sectors. This includes agricultural spending, food security spending, and rural 
development spending, which is sourced from the regional subnational budget (APBD). It is 




Local development GDP is the total GDP excluding administrative spending, which includes 
mostly local administrative salaries and operational costs. It includes the overall agricultural 
spending in all tiers of government, including the province and district levels. According to the 
Ministry of Finance of Republic of Indonesia, this agricultural spending includes spending on 
different agricultural activities such as irrigation, agriculture infrastructure support, inputs 
facilities, agriculture tools, extension programs, financial access, and research and development. 
Data for local spending is obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, data on 
agricultural spending is obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia, while 
data on GDP is obtained from the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics.  
 
2. Central Agriculture Deconcentration and Co-administration Spending 
The variable of CENT_AGRISPEND shows the level of agricultural support given by the 
central government to each subnational province. It includes both deconcentration and co-
administration spending, which is provided by the central government through the Ministry of 
Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. Explanations of this spending is provided in Chapter 3. It is 
calculated as the share of total deconcentration and co-administration spending given to the 
relevant province to overall deconcentration and co-administration spending. All data is obtained 
from the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia.  
 
3. Local Welfare Spending 
LOC_WELFSPEND consists of both local education and health spending. Education and 




GDP. Data for local spending is obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, 
while local development GDP is obtained from the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics. 
 
Main Independent Variables:  
1. Rural Participation in RPOs 
Rural participation in RPOs in this model will use the same measurement as in Chapter 4. 
Rural participation is defined as membership in an RPO and is calculated as the percentage of 
small producers belonging to RPOs divided by the total agricultural farmers in the state. Data on 
the number of farmers in RPOs and total agricultural workers are obtained from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia. The data on RPO membership is specifically obtained from 
the Extension Program and Human Resource Development Department under the Ministry of 
Agriculture Republic of Indonesia (BPPSDMP). 
 
2. Interaction Variables Between Rural Participation in RPOs and Different Political 
Contexts 
Since there are three political contexts tested in this chapter, there are three interaction 
variables used. They are Rural Participation x Political Competition; Rural Participation x 







Political Context Variables: 
1. Political Cohesion  
 Variable POLCOH measures the central-local political cohesion of the political parties. This 
is a binary variable where the value of “1” represents when the winning coalition of the local 
legislative is the same as the national legislative winning coalition. Otherwise, it is coded as “0.” 
Data for party structures both in national and local legislatives is obtained from the Ministry of 
National Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. 
 
2. Political Competition 
The variable POLCOMP shows the level of political competition in the region which is 
measured by the number of effective parties in the legislative. It shows the relative proportion of 
political parties by taking into account the vote share (Laakso and Taagerpera, 1979). It is 
calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera (LT) Index with the following formula: 
      ∑(  
 )
 
   
 
 where    is the proportion of votes of the i-th party. Data for party structure and electoral votes 
is obtained from the Ministry of National Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. 
 
3. State Independence 
The variable INDP shows the level of state independence from the central government. It is 




mentioned above, a local government’s revenue is sourced not only from its own revenue but 
also from the central government’s. In Indonesia’s case, local governments receive revenue from 
the central government from the general allocation fund (DAU) and the special allocation fund 
(DAK). All local related revenue information is obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Republic 
of Indonesia. 
 
Control Variables  
1. Pre-election Period 
During the pre-election period, incumbent politicians are under scrutiny by their citizens 
regarding social and trade liberalization issues. With fiscal policies having immediate and 
noticeable effects on voter welfare, incumbents have the incentive to adopt socially beneficial 
policies that can maintain their legitimacy. Moreover, considering their immobility and large 
number, small agriculture producers are important in local Indonesian elections. Therefore, 
during the pre-election period, politicians try to gain their votes through targeted spending 
focused on the agricultural sector. 
Pre-election period in this case means one year period before the election year. For local 
spending, I look at one period before the local election is held. For central spending, I look one 
period before the national election. Both central and local elections in Indonesia are held every 5 
years. However, they are conducted during different times. Schedules of Indonesian elections are 






2. Socio-economic Conditions 
Since government support is likely to depend on the socio-economic conditions of the  
population, I included poverty level, inequality, share of rural population, and the human 
development index in my analysis. Since the government is likely to provide support and social 
assistance when development conditions are low, poverty, inequality, and the share of rural 
population is expected to have a positive correlation with all three forms of government support. 
Meanwhile the human development index is expected to have a negative correlation with all 
three forms of government support. Data on poverty, inequality, share of rural participation, and 
the human development index is obtained from the State Statistics Annual Report provided by 
each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS). The human 
development index data from the BPS consist of three elements, life expectancy, educational 
level, and income.   
 
3. GDP per Capita 
Another control variable involves the local government’s capacity to provide such spending 
to each province. The log of local GDP per capita and the number of jurisdictions within the 
province will therefore be included. Data on GDP and population are obtained from the State 
Statistics Annual Report provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau 
Statistics (BPS), while data on the number of jurisdictions is obtained from the Ministry of 







4. Structure of Agriculture Sector 
Similar to the model in Chapter 4, the structure of the agricultural sector in the state will also 
be included in the model. This is because the government’s decision to provide support to a 
sector will depend on its position relative to the other sectors in the economy. Local governments 
also face similar choices as the central government in choosing which sector to support. Since 
political context is included to capture the political reasons for government support, economic 
reasons should also be included. Like Chapter 4, this analysis included agricultural share of GDP 
and whether the agricultural sector is the main sector of the state. It is expected that a larger 
agriculture sector ‒ indicated by the sector’s economic share and its relative position in the 
economy ‒ will increase government support, particularly agricultural support.  
 
5. Labor Institution 
The last control variable is the Potential Labor Power (PLP) suggested by Rudra (2002) 
which measures labor power as a predictor of social welfare programs. Because labor plays an 
important part in explaining the welfare state, Rudra attempts to calculate the strength of labor 
instead of the union density which has been used in previous literature. The PLP index captures 
two measures of labor strength, the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor
11
 and the surplus labor 
– measured by the working age population minus the economically active population.
12
 The 
formula of PLP is therefore as follows: 
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 Rudra argues that the political power of labor increases when skilled labor dominates the labor structure in the 
economy as they are more able to act collectively. 
12




Data on subnational labor structure in Indonesia is obtained from the State Statistics Annual 
Report provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS).  
Summary of all the variables used in this analysis and its descriptive statistics are given 
in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below: 
Table 6.1 List of Variables 




The level of subnational 
government spending on 
agriculture related sector. This 
includes agriculture public 
spending, food security 
spending, and rural development 
spending, which is sourced from 
the regional subnational budget 
(APBD). 
The share of local 
agriculture related 
spending to local 
development GDP. Local 
development GDP is the 
total GDP excluding 
administrative spending. 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Republic of Indonesia; 
Ministry of Finance 




Level of central government 
support in agriculture sector for 
each subnational province. 
Includes both deconcentration 
and co-administration spending.  
It is calculated as the 
share of total 
deconcentration and co-
administration spending 





Ministry of Agriculture 




The level of education spending 
provided at the subnational 
level.  
The share of local 
education spending to 
local development GDP. 
Ministry of Finance, 






The level of health spending 
provided at the subnational 
level.  
The share of local health 
spending to local 
development GDP. 
Ministry of Finance, 







The level of Rural Producer 
Organizations (RPOs) 
membership in the state 
 
Percentage of small 
agricultural producers 
belonging to RPOs of the 
total small agricultural 
producers in the state 
Extension Program and 
Human Resource 
Development 
Department, Ministry of 
Agriculture Republic of 
Indonesia (BPPSDMP).  
PRE-ELECTION 
PERIOD 
One year before election period. Binary variable where “1” 
holds when there is 
election in the following 
year, while “0” holds for 
the opposite. 
Ministry of National 





Variable Definition Measurement Data Source 
POLITICAL 
COMPETITION 
The level of political 
competition in the region.   
The number of effective 
parties in the legislative. 
Calculated using the Laakso-
Taagepera (LT) Index.  
 
Ministry of National 








cohesion of the political 
parties.  
 
This is a binary variable, 
where “1” represents when 
the winning coalition of the 
local legislative is the same 
with the national legislative’s 
winning coalition and “0” 
means otherwise. 
Ministry of National 




The level of state 
independence from the central 
government. 
 
The percentage of the local 
government’s own revenue to 
the overall local revenue. 
Ministry of Finance, 
Republic of Indonesia 
POVERTY 
 
The share of population living 
under the poverty line. Poverty 
line is calculated based on the 
national standard of living, 
which includes both food and 
non-food needs.  
Percentage of population 
living under the poverty line 





INEQUALITY The unequal income 
distribution within the 
population.  








Development level of 
population in terms of 
education, health, and income. 
Calculated by the Indonesian 
Center Bureau Statistics 
(BPS) using an equation that 








The relative size of rural 
population in the region. 
The share of rural population 







The relative size of 
agricultural sector in the 
economy. 
The share of agricultural 





MAIN SECTOR Whether agricultural sector is 
the main sector in the state. 
Binary data, where “1” 
means agriculture is the main 
sector in the economy, while 
“0” holds for the opposite. 
Agriculture is the main sector 
in the economy when 
agriculture GDP is  more 




PLP Potential Labor Power (PLP) 
which explains the labor 
power. 







Table 6.2 Summary Statistics of All Variables in the Model 




186 23.13 14.56 3 65 
General trade share 
 
186 22.69 27.68 14 138 
Agriculture trade share 
 




186 0.8 0.39 0 1 
Agriculture credit 
 
186 9.8 4.2 2 29 
Poverty 
 
186 12.87 6.8 4.18 36.8 
Inequality 
 
186 0.37 0.037 0.28 0.46 
Rural Population 
 
186 59.63 14.9 17 80.7 
Human Development Index 
 
186 66.45 3.6 54.5 74.17 
Agriculture share 
 
186 21.5 9.32 3.64 43.57 
Agriculture as main sector 
(1=agriculture as main sector) 
 
186 0.55 0.5 0 1 
Endowment Factor (Share of staple food 
production) 
 
186 63.15 29.8 0.814 99.62 
Number of Jurisdiction 
 
186 12.9 7.09 4 29 
Election period 
(1= election held within the year) 
 
186 0.17 0.37 0 1 
 
6.6 Empirical Analysis 
 To test the abovementioned hypotheses, I conduct several quantitative analyses using a 
fixed-effect method for cross-case data. Table 6.4 reports the estimation results for equation (1), 




Indonesian provinces. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 report the estimation results for equation (2), which 
explains the provision of local social welfare spending. I test two main social welfare programs, 
education and health, which are reported in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, respectively. Finally, Table 
6.7 reports the estimation results for equation (3), which explains the provision of the central 
government’s support for the agricultural sector. In each of the estimations, different models are 
conducted to test the validity of the results and test the hypotheses on the local political 
variables. 
 In testing the relationship between rural participation and local agricultural spending, 
seven models are used. Model 1 tests the bivariate relationship between the two variables. Model 
2 tests the relationship between the two variables in a multivariate setting in which all relevant 
control variables are included. Model 3 tests the relationship between the two variables while 
including the interaction variable between rural participation and pre-election period. This is to 
see whether agricultural spending is associated with clientelism. Model 4 tests the relationship 
between the two variables while including the interaction variable between rural participation 
and state independence. Model 5 tests the relationship between the two variables while including 
the interaction variable between rural participation and central-local political cohesion. Model 6 
test the relationship between the two variables while including the interaction variable between 
rural participation and local political competition. Model 7 tests the relationship between the two 
variables using a random effect method. 
 Based on the bivariate model, the estimation results show an insignificant relationship 
between rural participation and local agricultural spending. However, the relationship is the 
opposite under the multivariate models, as rural participation has a positive and statistically 




all the models conducted, indicating that the role of rural participation in shaping local 
agricultural spending does not stand alone. Rather it holds true when other conditions are in 
place.
13
 Based on the multivariate estimation in Model 2, these conditions are low human 
development index (p<0.05), high agriculture share in the economy (p<0.05), under pre-election 
period (p<0.01), high state independence (p<0.05), and low political competition (p<0.1). Two 
of the three expected political variables are significantly correlated with local agricultural 
spending – political competition and state independence. While state independence has the 
expected sign, political competition does not. The results indicate that agricultural support is 
given under low political competition, which supports the government control hypothesis. That 
is, when political competition is low, there is less government control since the opposition is 
weak. Therefore targeted spending, such as agricultural support, is higher.  
  The interaction variable between rural participation and local political contexts, 
however, is the focus of this chapter. Based on the estimation results, the interaction between 
rural participation and local political competition is the only interaction variable that is 
statistically significant with a positive sign. This means that these two variables, when taken 
together, reinforce the level of local agricultural spending (shown in Model 6). In other words, 
the role of rural participation in obtaining agricultural support increases when local political 
competition is high. While high rural participation indicates the ability of rural communities to 
demand their desired policy, the interaction between rural participation and political competition 
confirms that the provision of agricultural compensation programs is attached to vote-buying 
practices. Agricultural productivity programs will be given when local political competition is 
                                                             
13
   This is known as a suppressive variable. The variable will only be significant when other conditions hold, 






high, which increases the political value of farmers for politicians. Meanwhile, high rural 
participation provides a mechanism to control voting behavior.  
 In contrast to local agricultural spending, rural civic participation, in general, does not 
yield a significant relationship for local education spending, local health spending, and the 
central government’s agricultural support. These findings indicate that rural participation is most 
effective at the local level, as farmers are closer to local authorities instead of central authorities. 
Meanwhile, the estimation results for both education and health spending indicate a more 
significant effect of labor power, as suggested by previous welfare state theories using the PLP 
measured suggested by Rudra (2002).  
 The role of labor power (PLP) in the bivariate model with education shows a positive and 
significant correlation (p<0.01) but an insignificant correlation with health spending. This 
relationship, however, changes when the interaction variable with local political variables are 
also in place. In both education and health spending, the interaction between labor power with 
state independence and pre-election period yields a significant effect but in different directions. 
For education spending, the role of labor power is increased under the pre-election period but 
decreased as the state becomes more independent. These findings reaffirm the vote-buying claim 
that the more independent a state is, the more it is prone to vote-buying practices that target 
agricultural support rather than general welfare support. However, during the pre-election period, 
both education and agricultural spending increases, indicating that broad policies such as 
education may not always be a substitute for more targeted spending. During this period, 
incumbents may increase their chances of winning by providing both types of policies.  
 A different result is shown for local health spending, where both the pre-election period 




power. State independence shows a consistently positive and significant result across different 
models for local health spending. This weakens the argument for local government vote-buying 
practices. However, there are several possible explanations for why state independence has a 
positive effect on health spending but not education spending. First, the role of the central 
government in providing health services in Indonesia is dominant regardless of a state being 
more independent in terms of revenue. This indicates that the central government has more 
control than local authorities over the health sector. A more independent state brings scrutiny and 
may therefore be more obligated to provide such support and less likely to be influenced by its 
political incentives. Second, local governments are more committed to spending on health rather 
than education, as health was 20 percent of the subnational budget while education was 10 
percent of the subnational budget. Despite these mixed findings in local social welfare programs, 
the provision of local agricultural spending is dependent on political variables that are conducive 
for vote-buying.  
 One interesting finding is how central-local political cohesion is not a significant factor in 
the provision of agricultural support from the local government or the central government. The 
estimation results show that despite other political variables having an influence on a local 
government’s decision to provide agricultural support, the local government’s decision is not 
influenced by its political relationship with the central government. Similarly, the central 
government’s decision to provide agricultural support, such as deconcentration programs, is not 
influenced by either the political context at the local level or the level of central-local political 
cohesion. Instead, the central government’s decision is mostly based on the socio-economic 





Table 6.3. Estimation Results in Explaining Local Agriculture Spending 
  Dependent Variable = Local Agriculture Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
FE 
(Bivariate) FE (Multivariate) FE (Interaction1) FE (Interaction2) FE (Interaction3) FE (Interaction4) RE 
Rural participation 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.0404 0.0483 0.1185 0.03969 
  (0.014) (0.014)* (0.015)** (0.0303) (0.0264)* (0.031341) (0.014754)** 
  
 
      
GDP per capita (log)  
 
0.1358 0.124 0.1144 0.11365 0.1222 0.0012 
  
 
(0.1635) (0.16) (0.15884) (0.15894) (0.15721) (0.1317) 
 
 
      
Socio-economic aspect: 
 
      
Poverty 
 
- 0.0825 -0.087 -0.11406 -0.1161516 -0.106378 -0.012501 
  
 
(0.074) (0.0749) (0.0763) (0.0761) (0.0754) ( 0.04087) 
Inequality 
 
-3.82 -3.941 -3.617 -3.462189 -4.14299 -2.23505 
  
 
(4.22) (4.228) (4.207) (4.30775) (4.1743) (3.53286) 
Rural Population 
 
-0.074 -0.07317 -0.03529 -0.0257 -0.06673 -0.0312839 
  
 
(0.08) (0.0827) (0.0869) (0.08304) (0.085203) (0.0797) 
Human Development Index 
 
-0.33 -0.3392 -0.3577 -0.3585 -0.3813257 -0.169275 
  
 
(0.16)** (0.16127)** (0.162524)** (0.1635)** ( 0.16139)** (0.09276)* 
 
 
      
Agriculture Relative Position: 
 
      
Agriculture Share 
 
0.294 0.2858 0.27833 0.2745 0.259763 0.22815 
  
 
(0.12)*** (0.1235)** (0.1237)** (0.1254)** (0.12285)** (0.043)*** 
Agriculture as Main Sector 
 
-0.71 -0.6909 -0.79097 -0.8069 -0.61252 -0.41202 
  
 
(0.75) (0.717) (0.71499) (0.71618) (0.713716) (0.4865) 
  
 
      
Political Variables: 
 
      
Election Period 
 
0.62 0.819 0.5975 0.59147 0.61052 0.539345 
  
 
(0.23)*** (0.3698)** (0.2143)*** (0.2138)*** (0.21181)*** (0.2031)*** 




  Dependent Variable = Local Agriculture Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  FE FE FE FE Interaction (FE) RE Interaction (RE) 
Subnational independence  0.043 0.04138 0.0405 0.04398 0.04359 0.01019 
   (0.02)** (0.0214)* (0.0228)* (0.02142)** (0.021126)** (0.013434) 
Political Cohesion  -0.008 -0.0031 -0.0904 -0.05781 -0.0277914 -0.0347086 
 
 (0.23) (0.2342) (0.24716) (0.432) (0.24416) (0.21092) 
Political Competition  -0.16 -0.1602 -0.16483 -0.1673 -0.278701 -0.139142 
 
 (0.0957)* (0.098) (0.0978)* (0.0988)* (0.11601)** (0.080925)* 
        
Interaction Variables:        





    
RPO x Independence    0.002    
    (0.0037)    
RPO x Political Cohesion     -0.00217   
 
 
   
(0.0149) 
  
RPO x Political Competition      0.00403  
      (0.0023)*  
        
Constant 5.16 24.75 25.2148 24.262 23.633 29.003 14.9 
  (0.33)*** (15.4) (15.45) (15.379) (15.2927) (15.415)* (7.02)** 
   
      
Observations N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 
R- squared 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.77 




Table 6.4. Estimation Results in Explaining Local Education Spending 
  Dependent Variable = Local Education Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
FE 
(Bivariate) FE (Bivariate) FE (Multivariate) FE (Interaction1) FE (Interaction2) FE (Interaction3) FE (Interaction4) 
Rural participation -0.00877 
 
0.03739 0.03739 0.039878 0.0344 0.03749 
  (0.030807) 
 
(0.028989) (0.02934) (0.028223) (0.02934) (0.029139) 
  
 
      
Labor Institution: 
 
      
PLP 
 
23.29 6.0241 6.02437 30.723 -4.21396 -4.7189 
 
 
(5.727)*** (6.38951) (6.8524) (13.8365)** (6.89412) (22.208) 
 
 
      
GDP per capita (log)  
 
 




(0.33475) (0.33668) (0.32829) (0.33568) (0.33625) 
 
 
      
Socio-economic aspect 
 
























(0.170488) (0.17111) (0.166167) (0.171096) (0.17123) 
Human Development Index 
 
 




(0.332397)* (0.333876)* (0.33415) ( 0.33568)* ( 0.339103)* 
 
 
      
Agriculture Relative Position 
 








(0.254529) (0.2554566) (0.247886) (0.25526) (0.25762) 
Agriculture as Main Sector 
 
 




(1.473098) (1.478402) (1.434799) (1.47638) (1.48918) 





  Dependent Variable = Local Education Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  FE FE FE FE Interaction (FE) RE Interaction (RE) 
Political Variables:  
      
Election Period  
 
-0.09191 -0.09198 -0.26306 -0.106461 -0.09454 
   
 
(0.44628) (0.83004) (0.43905) (0.448557) (0.45091) 
Subnational independence  
 
0.050146 0.050146 0.11945 0.051976 0.0498441 
   
 
(0.04487) (0.04503) (0.049499) (0.045027) (0.0453024) 
Political Cohesion  
 




(0.4812215) (0.485079) (0.47084) (0.832671) (0.486569) 
Political Competition  
 




(0.2016881) (0.20242) (0.196459) (0.2021199) (0.32738) 
        
Interaction Variables:        





   
PLP x Independence     -0.8684208   
     (0.2921089)***   
PLP x Political Cohesion      -3.85659  
 
 
    
(5.4559)  
PLP x Political Competition       -0.17697 
       (2.88291) 
        
Constant 5.5596 7.9812 50.27 50.27 32.035 49.35232 49.827 
  (0.7321)*** (0.6649) *** (31.768) (31.896)** (31.5171) (31.8516) (32.6873) 
   
      
Observations N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 
R- squared 0.51 0.51 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.63 





Table 6.5. Estimation Results in Explaining Local Health Spending 
  Dependent Variable = Local Health Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
FE 
(Bivariate) FE (Bivariate) FE (Multivariate) FE (Interaction1) FE (Interaction2) FE (Interaction3) FE (Interaction4) 
Rural participation -0.0111 
 
0.0193145 0.0140411 0.0179399 0.016773 0.0205 
  (0.022872) 
 
(0.0231172) (0.023157) (0.0228744) (0.0233977) (0.0237) 
  
 
      
Labor Institution: 
 
      
PLP 
 
6.04277 10.58881 7.296296 -9.73156 12.1262 25.9505 
 
 
(4.4532) (5.095212)** (5.406646) (11.21432) (5.496282)** (17.65734) 
 
 
      
GDP per capita (log)  
 
 




(0.266944) (0.265645) (0.26607) (0.2676224) (0.26735) 
 
 
      
Socio-economic aspect 
 
























(0.135951) (0.135015) (0.1346765) (0.136404) (0.136145) 
Human Development Index 
 
 




(0.265064) (0.2634315) (0.270825)* ( 0.265852) ( 0.26962) 
 
 
      
Agriculture Relative Position 
 








(0.20297)*** (0.2015579)*** (0.2009)*** (0.203504)*** (0.20484)*** 
Agriculture as Main Sector 
 
 




(1.17468) (1.166474) (1.162888) (1.177032) (1.18403) 





  Dependent Variable = Local Health Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
FE 
(Bivariate) FE (Bivariate) FE (Multivariate) FE (Interaction1) FE (Interaction2) FE (Interaction3) FE (Interaction4) 
Political Variables  
      
Election Period  
 
-0.298752 -1.250297 -0.2041122 -0.3111 -0.32967 
   
 
(0.356679) (0.6549105)* (0.3558495) (0.3576) (0.35852) 
Subnational independence  
 
0.1070626 0.1063993 0.068739 0.10862 0.103499 
   
 
(0.035783)*** (0.0355342)*** (0.040119)* (0.03589)*** (0.03602)*** 
Political Cohesion  
 




(0.3837422) (0.382732) (0.381612)* (0.663839) (0.386865) 
Political Competition  
 




(0.1608329) (0.1597118) (0.1592278) (0.161138) (0.260296) 
        
Interaction Variables:        





   
PLP x Independence     0.480211   
     (0.2367509)**   
PLP x Political Cohesion      -3.27572  
 
 
    
(4.34967)  
PLP x Political Competition       -2.08287 
       (2.29216) 
        
Constant 8.47706 7.539291 44.4458 43.14824 54.5289 43.6668 39.2357 
  (0.543913)*** (0.6649) *** (25.33308)* (25.16671)* (25.54431) (25.39344) (25.98921) 
   
      
Observations N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 
R- squared 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 






         Table 6.6. Estimation Results in Explaining Central Deconcentration Spending 
 
Dependent Variable = Central Deconcentration Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  FE (Bivariate) FE (Multivariate) FE (Interaction1) FE (Interaction2) FE (Interaction3) FE (Interaction4) 
Rural participation 0.0409831 0.0443421 0.04956 -0.00462 0.0583445 0.152393 
  (0.1235001) (0.11249) (0.11785) (0.2604) (0.124356) (0.363805) 
  
 
     
GDP per capita (log)  
 
-0.606583 -0.610523 -0.61198 -0.589479 -0.601191 
  
 
(1.270175) (1.274851) (0.005534) (1.275971) (1.274376) 
 
 
     
Socio-economic aspect 
 
     
Poverty 
 
0.6123405 0.617298 0.602938 0.634558 0.6443 
  
 
(0.598218) (0.60116) (0.60194) (0.60588) (0.608798) 
Inequality 
 
7.52629 7.29372 8.17369 9.358277 7.670055 
  
 
(33.76577) (33.9168) (34.0226) (34.5594) (33.87746) 
Rural Population 
 
-3.01017 -3.0093 -3.009217 -3.02806 -3.02698 
  
 
(0.6616858)*** (0.66401)*** (0.663957)*** (0.66721)*** (0.6659908)*** 
Human Development Index 
 
2.749646 2.745115 2.7536 2.715721 2.801734 
  
 
(1.28861)** (1.2934) (1.293139) (1.299042) (1.303455) 
 
 
     
Agriculture Relative Position 
 
     
Agriculture Share 
 
0.7224616 0.705765 0.7305 0.6859004 0.785046 
  
 
(0.981246) (0.990603) (0.985346) (0.993888) (1.00458) 
Agriculture as Main Sector 
 
-5.341416 -5.3063 -5.361321 -5.11227 -5.556635 
  
 
(5.726802) (5.75124) (5.747117) (5.808937) (5.78637) 
  
 
     
Political Variables 
 
     
Election Period 
 
-2.411664 -2.038223 -2.395984 -2.396916 -2.40801 
  
 
(1.70563) (2.966613) (1.71309) (1.712156) (1.71116) 






 Dependent Variable = Central Deconcentration Spending 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  FE (Bivariate) FE (Multivariate) FE (Interaction1) FE (Interaction2) FE (Interaction3) FE (Interaction4) 
Subnational independence  -0.09883 -0.101195 -0.12345 -0.095713 -0.098646 
   (0.170676) (0.17195) (0.20807) (0.1726346) (0.171156) 
Political Cohesion  -2.686857 -2.676967 -2.635207 -1.862007 -2.753301 
 
 (1.87083) (1.87844) (1.893462) (3.603476) (1.88861) 
Political Competition  -1.01409 -1.00738 -1.0002 -1.042889 -0.635702 
 
 (0.78321) (0.787112) (0.788677) (0.793145) (1.4435) 
       
Interaction Variables:       





   
RPO x Independence    0.0011547   
    (0.0055344)   
RPO x Political Cohesion     -0.03263  
 
 
   
(0.1216967) 
 
RPO x Political Competition      -0.141956 
      (0.045439) 
       
Constant 3.4687 -15.34399 -14.4685 -15.055 -12.456 -22.51524 
  (2.934974) (123.35) (123.91) 
 
(123.778) (124.226) (125.8582) 
   
     
Observations N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 N=186 
R- squared 0.22 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 






This chapter shows how rural participation influences the level of government 
productivity programs. Since the main livelihood of rural communities is in the agricultural 
sector, the analyses focus on government support programs that specifically target agricultural 
development in general, which include agriculture infrastructure development, irrigation 
systems, extension programs, access to production inputs, financial access, and research and 
development.  
Based on the estimation results, the role of rural participation alone on local agriculture 
support is not statistically significant. However, the relationship becomes significant when other 
conditions are also in place. Based on the different models in this chapter, rural participation 
consistently shows a significant and positive effect on local agriculture spending when other 
relevant variables are added. Thus, I find that the effectiveness of rural participation in gaining 
local agricultural support is not inevitable. It depends on other variables. Because many 
compensation policies lie in the hands of local governments who are also political actors, the 
effectiveness of rural participation in obtaining local agricultural support depends on the 
electoral interests of local governments. Because local incumbents are interested in re-election, 
the provision of targeted and particularistic spending such as agricultural support is prone to 
vote-buying. Agricultural support provides an opportunity for local incumbents to gain higher 
political support from rural agrarian communities.  
I further found that vote-buying at the local level is conditioned by certain political 
contexts. The strongest finding is that it is likely to occur when political competition is high, thus 




rural participation, further development of rural political agency depends on the political 
incentives of local governments. 
Another political factor that determines agricultural support at the local level is the level 
of state dependence. The estimation results in this chapter indicate that higher agricultural 
support is given to states where they are more financially dependent. In other words, the more 
decentralized a state is, the more they have control over their financial resources. This can 
provide the financial capacity and power to use state resources as rents to gain more electoral 
votes.  
Meanwhile, the estimation results show an insignificant association between the level of 
central-local political cohesion and agricultural support. This has important implications for our 
overall understanding of trade and productivity policies in decentralized democracies. As 
productivity trade policy function as a way for governments to continue national liberalization 
policies, the lack of the central government’s control over the policies weakens its ability to 
synchronize national trade policies with related policies. This finding suggests that further 
studies on productivity trade policies need to consider central-local coordination and its 
implication for the development of national trade policies. 
The analyses also found that rural participation is only effective in local agricultural 
support but not in the central government’s agricultural support or local welfare programs. This 
indeed indicates that rural participation is most effective at the local level since rural 











7.1 Summary of the Dissertation 
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate civic activism among rural communities in 
Indonesia and how this activism shapes their political agency. It is defined here as the rural 
communities’ capacity to participate in matters that concern their well-being and ability to access 
decision-making processes. A key feature of rural political agency is, therefore, rural 
participation, however, one that can translate into their policy of interest. Understanding civic 
participation in rural agrarian communities should be an integral part of understanding 
democracy in developing countries such as Indonesia, as nearly three-quarters of its population 
lives in rural areas and engaging in agricultural activities.  
Since the dissertation focuses on Indonesia, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide a historical 
background of rural participation in Indonesia during two different political systems, which are 
the “New Order” authoritarian regime (Chapter 2) and democratic regime (Chapter 3). The 
discussions highlighted that under the “New Order” regime, the government implemented many 
agricultural and developmental programs, including supporting rural civic participation, that was 
good on the surface. In practice, however, they were constrained by clientelist and predatory 
practices that made rural farmers passive and not mobilized. Farmers’ organizations were more 
of an instrument of control and rent-seeking than a means for rural representation. Under the 
democratic regime, the discussions highlighted how the reformation provides a segway for rural 




RPOs that comes from within the organization and the external context. They include collective 
action problems, unconsolidated democracy, and the weak decentralized system. Thus, 
democratization and decentralization can be considered as a perquisite in the development of 
rural civic participation in Indonesia, although not sufficient. 
The next three chapters provide empirical findings to answer the research questions. It 
starts by looking at the role of RPO membership on individual political participation in Chapter 4 
by using quantitative analysis based on an original survey of 220 farmers drawn from 30 villages 
across three districts of Indonesia – Keeron, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and 
Semarang, Central Java. The empirical results suggest that farmers who are members of an RPO 
are more likely to participate in two political forms - voting in elections and participating in 
policy discussions with the government- compared to farmers who are not members of an RPO. 
The relationship, in general, also holds true across all members of an RPO regardless of the 
position they hold in the organization, age, education, and land ownership. In addition, the 
empirical results also show that membership in RPO is most significant for farmer’s political 
participation in compare to other forms of civic associations such as religious, youth, and women 
organizations. Understanding rural agricultural producers participation in RPOs therefore can 
provide us an understanding of the overall rural civic participation. 
Chapter 5 discusses the contextual factors explaining rural participation in RPOs across 
subnational Indonesia. Through the interviews, there were three main external factors identified, 
namely (1) exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of government support programs, and 
(3) the existence of external supporting actors. Further, through the survey, it is identified that 
exposure to trade liberalization is the most common reason why farmers join an RPO. Several 




globalized market, as they have concerns over the fluctuating prices and the low selling price of 
agricultural products in Indonesia due to the market openness. A quantitative approach – a fixed-
effect panel data regression on panel data of Indonesian states from 2010 to 2015 – was then 
used to test the correlation between these contextual factors and participation in RPOs. The 
empirical results indicate that regions with higher exposure to trade indeed have a higher rate of 
rural participation in RPOs, even after controlling for other relevant factors, such as the 
availability of government support programs. This finding shows that trade exposure encourages 
rural political agency since it motivates rural farmers to join RPOs.   
Chapter 6 links back to the notion of rural political agency where the chapter discusses 
how rural participation results in rural farmers obtaining their desired policy outcomes. This 
chapter looks at how rural participation in RPOs correlates with government agricultural 
productivity programs, as well as general social welfare programs. The agricultural productivity 
programs include an array of government supports such as agriculture infrastructure 
development, irrigation systems, extension programs, and access to production inputs. By using 
quantitative analysis on subnational data of Indonesia from 2010 to 2015, the empirical results 
indicated that rural participation in RPOs is associated with a higher level of local agricultural 
support. However, this does not hold true for agricultural supports that are provided by the 
central government, as well as general welfare spending. This finding demonstrates that the 
development of rural political agency through their civic participation is most effective at the 
local level rather than at the national level.  
In this chapter, I further argue that the effectiveness of rural participation in obtaining 
local agriculture supports is not automatic. Instead, it is constrained by the local political 




political actors who have their electoral interest for re-election, targeted spending such as 
agriculture support provides an opportunity for vote-buying practices from rural agrarian 
communities. Such vote-buying practice, I argue, is conditioned by three political contexts, 
namely (1) the level of political competition, (2) the level of state independence, and (3) the level 
of central-local political cohesion. The empirical findings show that rural civic participation 
translates into government support when political competition is high, as the value of rural 
communities’ votes becomes high.  
 
7.2 Main Conclusions 
The findings in this dissertation show that contrary to the common view of rural communities 
being weak and unable to organize, there are growing rural civic participation in a society-based 
organization such as RPOs. This dissertation found that exposure to trade openness provides the 
primary motivation for rural farmers to join an RPO, as they desire to stay competitive in the 
market. The need to include contextual features of a region is promoted in this dissertation as 
data shows the variation of rural civic participation exists across places.  
This dissertation further shows that high civic participation in RPOs promotes rural 
political agency, as it correlates with higher government support. This is because RPOs, on top 
of their economic function, also enhance the political participation of its members, mainly by 
participating in policymaking discussions. The findings further shows that government supports 
are mainly provided in the form of agricultural productivity programs given by the local 
government. Meanwhile, civic participation in RPOs does not correlate with government support 
provided by the central government and in the form of general welfare programs. This indicates 




authorities rather than central authorities.  Such correlation, however, holds true under certain 
political conditions as it is influenced by local incumbent’s vote maximizing behavior. This 
suggests that further development of rural political agency will still depends on the political 
incentive of local government. 
 
7.3 Future Research 
This study talks to different fields of research and suggests that there are ample of 
opportunities for future research. In response to the literature on RPOs, I pointed out the possible 
ways in which RPOs can function in the political realm. Past studies on the role of RPOs have 
mostly focused on how RPOs increase economic production and sales, but less have been made 
on their participation in political activities. I propose that more studies need to be made using 
broader cases to obtain the transferability of the theory. Further research questions related to this 
can also be explored, such as Why do certain RPOs are more involved in politics?; What are the 
characteristics of RPOs that participate in political activities?; and In what forms do they 
participate?  
Moreover, this dissertation finds that political context at the local level matters for the 
progression of rural political agency, as it links to the vote-maximizing motives of local 
incumbents. Part of the explanation for Indonesian is its electoral system. Because the electoral 
system is an open-list PR system that promotes a personal vote, we can expect that the provision 
of a particularistic benefit such as agriculture support is common. Further research questions to 
explore may include: Do agricultural productivity support always attached to vote-buying 
practices such as in the case of Indonesia?; If not, how would the argument be different?; Does 




On democracy in general, further studies can also be done in looking at how RPOs 
support the progression towards a consolidated democracy. How do RPOs interact with other 
Civil Society Organizations? How does modernization affect RPOs development? Does further 
exposure to trade mean a better quality of democracy? 
 
7.4 Policy Implication 
This dissertation pointed out the important role of local government in progressing rural 
political agency as many supporting policies related to agricultural and rural development are 
under the local government’s authority. Considering that the provision of such spending is 
attached to the political motives of local incumbents, rural farmers have less control over their 
political agency. As the findings suggested, it is when such spending provides electoral benefit to 
incumbents do agricultural support is given. Such practice is not necessarily bad for rural 
producers because they gain agriculture support under such conditions. However, they do have 
less control over it. When such policies are constrained, it is difficult for them to exercise their 
political rights and well-being. Thus, decentralization poses another challenge for rural 
development and requires strengthening central-local coordination as well as local citizens-local 
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1. Province  
 
2. Regency/City  
 
3. District  
 





5. Education 1. Does not attend 
School 
2. Primary School 
3. Middle School 
4. High School 
















9. Marital Status 1. Married 






10. Position in the household 
 
1. Head of household 











12. Land Ownership 1. Land Owner 







13. Currently or have been involved 

























Additional Information (please list 


































19. Business contracts a. Contract with domestic 
companies or 
organization 
b. Contract with foreign 
companies or 
organization 
c. Does not have any 
business contract 
 

















Additional Information (if yes, 





21. Reason to join an RPO  a. Challenges from 
exposure to trade 
liberalization,  
b. Obtain government 
support programs,  






22. Position in the RPO 1. Head 










23. Role of RPO 
 
1. Cooperation in 
production activities. 
2. Cooperation in sales 
3. Representative for 
negotiation with buyers 
4. Representative with 
government 
5. Others  



















Additional Information (please list 





25. Affiliated to political parties a. Yes 




26. Participate in election a. Yes 




27. Member of other civic 
organization (e,g religious 








Additional Information (please list 






















29. Challenges in production 
 
 




30. Challenges in Marketing 
 
Please explain the challenges in marketing activities (if any): 
31. Are you satisfied with the 
government's role in facing the 










32. If not satisfied with the role of 
government above, please 








Appendix B. Open Ended Interview Questions 
 
General 
- Are they expose to risk of trade? 
- If yes, in what way? If no, what other challenges they are facing, or if they benefit, how? 
- What policy do they hope for? 
- How do they voice their demand?  
- How has business or occupational organization helped small scale producers? 
- Do they involve in different types of organizations as well? If yes, is professional 
organizations more effective as a venue to demand their interest? 
 
Activities 
- How often are their meetings in a month; 
- How much range of activities does the organization cover (this might include accessing and 
managing the products; providing inputs like seeds and equipment; enabling access to 
markets; improving information and communication; identify risk and opportunities and to 
make improvements; provide access to credits; disaster relief); 
- How much they trust the leader of the organization and each other. 
- What explains a working organization? 
- How do external organizations such as local and international NGOs help their organization?  
 
Inclusiveness 
- How much percentage is the small producers represented in the organization; 
- How often they are involved in meetings; 
- How often they are asked for feedback. 
 
Policy-making 
- How does the small producer involve in dialogue with the government and ability to express 
their concerns and preferences? 
- How do they negotiate with the government? 
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